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Abstract 
This thesis examines the paradigm change and transformation of the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party – the PKK and how it became the hegemonic dominant actor in the Kurdistan National 
Liberation Movement. The thesis argues that the Kurdish Question is an international 
question that can only be solved through the doctrine of National liberation aiming for 
National Right to Self-Determination discourse. Such a paradigm change and transformation 
of the PKK consists of four stages: Formation, Reformation, Transformation and Re-
transformation. Throughout the nineteenth century and three quarters of the twentieth 
century, Kurdish national and political organisations had failed to secure the national and 
political rights of communities in Kurdistan. Those failures caused a radical revolutionary 
emergence, such as the PKK in Bakur Kurdistan. The PKK formed when the KDP-led revolt 
in Bashur failed. National right to self-determination for an independent, united and 
democratic Kurdistan was the manifest of the PKK from 1973 to 1993. A Political party, a 
guerrilla army and national liberation front was formed. The Re-formation stage started when 
the PKK evaluated the national, regional and international changes, and began negotiations 
with the Turkish state. The thesis argues that the PKK was successful in the formation stage 
and had a stalemate at the reformation stage, which cost president Özal his life, and resulted 
in the life imprisonment of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. It argues that at the third stage, 
Transformation, the PKK tried to save its leader’s life as well as safeguards the movement 
from total failure. Therefore, it started to totally transform the party, the front and the 
guerrilla army. A comprehensive paradigm change occurred and the National Liberation 
Strategy transformed into the Democratic Liberation Strategy. The Democratic Liberation 
Strategy began in March 1999 up until July 2015, when the latest so-called ‘solution process’ 
totally failed. The fourth and final stage of Re-transformation is necessary to examine 
because the Democratic Liberation Strategy, which was based on ‘Democratic Autonomy’, 
has failed and has not guaranteed any legal political rights to Kurdish communities. 
Therefore, this study concludes that a Re-transformation of the PKK paradigm is a necessity 
especially at this historically, politically and diplomatically critical time in Kurdistan’s 
national and political history. This examination is based on a wide range of qualitative 
contemporary resources, the PKK literature and its journals with interviews, alongside a 
variety of comprehensive observations that were conducted during my fieldwork in Bashur as 
well as in Bakur Kurdistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	 7	
 
Acknowledgements 
 
It is difficult to acknowledge those who helped me in the journey to achieve to the 
level of writing a PhD thesis. This journey started when I began to learn the English language 
at the age of forty, after arriving in Oxford as an asylum seeker in January 2000. It was the 
most difficult time of my life because I felt like I was deaf, blind and dumb: could not 
understood what I was hearing, could not read and write what I was seeing and could not 
answer what I was asked for. I immediately asked how to learn English. I was directed by 
Oxford City Council’s Social Services to a charity called Asylum Welcome, who were 
offering some free English lessons. My first English lessons started from there, and then to 
Oxford College of Further Education. There, I took the language courses of Beginner, 
Intermediate and Advanced English with International Study Programme together in order to 
have an equivalent Secondary Education Certificate to enter University. I was accepted into 
Oxford Brookes University, and finally made my way up to University of Exeter to be able to 
study in the Centre for Kurdish Studies, the only centre of its kind in the United Kingdom.  
My first and foremost gratitude and sincere thanks go to Professor Gareth Stansfield, 
my thesis supervisor, who has spent a long time among the communities in Bashur 
(Southern) Kurdistan while he was doing his fieldwork, and has become one of the most 
knowledgeable experts on the Kurds and Kurdistan. Without his deep understanding of my 
personal story and ambition, and his guidance and feedback, this project would have not been 
completed. My thanks go to Professor Jonathan Githens-Mazer, my second supervisor, for his 
guidance during my upgrade process. And also to Professor Christine Allison and Ms Zoe 
Humble since 2010 when I started my MA in Kurdish Studies, and then continuing to do my 
PhD because of all the efforts they have taken during these seven years. 
I would like to thank Professor Garry Browning, my tutor during the three years at 
Oxford Brookes University while I was studying my BA in International Relations and 
Politics. But more so, without the help of Sally Mercer-Smith and her husband Bruce Rose-
Smith at Oxford College of Further Education, this thesis would have not existed today.  
Fatima, my dear wife, has always been like Ararat Mountain keeping my back safe 
and secure, encouraging and pushing me to endure this journey. When it had been just 10 
days that I had started my PhD in 2011, we faced a very difficult problem, which has 
continued over the years. It was because of her that we have been able to resist and rise. So, 
my greatest gratitude and acknowledgement goes to my dear Fatima, who always becomes a 
light to shine in the darkness; together we have continued to overcome the odds and have 
been successful. Great thanks also to my four children and three grandchildren and all the 
family.  
 
 
 
  
	 8	
Chapter 1 
Introductory Remarks  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate, analyse and explain why the PKK – Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers’ Party changed its paradigm of national liberation 
to democratic liberation. In order to understand the paradigm change and transformation of 
the PKK, one needs to look at its ideological and political formation, reformation, and 
transformation, as well as the possible retransformation of the PKK from its birth in 1973 
until 2016.  In order to investigate, analyse and explain why and how the PKK has become a 
predominant and hegemonic non-state player in the struggle to dominate the Kurdistan 
National Liberation Movement (KNLM)1, contrary to all expectations voiced by the ‘Turkish 
social-chauvinists’ and the Kurdish ‘nationalist-reformist’ political parties, it is necessary to 
look at its formation and historical development. The PKK emerged at a critical juncture, 
when the Kurdish nationalist struggle was defeated in Bashur 2  Kurdistan and, as a 
consequence, the majority of people in all four parts of Kurdistan lost their hopes in any 
successful outcome of the struggle. The reason for this mistrust in the cause has to be seen 
both in the external occupation suffered by all Kurdistan, and in the long internal tribal 
conflicts which tore apart the Kurdistani political parties and organisations in the Bakur 
(North Kurdistan, known as Southeast Turkey), Bashur (South Kurdistan, known as North 
Iraq), and Rojhilat (East Kurdistan, known as West Iran) parts of Kurdistan. In this context, it 
is important to understand why significant changes and transformation had taken place in the 
                                                1	The	 Kurdistan	 National	 Liberation	 Movement	 (KNLM)	 in	 this	 research	 means	 that	 combination	 of	 all	 Kurdistani	 political,	nationalist,	and	cultural	organizations	in	all	parts	of	Kurdistan	including	the	Kurdistani	Diaspora	around	the	world.	Since	1999	after	the	 imprisonment	 of	 the	 PKK	 leader	 Abdullah	 Öcalan,	 the	 political	 discourse	 of	 the	 PKK	 has	 changed	 from	 Kurdistan	 National	Liberation	to	a	Kurdistan	Freedom	Movement.	The	term	Freedom	Movement	can	also	explain	that	the	PKK	has	removed	the	idea	of	an	 independent	 Kurdistan	 as	 the	 realization	 of	 self-determination	 to	 substitute	 it	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 	 ‘democratic	 nation’,	 As	explained	later	in	the	thesis,	this	change	will	have	a	huge	impact	on	the	future	popular	support	to	the	PKK.			2	In	this	dissertation	Bakur	denotes	North	parts	of	Kurdistan	under	Turkish	occupation;	Bashur	denotes	Southern	Kurdistan	(Iraqi	part);	Rojhilat	denotes	Eastern	(Iranian	occupied)	and	Rojava	denotes	South-Western	(Syrian	occupied).	
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national and political strategy of the PKK from its foundation in the seventies until 2013 
when the ‘Peace Process/Solution Process’ started. 
The case of the PKK as a radical movement is important because it has challenged all 
the other Kurdish political actors in its claim to secure freedom and independence since its 
formation. For this reason, this thesis will focus on the political and ideological 
transformations of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In particular, focusing on the passage 
from a national revolutionary strategy and the idea of an ‘Independent, United and 
Democratic Kurdistan, to the formation of a ‘Democratic autonomy’ in Bakur Kurdistan, 
which towards an Association of Kurdistan Communities’ Confederations, the KCK – Koma 
Civakên Kurdistan – Kurdistan Communities Union involving all the four parts of Kurdistan.  
As will be explained further in the literature review, the process of change undertaken 
by the PKK and its leader Öcalan, has been explained in the book Turkey’s Kurds: 
Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan by Ali Kemal Özcan, and published in 
2006 is a general overview. But, however important his contribution, it does not fill all the 
gaps for a complete assessment on the role of the PKK in the Kurdish question. This is why 
this study aims to investigate, analyse and explain the rise of the PKK and its paradigm 
change in the context of the Kurdish question. This approach will help the researcher to see 
the action of the PKK in a wider regional perspective and to compare different ways of 
addressing the Kurdish question.  
In addition, this study will offer the opportunity to place the role of the PKK in the ever 
changing political scenario of the Middle East in the last forty years, with a particular 
emphasis on the changes due to the different balance of power in the world after the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the consequent supremacy of the West, in particular of the United 
States it will analyse the new developments of the Kurdish question that have arisen from the 
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establishment of a de facto then a de jure state in Bashur Kurdistan with the founding of the 
Kurdish Regional Government, and with the Rojava Kurdistan Revolution, following the 
most recent conflict in Syria (Rojava is West Kurdistan, known as North Syria). 
In this context, in order to explain the theoretical framework of the PKK, it is necessary 
to analyse its leaders’ political socialist ideas, and in particular how they relate to the 
different Kurdish communities and their historical, ethnical, cultural, territorial, and sectarian 
realities. This will help to explain why Kurdish people have been living for such a long time 
in an under-status3 - worse than the status of a colony. To investigate, analyse and explain 
their struggle for their national and political independence, it is important to explain concepts 
such as nationalism, federalism, and democratic autonomy.   
Applying the theories of nationalism will enable a better understanding of how a 
national liberation movement in Kurdistan can be transformed to a social movement, if there 
is a democratic environment to oppose the monist Turkish state’s assimilationist polices in 
order to liberate society democratically. In order to contextualise, classify and test the 
hypothesis, and predict the scientific outcomes, the theory of nationalism will explain the 
evolution of the ideas of nation and nationalism, and how in a colonised area such as 
Kurdistan it translates into a social movement. There are interlinked vigilant civil society 
organisations evolving in Kurdistan at the national and political level. However, when these 
work as a pressure force for democratic change, the state uses its coercion policies against 
them. This, contrary to Europe, happened in the absence of the industrial economic 
developments in Bakur Kurdistan, where the Turkish state intentionally left the region in an 
economic crisis. But because of Kurdish national and democratic demands, when there is 
even the smallest democratic environment, Kurdish civil society organisations flourish, and 
                                                3	The	term	has	been	used	by	Professor	Ismail	Beşikçi,	which	means	that	the	inhabitants	of	Kurdistan	even	do	not	have	a	name	or	a	status.	For	instance	he	mentions	that	the	slaves	have	had	their	names	and	their	status,	the	inhabitants	of	Kurdistan	not	only	do	not	have	name	and	status	even	they	are	in	lower	position	than	the	slaves.		
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immediately the Turkish state shuts down legal civil society organisations and closes the 
door of any democratic political environment. 
In order to analyse the origins of the PKK and its role in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkish 
politics, it is necessary to offer a brief historical account of the Kurdish question in the 
country. After the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923 any reference to Kurds in 
politics, culture, and literature was banned. The new republic was based on a strong monist 
Turkish nationalist ideology with the purpose of creating a unified and homogenous country 
and nation with one language, one state, one nation, one country and one flag oppressing all 
non-Turkish ethnicities. The Armenians were exterminated in 1915; the Greeks exiled and 
also exterminated, the Kurds faced assimilation of Turkification, and the Alevite were forced 
to convert to the Sunni branch of Islam (Pope & Pope 2011: pp. 43). These policies triggered 
more than twenty-eight Kurdish rebellions against the Turkish State, most of them suppressed 
with the killing of their leaders, the destruction of their villages, and their forced deportation 
to Anatolia under the ‘compulsory settlement’ which was aimed at assimilating (Gürbey 
1996: pp. 10).  
In the historiography of Kurdistan National Liberation Movement in general and the 
PKK in particular, the abduction of Öcalan in Nairobi, Kenya on 16th of February 1999 
constituted a significant turning point for the speeding up of the reformation and a total 
transformation of the movement. The PKK’s first significant manifest: The Path of Kurdistan 
Revolution was written in the summer of 1978 in Amed, introducing the aims and reasons for 
its foundation. The second important manifest entitled the Declaration on the Democratic 
Solution of the Kurdish Question was released 31 years later under Öcalan’s leadership, 
focused mainly on the need for reform and transformation. The former, The Path of 
Kurdistan Revolution, was written, when free Öcalan was preparing for establishing an 
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underground party in Amed the unofficial capital city of Bakur Kurdistan, while the 
Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question was written under strict 
control of Turkish state in the high security prison of Imrali. The previous was focused on an 
Independent, United and Democratic Kurdistan; the latter discussed the Bakur Kurdistan as 
part of the Turkish state, the logic of the puzzle is obviously clearly can be read. 
A number of rebellions against the central government took place until 1973, when the 
twenty-ninth rebellion started and was led by the PKK. It was in that year that a group of 
undergraduate university students founded a movement totally different from the previous 
Kurdish organisations operating in Bakur and the other three parts of Kurdistan. This 
movement became the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan-PKK) in 
1978, and that underground party officially declared its activities one year later in July 1979.  
The PKK was founded during the Cold War era under the influence of international 
leftist socialist and National liberation Movements fighting against the colonial regimes in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. It manifested its ideological and political goals by defining 
Kurdistan as a ‘classic colony’. In order to gain the universal national right to self-
determination, an Independent United and Democratic Kurdistan could be created only after 
the liberation from the yoke of colonialism of the four states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria 
after a long-term popular war. In order to achieve this goal, the PKK despite the criticism of 
the Soviet Union and its satellite Communist Parties, considered itself as a part of the 
Socialist block of the National Liberation Movements, and of the Labour Movements 
operating in the developed Western world.  
It is important, in order to follow the activity of the party and its ideological stance, to 
say that at the beginning the PKK was not dissimilar to left parties all over the world inspired 
by the Marxist-Leninist ideology in opposing their colonial past. In this sense, the objectives 
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of the PKK were in tune with the international leftist movements, ‘since [Kurdistan] is an 
international colony; since it is a place in which humanity is ignored to the utmost and 
regarded as 100 per cent its property, then the revolution of Kurdistan shall be international 
and the property of humanity in proportion to it’ (Öcalan 2011: pp. 51-52).  
In this context, it is obvious that the new born party aimed to present itself as a 
clandestine underground organisation and that its main means of resistance to the Turkish 
power was the armed struggle, which started officially in 1984 and lasted until 1999. As 
stated in the first Manifesto of the party released in 1978, Öcalan made very clear the aims of 
the organization, and the language used remind clearly the language of leftist revolutionaries’ 
movements around the world. Öcalan himself defines it as ‘a manifesto for proletarian 
revolutionaries of Kurdistan’, establishing in this way that the revolution had to involve a 
complete change in the life style of those who adhered to it. This stance is particularly 
important because, as we will see later in this thesis, even during the years of the armed 
struggle, and in particular after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the language of the 
revolution together with its emphasis changed considerably. 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union and Socialist system took place, during the 
trade union workers’ strikes in Poland started, the PKK had already started its paradigm 
changes towards reformation. In 1988, at Öcalan’s first ever interview with the Turkish 
journalist Mehmet Ali Birand (whose maternal heritage was Kurdish), the PKK leader 
indicated that a compromise was needed in order to establish a democratic relationship 
between Kurds and Turks. Of course, Öcalan and the PKK were answering the demands of 
the people of Kurdistan despite the Turkish state’s harsh and violent measures. Nevertheless, 
it has to be mentioned that if there were not a statesman such as President Turgut Özal 
(whose maternal heritage was also Kurdish) any recognition of Kurdish language would have 
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been impossible. In the beginning, his aims were focused on totally destroying the PKK, but 
when he found that was not possible by military means he changed the direction towards a 
peaceful solution. In this phase, the president of Turkish state and the PKK came closer to a 
dialogue, but the Turkish state and the army were against that dialogue. 
The Soviet Union collapsed, the bipolar world ended, the European Community 
evolved to the European Union, in the Middle East the Palestinian Liberation Movement 
entered negotiations with the state of Israel, and the Bashur part of Kurdistan went under 
international humanitarian protection. The PKK at the beginning of those changes did not 
react quickly enough to adapt itself to the changes that occurred in the national, regional and 
international arena. The slow moving process of the organisation’s reformation did not take 
place until Öcalan was abducted and handed over to Turkey. Although this event constituted 
a big blow for the movement and a tragedy for its international reputation, in a very short 
time the PKK leadership declared a leadership council to act on behalf of the leadership and 
the process of reformation upgraded to its transformation. In the reformation and in particular 
in transformation, the PKK saved the organisation from a total failure and saved Öcalan’s life 
too. 
Despite Öcalan’s arrest, the PKK gained more and more support from all parts of 
Kurdistan and significantly, from the Kurds in the Diaspora. The PKK membership is unique. 
For example, the members of the organisation never marry, they stay as brothers and sisters, 
and they are completely devoted to the revolution of Kurdistan at the expense of their private 
lives. In addition, since the PKK based its activities on a strong revolutionary will and self-
sacrifice - they do not own any private property.    
It is not the purpose of this study to offer an analysis of the impact of the armed 
struggle conducted by the PKK. However, it is important to remember briefly that in March 
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1993 with the mediation of Jalal Talabani the famous Kurdish guerrilla leader in Bashur and 
then the president of Iraq negotiated the first ceasefire with Öcalan and Özal. A second 
ceasefire followed in 1995 and third one in 1998 starting a series of negotiations with the 
Turkish state (Gunter: 2014 pp.62). This was due to two main factors: the first one was the 
local, regional and international pressure on the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan because he had 
organised a strong guerrilla movement against a NATO member. The second factor was that 
Turkey was in a deep political, social and diplomatic crisis and could not destroy the PKK led 
guerrilla movement. In order to come out of the crisis, president Özal went as far as to 
propose a federal solution for the Kurdish question in Turkey (Ibid: 2014, pp.62). 
After three ceasefires and three attempts for peaceful solution, NATO and Turkey 
forced the Syrian authorities to extradite Öcalan, who was forced to leave Syria where he had 
been in exile. Abdullah Öcalan chose to move to Europe to look for support for a democratic 
and peaceful solution instead of moving to the mountains of Kurdistan. Eventually he was 
handed over to the Turkish authorities and he is still in a solitary confinement prison on the 
Turkish island of Imrali, due to the influence he had on the Kurdish struggle for recognition 
of the national and political rights of Kurdish people not only in Bakur Kurdistan, but also in 
the other three parts and among the Kurdish diasporas in the world.  
 Despite of his long imprisonment, in 2013 Öcalan was among the one hundred most 
influential political leaders of the world according to Time Magazine. In an article by Gerry 
Adams, the president of the Sinn Fein and deputy Prime minister of Northern Ireland, the role 
of Abdullah Öcalan was compared with Nelson Mandela for its contribution toward a 
peaceful democratic solution of the Kurdish question in the Middle East (Time:18/4/2013).    
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The PKK’s continued political, military and diplomatic activities, together with the 
struggle carried out by PKK members and activists imprisoned in Turkish prisons where 
hunger strikes that lasted more than sixty days in the last quarter of 2012, pushed the AKP 
government to gain local, presidential and general elections, and resulted in the start of a new 
dialogue process between the leader of the PKK and the Turkish State. The AKP government 
attempted as if Abdullah Öcalan has been recognized as the only interlocutor in order to start 
a new ‘peace process/solution process’. The AKP by this attempt tried to gain more votes 
among communities in Bakur Kurdistan (Gunter: 2014, pp.68). 
This new ‘peace process/solution’ happened after the TAF – Turkish Armed Forces – 
with the support of the NATO, failed to overcome to the PKK’s guerrilla war, which had 
continued for more than thirty consecutive years. The PKK led guerrilla war was under the 
control of the armed wing of the HRK – Hêzên Rizgarîya Kurdistan – Kurdistan Liberation 
Forces from 1982 to 1986, the ARGK – Arteşa Rizgarîya Gelê Kurdistan – Kurdistan 
Peoples’ Liberation Army from 1986 to 2000 and the HPG – Hêzên Parastina Gel – the 
Kurdistan Peoples’ Defence Forces from 2000 until now.  The chaotic situation was that the 
TAF could not defeat the PKK in spite of having the full support of the NATO and extremely 
advanced technology. However, at the same time the PKK was unable to liberate the free 
zone from the TAF; a stalemate situation still was and is in place. 
 The latest attempt toward a  ‘peace process/solution process’ was a declaration on 21st 
of March 2013 on the occasion of Newroz – the Kurdish New Year – in Amed (in Turkish 
Diyarbakir), the unofficial capital city of Bakur Kurdistan. Two MPs from the BDP – Bariş 
ve Demokrasi Partisi – Peace and Democracy Party Pervin Buldan and Sirri Sureyya Onder 
acted as mediators between Turkish State, and the PKK to read the message of Öcalan for a 
peaceful solution to the Kurdish Question. They read the message directed to the PKK and 
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the Turkish State in front of more than two million people first in Kurdish and then in 
Turkish asking to silent the guns and come to a compromise for a peaceful solution. This 
event was broadcasted live by most of Kurdish, Turkish and international media. In his 
message the leader of the PKK declared that honourable peace could be achieved “if we read 
the political reality and the spirit of our time, otherwise we would be in the dustbin of the 
history”. He went on: “Today a new era has begun, the period of armed struggle is ending, 
and the door is opening to democratic politics. We are at the beginning of a new process 
focused on political, social and economic aspects; an understanding based on democratic 
rights, freedoms, and equality is growing” (Öcalan’s 2013 Newroz Declaration in Amed on 
21st March 2013).  
It is very interesting to notice that the PKK, still under the leadership of Öcalan, has 
changed its position considerably from 1999, the same year in which the PKK’s leader was 
abducted from Nairobi and incarcerated in Turkey. Following a very controversial step, 
Öcalan brought into practice his ideological stance of the 1990s, and his party followed him. 
He moved from the original Marxist-Leninist position to a democratic socialism, in an 
attempt to explain, or for some, justify, his exit from the Soviet Union’s Real Socialist 
ideology. To the ones who accuse him and his party of still living in the past, in 1998 he 
replies: 
‘This is just propaganda. It is not possible for us to be communists. Why the Soviet 
Union collapsed and the United States has not? It is because the communism made the 
government everything, but human being nothing. The United States represents 
development (Gunter: 1998: 82). 
 
However, it is important to remember that the position of the party started to change 
even further before Öcalan’s abduction in 1999 and even before 1998 when he released this 
statement. This is so true that in the 1995 congress the party decides for the removal of the 
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hammer and sickle from the PKK’s flag, a trend in tune with other European communist 
parties that had to deal with the harsh reality of the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the 
communist dream. It is in this context that the various cease-fires mentioned earlier have to 
be interpreted as the PKK aiming to reform and to have a compromised peaceful settlement 
with the Turkish state to have a democratic solution to the Kurdish question. The new PKK 
does not aim to change the society according to a Marxist-Leninist ideology as it was 
practicing during the Cold war era. As a consequence, Öcalan and the party abandoned the 
founding idea of an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan through the prolonged 
popular war strategy. Now in 1999, it is very important to recognise that beside the armed 
struggle it is possible to act in a democratic way if the channels are open. Öcalan himself 
admits this with the following words: 
We are not demanding an immediate separation from Turkey. We are realistic on this 
subject. Do not interpret this [cease-fire] as a simple tactic [serving a hidden agenda]. 
Those who understand the historic, political and economic situation of [the Kurds and 
Turks] know well that separation could not take place. They are intertwined like flesh 
and bone (Öcalan 1999: pp. 7). 
 
It is common knowledge what happened in the world from 1989 onwards, which was 
the failure of the Soviet Union and its proposed socialist system. However, it is important to 
establish some correspondence with the Kurdish question not only in Turkey but also in the 
other parts of Kurdistan. In particular, as stated earlier, this study will focus on the PKK’s 
reformation during the collapse of Soviet Union and its transformation after its leader’s 
abduction and its influence on the other parts of Kurdistan. 
 Kurdish political parties played a very influential role in Kurdish political, cultural and 
social development during the last century. The KDP-Iran – Hizb i Demokrata Kurdistan a 
Iran – Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran that is the mother party for the KDP-Iraq – Partiya 
Demokrata Kurdistan’a Iraq – Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iraq until 1958 when Mustafa 
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Barzani returned from the Soviet Union. From 1958 onwards the KDP-Iraq became 
dominant and led all KDPs in four parts of Kurdistan. The KDP-Syria – Partiya Demokrata 
Kurdistan – Kurdistan Democratic Party-Syria was established in 1957, and in the following 
years the KDP-Turkey – Partiya Demokrata Kurdistan’a Turkey – Kurdistan Democratic 
Party-Turkey was established in 1965. All the KDP’s in their party programme were aiming 
for autonomy for Kurdistan and they were the dominant hegemonic nationalist parties in four 
parts of Kurdistan up to 1975, when the KDP-Iraq led Kurdistan liberation movement 
collapsed.  
The First and Second Gulf Wars created an opportunity for Rojhilat and Bashur 
Kurdistan, because of the long destructive war between Iran and Iraq, if the KDP-Iran and 
KDP-Iraq had used the opportunities for the benefit of their people. However, neither of 
them took those opportunities and both failed. Both KDPs instead of acting together, fought 
each other and lost those opportunities and both became immigrant parties. The KDP-Iran 
was in Baghdad and the KDP-Iraq was with Tehran. The First Gulf War, which was started 
by Iraq against Iran, produced nothing more than the genocide campaign of Anfal in Bashur. 
The Second Gulf War was again started by Iraq against Kuwait and this time was responded 
by the international coalition, and caused the international coalition’s Humanitarian 
Intervention in Bashur Kurdistan. By Humanitarian Intervention a new political situation 
came into existence after the First and Second World Wars in the Middle East.  WWI 
produced the Turkish republic, WWII produced Israel. The Second Gulf war coincided with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and produced a Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria saw the KRG as future base of a greater Kurdistan, and as 
playing a similar role to Israel. Humanitarian Intervention brought international protection 
for Bashur Kurdistan and it became a Safe Haven as No-Fly Zone. 
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The national strategic goal of most of the Kurdish political parties in Bashur was 
autonomy. Humanitarian Intervention created a free political environment and they replaced 
demands for autonomy with federalism. Following the establishment of a federal structure 
(KRG) in Bashur in 1992, PDK-Iraq removed the suffix of Iraq from its name, calling itself 
KDP or PDK. In this thesis it will be referred to as KDP-Iraq, in order to avoid confusions, 
and also due to recent preparations of a national referendum for independence in Bashur 
Kurdistan. 
 Since its emergence, the PKK has become the main rival party to the KDP-Iraq. Both 
parties are having massive impact, influence, and interactions with all parts of Kurdistan as 
main rival parties.  The Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP-Iran in Rojhilat Kurdistan founded 
during the Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad in 1946 and the PUK – Yekîtî Niştimanî 
Kurdistan – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan founded in 1975, have both played a very 
significant role in the evolution of national consciousness in Kurdistan. In addition, the 
Gorran movement recently separated from the PUK has gained a significant voice in 
becoming a major civil and political force in Bashur Kurdistan. In all the four parts of 
Kurdistan there are also Islamic Kurdish nationalist parties as well as Communist, Socialist 
and Liberal ones participating in the struggle. All national and patriotic organisations small 
or large are important elements of the KNLM.  
By focusing on the radical emergence, reformation and transformation of the PKK, this 
thesis does not intend to ignore the contribution of the KDPs, the PUK and other parties that 
have struggled from 20th century, and which have lead to the formation of the national 
liberation movements and its development in Bashur and in other parts. Since September 
1961, the armed struggle against Baghdad had gained support from all the other parts of 
Kurdistan from all stratums of Kurdish society and had played a significant role in the 
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evolution of national consciousness (while the people from all stratums of the society were 
supporting this policy, however, the leadership of the movement failed to take advantage of 
this support). Although the KDP-Iraq was founded as a branch of the KDP-Iran, after the 
failure of the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad, the KDP-Iraq took the initiative to lead the 
political and national movement in the Bashur mainly in Suliamania, Kirkuk, Hewler and 
Baghdad. In all the four parts of Kurdistan the KDPs were active under the leadership of 
Molla Mustafa Barzani until the 1975’s failed uprising. The agreement between Iraq and Iran 
in 1975 in Algeria meant the failure of the revolution and the fragmentation of Kurdistan 
autonomy dreams. The KDP-Iraq leaders chose to live in Iran and some party leaders moved 
to Europe and America, the party leadership stayed in Tehran and Karaj cities of Iran. Later 
the KDP reorganised itself in the Zagros Mountains of Bakur Kurdistan mainly on the border 
areas. Most of the nationalist political organisations in the four parts of Kurdistan, with the 
exception of the PKK, derive from this fracture of the KDP’s tradition that started in 
Mahabad in Rojhilat Kurdistan. 
The image of Öcalan as the most radical Kurdish leader handcuffed and blindfolded 
between two Turkish flags, and his imprisonment, caused a national humiliation and 
dehumanization of the Kurds. Large groups of literate and illiterate Kurdish youths from all 
parts of Kurdistan joined the PKK to become guerrillas. The humiliation of Ocalan was seen 
as humiliation of Kurds and Kurdistan from both home and the Diaspora. That massive 
participation encouraged the organisation to decentralise the PKK by creating multiple 
organisations for the other three parts of Kurdistan too. At that point, the establishment of the 
PJAK – Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistan – The Kurdistan Free Life Party in 2000s by 
Rojhilat Kurdistan youths and intellectuals; the PYD – Partiya Yekitiya Demokratik – The 
Democratic Union Party in 2003 by Rojava Kurdistan youths and intellectuals; and the 
PÇDK – Partiya Çareseriya Demokratika Kurdistan – the Kurdistan Democratic Solution 
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Party in 2002 by Bashur Kurdistan’s youths and intellectuals were born. (In 2015 the PÇDK 
dissolved and joined Tevgera Azadi – Tevgera Azadi û Demokrasiya Komelgayî Kurdistan). 
They were all founded based on Öcalan philosophy and leadership. The PKK, PJAK, PYD 
and PÇDK became autonomous four parties in four parts of Kurdistan under the umbrella 
organisation of the KCK – Koma Civakên Kurdistan – Kurdistan Communities Union.  
The PKK’s national liberation strategy for an independent, united and democratic 
Kurdistan in the long run was an open invitation for magnifying young educated and 
energetic revolutionary Kurdistani people’s support from everywhere in Kurdistan regardless 
of international borders. Those Kurdish political parties who did support autonomy goal were 
blamed by the PKK as not patriotic enough, because the autonomy would not be satisfying 
national demands of a nation. This ideological stand of the PKK continued from 1973 to 
2000. National liberation aiming towards an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan 
was the main focus of the PKK and it was the main bold line between the PKK and the other 
Kurdish parties. An overwhelming majority of people participated in the PKK struggle and 
lost their lives fought for National Self-Determination and an Independent, United 
Democratic Kurdistan, nothing less. 
All Kurdish political parties have played significant roles in spreading the national 
consciousness and awareness of the Kurdish cause among Kurdish people all over the world. 
However, none of them had the activity and discipline to organise and mobilise strong 
political, cultural and social activities as the PKK did locally, regionally, and internationally. 
For example the KDP-Iraq since 1946 has been active in Bashur Kurdistan and led by its 
honorary leaders late Mustafa Barzani, Ibrahim Ahmed, Jalal Talabani, Mahmoud Osman, 
Sami Abdurrahman and Massoud Barzani. The KDP-Iraq was fractioned into different 
groups and none of them have been successfully mobilized; they failed to organize the Kurds 
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in the Diaspora and bring them towards national unity, and politically and culturally engage 
with national associations. However, the PKK did work hard and amongst the Kurdish 
Diaspora in Europe since 1978 onwards, has opened associations in almost all European 
countries for Kurds to help each other and create their national unity and national knowledge.  
Why This Study? 
 
The PKK emerged as the most radical-revolutionary national liberation movement in 
Kurdistan aimed at fighting for National Self-Determination and an Independent, United and 
Democratic State of Kurdistan. This idea became the principle of its foundation. The 
ideological framework gained support based on those principles in a short time, and the PKK 
was able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of Kurds. Later, the PKK transformed its 
National liberation strategy into Democratic Liberation, leaving behind its aims of creating a 
Kurdish nation-state and liberation of Kurdistan. This transformation is at the core of this 
study. While the PKK was leaving its founding strategy on National Liberation, in the 
Balkans and former Soviet Union neighbouring countries, tens of new independent states 
came into existence. If Kurdistan was not divided into four parts and in each part an 
extermination, annihilation and assimilation policy was not in force and Kurdish nation was 
not denied an existence, neither a political party such as the PKK would have come to 
existence nor the Kurdish mass mobilisation would have had supported it. The Kurdish 
question remained unsolved; the fundamental reasons that had caused the emergence of the 
PKK were still there, so why did that paradigm change happen? How much of those 
paradigm changes were related to the evolution of Öcalan’s thoughts, and how much of those 
changes were accelerated by period of his imprisonment? At the end, after examining the 
formation, reformation and transformation of the PKK, the transformation and paradigm 
change of the PKK will be analysed. Although research into the PKK’s transformation is in 
increase around the world, this study differs in that it argues the PKK should not and did not 
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have to drop its fundamental national right to self-determination of a nation and propose its 
strategic goal to Turkey’s democratisation. Such a movement with those fundamental 
strategic goals that mobilised millions of Kurds both at home and Diasporas politically and 
nationally was wrong to drop the nation liberation goal, and the status quo will necessarily 
force it into retransformation process. 
Roger Brubaker states that Europe was the birthplace of the nation-state and 
nationalism at the end of eighteenth century, and it was supposed to be their graveyard at the 
end of twentieth (Brubaker 1996: 1). Nationalism as an ideology of nations caused 
fragmentation and division of Europe into small territorial entities, particularly after eighty 
years of destructive wars. The Westphalia peace treaty of 1648 brought European powers into 
a stable peaceful coexistence recognizing national sovereignty of nations. It ended the 
conflicts and wars; it caused economic, social, cultural and political prosperous development. 
These developments had resulted in the birth of nation-states at the end of eighteenth century. 
Although the two World Wars were the results of the struggle for hegemony between the 
European sovereign nation-states, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 presented to the European 
nations an era of supranational organisation and removal of the nation-states boundaries. It 
was also assumed that the era of nationalism and nation-states was coming to an end (Ibid: 
pp. 2). 
From 1917 to 1991 in a substantial part of the world a new system of government came 
into existence. It was implementing a socialist political economy and claimed that moving 
towards a communist system led by the Soviet Union and will ultimately aim to a free and 
democratic society, which would not need a state any more. It looked unquestionable that 
even the era of the state and nation-state has ended and there was no need for the state 
apparatus, that people could run all the affairs by themselves by their rural and urban 
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councillors. However, not long after the Maastricht treaty the Soviet Union collapsed, the so-
called communist system ended, and fifteen new nation-states declared their independence. 
East and West Germany were unified; Czechoslovakia was separated into the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, while Yugoslavia was divided into ten new nation-states. Those events were 
simply proving that after almost seventy years of ruling socialist system not only could not 
weaken the nationalist sentiments, but even they became stronger and powerful forces in all 
the so-called Soviet Union and Socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 
The concept of nation and nationalism proved to be a powerful paradigm not only in 
the socialist countries but also even in the most developed capitalist countries too. Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland in the UK, the Bask in Spain and France, and Catalonia in Spain 
constitute still unresolved national questions in Europe and similar situations continue to 
exist in Asia, Africa and more importantly in the Middle East.  
Another surprising example is Switzerland with four different official languages and 
nations living side-by-side in a democratic country under the banner of a supra-national 
extraordinary confederalist democratic system. The PKK leader in its second manifestation of 
the paradigm change takes Switzerland as a unique example for democratic civilization and 
democratic confederalism. Abdullah Öcalan also gives examples of the UK and Spain as the 
triumph of democracy. The PKK leader at the Imrali prison from February 1999 onwards, 
tried to convince his party and the Turkish state to take the examples of the EU countries 
especially the UK, Spain and Switzerland as the examples of Democratic Civilisation, to 
compromise on democratic principles rather than nationalist nation-state’s ideological 
ambitions. His party followed his transformative guidelines and was keen to compromise on 
democratic principles for the sake of peace, which resulted in the longest ceasefire from 1st 
September 1999 to 1st June 2004. 
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The Kurds as the largest nation without a state of its own had to fight against four 
different nation-states who are trying to assimilate them by force. Kurdish nationalism as a 
reaction in its search for recognition can be traced back to Sheikh Ubaydullah at the end of 
ninetieth century. Sheikh Ubaydullah in his famous letter to the British King through William 
Abbott, the British Consul-General, in Tabriz in 1880 says: 
The Kurdish nation … is a people apart. Their religion is different [from that of others], 
and their laws and customs are distinct … the Chief and Rulers of Kurdistan, whether 
Turkish or Persian subjects, and the inhabitants of Kurdistan, one and all are united and 
agreed that matters cannot be carried on in this way with the two Governments 
[Ottoman and Qajar], and necessarily something must be done, so that European 
Governments having understood the matter, shall inquire into our state. We also are a 
nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our own hands (McDowall 2000: 53). 
 
The reactionary nature of Kurdish self-rule against Ottoman and Qajar-Persian 
nationalism has continued consistently from 1806 up to the declaration of the Kurdistan 
Republic in Mahabad in 1946. After the failure of the republic, the evolution of Kurdish 
nationalist politics shifted from Rojhilat Kurdistan to Bashur Kurdistan and continued under 
the leadership of KDP-Iraq in almost two decades from 1958 to 1975, dominating all parts of 
Kurdistan. The Kurds from other three parts of Kurdistan helped in any way they could. The 
KDP-Iraq had better situation than the previous rebellions, because almost five hundred 
Peshmerga with Mustafa Barzani spent their life in Soviet Union for eleven years. They were 
also supported by the Iraqi government of the time, as well as by the Soviet Union, when 
Mustafa Barzani returned to Baghdad with his Peshmergas officially in 1958. 
The idea that Kurdistan had to be a separate nation was not promoted for the first time 
by Azadi, Xoybun, KDP-Iran, KDP-Iraq PUK or the PKK, but by Sheikh Ubaydullah whose 
aim was the unification of the two parts of Kurdistan at that time divided between the 
Ottoman Empire and Safavids. Although during the leadership of Sheikh Ubaydullah there 
was not a significant educated intellectual stratum available to help him in the modern sense, 
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Sheikh himself had the vision to ask the Western world through the British Empire the 
recognition and protection of the emergent Kurdish national demands. Despite the failure of 
Sheikh Ubaydullah’s rebellion, this idea was evolved and maintained alive since the 
beginning of nineteenth, and the whole of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.   
The nascent roots of Kurdish nationalism can be also traced from Sheikh Ubaydullah to 
the Baban rebellion in 1806; this rebellion was a reaction to the centralization of the Ottoman 
Empire, (Mir Mohammed Rawanduz in 1815-35, Badirkhan Beg Botan and Yazdan Şêr in 
1835-55, Sheikh Ubaydullah in 1879-81). Throughout the twentieth century, twenty-eight 
rebellions took place in support of an independent identity and an independent Kurdistan only 
in Bakur Kurdistan. The KDP-Iran was in 1946 and after the KDP-Iraq, the PUK from 1975, 
and PKK since 1973 have all continuously fought for Kurdistan’s autonomy, federalism and 
independence, applying a modern form of nationalism. All Kurdish political parties in all 
parts of Kurdistan were in their battlefield representing a national reactionary resistance 
against the regional and international colonial powers, the results were dramatic failures of all 
resistances and uprisings. This study will also fill the gap and the knowledge of the impact 
that Kurdish political parties, in particular the PKK had in the formation of a resistant and 
freedom oriented towards Kurdish national identity to be able to reform and transform itself 
if the conditions were changed in a specific situation.  
The struggle for dominance continued at a micro level between the PKK and its sister 
parties such as the PJAK, PÇDK and PYD in Rojhilat, Rojava, Bashur and Bakur Kurdistan, 
with the KDP and the PUK oriented parties and organisation moving from a violent to a non-
violent stance. At the macro level the struggle of all Kurdistani parties is moving towards 
unity against the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. At the micro level the KDP-Iran and 
KDP-Iraq, the KDP-Iraq and PUK, the PKK and KDP-Iraq and the PKK with the PUK have 
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had internal strives and challenges. While the gap between all Kurdish political parties in 
1970s, 80s, 90s and even 2000 was wide to internal strives, in 2013 when the so-called peace 
process started in Bakur between the Turkish state and the PKK, it seemed they were coming 
together in the reading of the spirit of the time at a macro level unity. Any macro level 
alliance of Kurdish political parties of four parts of Kurdistan would be the alliance of two 
paradigms: on the right side of the spectrum all the KDPs and Kurdish Sunni oriented parties 
and on the left side of the spectrum the PKK, PUK, Gorran with Shiite and Yezidi oriented 
Kurdish political parties. These two paradigms are in the struggle for hegemony and 
dominance of the KNLM.    
The struggle of the two paradigms is on the base of their class composition in 
ideological level in the paradigm of primordialist, ethno-symbolist and modernist. This has 
become a struggle for dominance between Kurdish political parties because of the liberation 
of a nation without a state.  They all desired to have their own Kurdish nation-state. However, 
the two strong states of Iran and Turkey are strictly against such an idea and have prevented 
and would prevent in the future whatever the cost would be. Despite their ideological, 
political and territorial differences, would these two paradigms of the KNLM ultimately be 
joining together at one junction at a near future, or would their struggle be widened and 
deepened in all spheres of socio-politics in Kurdistan?  
If the transformation of the PKK is considered from the ideological point of view of its 
founding principles, it could be considered as a sign of weakness and surrender to the Turkish 
State. However, from a broader concept, creating strong links between the peoples of the 
region on the base of aiming egalitarian, equal, just and democratic confederations, which 
would make the traditional nation-states’ in Kurdistan as well as in the wider Middle East 
dysfunctional, it could be a positive change. This concept of transformation of the PKK is in 
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implementation in Rojava Kurdistan. If it is successful in terms of self-governance and 
constitutionally recognition in Syria, then this success might have an enormous impact in the 
Middle East in terms of Democratic Confederalism. If after all of the possible options it fails 
to guarantee constitutional status, then the failure could possibly open up the gate of endless 
ethnic and sectarian conflicts. 
The PKK from its formation to its reformation has progressed significantly and has 
organised, mobilized and revolutionized the people not only in Bakur but also in Rojava, 
Bashur and Rojhilat to some degree, because of it national strategy and standing for an 
independent, united and democratic Kurdistan state. It has become a major factor in all four 
parts of Kurdistan in Bakur and Rojava where it is the hegemonic and dominant actor, in 
Rojhilat to a convincing degree, while in Bashur is in alliance with the PUK, Gorran and 
Tevgera Azadi. While the PKK is trying to bring most of the political actors in all parts of 
Kurdistan, the KDP-Iraq still insists on its nation-state paradigm and challenging the PKK, 
PUK and Gorran to join in a wider Kurdistan National Congress for all Kurdistani people in 
the world. The concept of Kurdistan National Congress itself is a fundamental strategic goal 
of the national liberation paradigm.  
 
 
Research Questions 
 
The main research question of this thesis is, what reasons caused the PKK to change its 
paradigm from National Liberation (Via Armed Struggle, Guerrilla War to liberate Kurdistan 
and establish a Kurdish nation state) to Democratic Liberation (Via Non-Violent, Civil 
Disobediences and democratic political parliamentary struggle to transform Turkish state to a 
Democratic Republic that Kurds will have their freedom of choice whether to live in a unitary 
state or ask for self-determination). National Liberation strategy was based on liberating 
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Kurdistan from yoke of Turkish state colonialism through a prolonged popular armed 
resistance, whereas Democratic Liberation is totally based on non-violent democratic 
political parliamentary elections under the unitary of Turkish constitutional law, which denies 
any other ethnic entities other than Turks. The thesis will investigate internal and external 
factors; Abdullah Öcalan’s thought process during his imprisonment, and the readings and 
reasons for the transformation and paradigm change of the PKK. In order to get an in depth 
answer to the main research question, this thesis requires many subsequent and dependent 
questions. For example, how did the PKK move away from the armed struggle to adopt a 
non-violent democratic political one? Will it be possible to implement it, while the Turkish 
state’s Turkification and denial policies continue? Why did the PKK shift its strategy from an 
independent, united, and democratic Kurdistan to federalism, then to democratic autonomy, 
and recently envisage democratization and decentralization in Turkey, Iran and Syria? Is it 
the struggle of the PKK the result of different branches of nationalism through Primordialist, 
Ethno-symbolist and Modernist paradigm, or beyond nationalism? Are the PKK and the other 
political parties despite their ideological, political, sociological, and territorial differences 
aiming the same objectives, or does the gap between the two trajectories expand? To what 
extend has the PKK’s strategic transformation caused other Kurdish political parties to turn 
their national strategy from autonomy to federalism, in particular after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein? And why did federalism fail to work in the Kurdish region to such an extent that it 
is now heading towards independence? 
Ontology 
 
Unlike the dominant rationale and logic in the discipline of Politics and International 
Relations, which has mostly considered Kurdistan as a part of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria4, 
                                                4	In	addition	to	the	four	main	parts	of	Kurdistan	as	the	mainland,	there	are	in	Armenia	hundreds	of	villages	of	non-Muslim	Yezidi	Kurds	 and	 Muslim	 Kurds.	 In	 between	 Armenia	 and	 Azerbaijan	 from	 1917	 to	 1930	 there	 was	 a	 Kurdistan	 region	 named	 Red	
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this research considers Kurdistan as an independent reality. It is the result of the division, 
partition, and sharing that occurred after the WWI, which divided the world on the basis of 
the geo-political and geo-strategic interests of the imperial powers. Particularly, the region of 
the Middle East is the home of the most complex conflicts of the world was divided and 
partitioned by those imperial powers with the creation of nation-states. This caused endless 
wars between the ethnic and religious realities in the region, Kurdistan as a part of this region 
and as the result of those policies of division, is the real picture of the reality of the Middle 
East.  
As such, this inquiry is focused on understanding the depth of this reality, and it 
concerns its independent existence as the nature and the structure of this object. In other 
words, the object of the inquiry is the PKK’s paradigm change and transformation for 
Kurdistan as a country and the people who are living in it. Its national and political partition 
and denial policies of four nation-states have caused the emergence of the entity called the 
PKK. The actors struggling for its liberation and freedom are the component of this national 
liberation struggle. Ontology is the study of those actors, countries, their policies, and of what 
constitutes their political will and structure. In other words, the inquiry of comparative 
politics and ontological concern is the regional nation-states, non-state actors, events, 
institutions, and processes which can be observed and need an explanation. In this particular 
case it is important to discover what the past, present and future contributions of the PKK to 
the Kurdish struggle are, and what impact its ideological stances have on other similar parties 
                                                                                                                                                  Kurdistan.	 After	 the	 failure	 of	 Soviet	 experience	 the	 Kurds	 from	 the	 Red	 Kurdistan	 set	 up	 their	 institutions,	 however,	 after	 the	seizure	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	region	by	Armenia	in	1991,	that	corridor	of	Red	Kurdistan	now	has	been	added	to	ethnic	Armenian	Nagorno-Karabakh	region.	The	population	of	Red	Kurdistan	has	been	displaced	to	Azerbaijan,	Russia,	Central	Asian	Republics,	and	European	countries.	In	Tbilisi,	Georgia,	Kazakhstan,	Russia,	and	Ukraine	according	to	unofficial	sources	live	hundreds	of	thousands	Kurds.	 In	 Iran	 since	 17th	 century	 Kurds	 have	 been	 dispersed	 to	 the	 provinces	 of	 Mashhad,	 Qazvin,	 Gylan,	 Mazandaran	 Shiraz,	Esfahan,	 and	 Zanjan.	 According	 to	 Dr.	 Abdurrahman	 Qassimlu	 in	 Afghanistan,	 Pakistan,	 and	 India	 exists	 a	 substantial	 Kurdish	community.	More	importantly	the	dispersion	of	Kurds	to	the	neighboring	provinces	of	Kayseri,	Çorum,	Konya,	and	Ankara	under	the	policies	of	the	Ottoman	state	has	been	dislocated	from	Kurdistan.	In	addition,	after	the	launch	of	guerrilla	war	by	the	PKK	against	the	Turkish	state	millions	of	Kurds	have	moved	to	Istanbul,	 Izmir,	Aydin,	Bursa,	Gebze,	Antalya,	Mersin	and	Adana	and	they	have	lost	all	their	properties	when	their	villages	were	destroyed	by	the	state.	The	Turkish	army	forces	applied	the	policy	‘dry	the	sea	to	destroy	 the	 fish’.	Literally	 it	meant	 to	cut	 the	support	 for	 the	PKK	guerrillas	 from	Kurdistan’s	rural	population.	Sometimes	 in	 the	academic	discourse	this	is	an	issue	when	it	is	said	that	Kurds	have	been	dispersed	all	over	Turkey,	hence	singling	out	that	Kurdistan	is	not	any	more	a	country	is	possible	because	almost	half	of	the	total	Kurdish	population	lives	in	western	parts	of	Turkey.	One	has	to	say	that	 these	people	have	been	forced	to	move	because	their	home	and	private	properties	have	been	destroyed	by	the	state.	All	those	forced	to	leave	now	are	demanding	to	move	back	again	to	their	villages	and	this	is	a	much	politicized	population.					
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in the region. As ontology establishes what is knowable in context of transformation of the 
paradigm of the PKK.   
Epistemology 
 
Epistemology refers to how we can know the nature of knowledge or how we come to 
know through both a priori and posterior means of observation, sense impression, and 
experiences. In contrast to ontology, it concerns what political knowledge of the political 
world is possible and what rules of inquiry scholars follow in analysing it (Landman 2001: 
16). The epistemological aim is to build up and interpret the link between the past and the 
present on the basis of evidence and inference about the theme and its political actors fighting 
for Kurdistan’s independence and freedom. The available sources of knowledge and 
examples to acquire knowledge of this particular subject are complex. Despite the complexity 
of the theme of inquiry, an epistemological account is about interpretation and understanding 
of these events in terms of why they happened and how they happened, and the likelihood of 
them happening again in the future (Ibid: 16). One of the main epistemological questions of 
this research is how can we know what is really happened in Bakur Kurdistan and why the 
PKK changed its national liberation strategy and how it did it? The reason for going through 
this route is that the official states’ ideologies have created a discourse among the Kurds 
themselves and their neighbours, one that is far from the reality of the situation. Indeed, those 
falsely created discourses need to be researched and interpreted.   
However, in the long run the political parties that struggled for the liberation and 
freedom of Kurdistan, whether at home or in the Diaspora have to some extent produced 
written literature. Among the literature, the most extensive are those produced by PKK 
oriented organisations. They have set up publishing houses in European countries as well as 
in Istanbul and Diyarbakir. The knowledge produced by these organisations had a direct 
impact on the young generations and on their aspirations to re-own and re-gain their cultural, 
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national and political identity. That identity has been reflected in literature from novels to 
academic work. In short, epistemology as the theory of knowledge tries to find out what is 
knowable about the paradigm change and transformation of the PKK from national liberation 
to democratic liberation.  
The Scope of the Thesis 
The scope of this thesis is the analysis of the PKK’s four stages, which define the 
change that took place in its national, ideological and political struggle for the right to 
National Self-Determination. Those changes are formation, reformation, transformation and 
possibly a retransformation if its Democratic Confederalism project does not succeed. As 
mentioned earlier, it emerged as a small radical national-democratic revolutionary group of 
higher education students aiming to liberate, unite and democratise colonised Kurdistan and 
at redrawing its borders with Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. This was with the goal that a state 
of Kurdistan would be established at the end. It started its struggle from Bakur, and then 
moved to Rojava, Bashur and Rojhilat as well. Today wherever Kurds are, the PKK is there 
and organised. The scope of thesis is from emergence of the PKK in 1973 until the end of 
2016. 
In the four parts of Kurdistan there are many large and small, weak and strong, 
conservative and liberal, communist, socialist and Islamic political parties, and they have 
struggled hard and interacted continuously to be the dominant actors since the 1980s. The 
KDP from its formation since 1946 to 1975 was the only strongest political entity in the four 
parts of Kurdistan, but after the 1975’s failure it lost its significance. In July 1975, the 
fraction separated from the KDP in Damascus and formed a new competitive political 
organisation called Yekîtî Niştimanî Kurdistan (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan-PUK). The PUK 
was an insider to the KDP, and some of the central committee members of the KDP joined 
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the new organisation. The PUK challenged the KDP ideologically, politically and territorially 
(Vanly 1993: pp. 140-180).  The KDP from 1958 to 1975 was not only the predominant actor 
of Kurdish nationalism inside of Bashur Kurdistan, but it was also the only actor in the 
regional and international level as well. Although the KDP had always being ruled by the 
Barzani family at the highest level, the participation of Kurdistani urban intelligentsia was at 
a significant level too (Stansfield 2010: pp. 132-33). The hard struggle for dominance was 
initially inside of Bashur Kurdistan between the KDP and PUK, and then reached over all of 
the other three parts of Kurdistan too.      
The struggle for hegemony and dominance of Kurdistan National Liberation Movement 
became more complicated when the PKK emerged and slowly this rivalry shifted between the 
PKK and KDP as the struggle between two trajectories/paradigms. Particularly, up until the 
PKK changed its paradigm in 1999, the rivalry was in the form of a war and since then it is in 
the form of ideological war but not in the highest-level. How are their social, cultural, 
political formation and roots related to the presentation of nationalism in Kurdistan? What are 
their goals for the Kurdish nation, Kurdistan, in the short and long run? Does this political 
and national movement project independence in the long run? If so, how and why do they 
aim for independence? If not, why? What has caused it to change or shift from one assumed 
solution to an opposite one? Has there been any good will for the solution of any of the states 
of Turkey, Iraq, Iran or Syria? Why has the PKK suddenly put the discourse on the table to 
discuss the issues that we have been living together with Turks for a thousand years? Will it 
be possible to think that Turkey will accept the Kurds as partners? Did the PKK take the right 
decision to drop off independence from its manifest? How was it interpreted when it removed 
independence from its party constitution?  
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The PKK emerged in a real difficult period of history, with a prime objective to discuss 
and strategically highlight the need for an independent united and democratic Kurdistan, 
while most of the other Kurdish political parties were against it based on reasons that such a 
goal would be unachievable,.. The reason was that the struggle in Bashur Kurdistan was 
aiming towards the formation of a democratic Iraq and an autonomous Kurdistan region. 
Therefore, the political dominant idea was following the same pattern offered by the 
formation of an autonomous region in Iraq as an example for Bashur Kurdistan in all other 
parts of Kurdistan. According to many different sources, participation in all levels from all 
parts of Kurdistan to the revolution led by KDP under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani was 
very high. Not only people who participated voluntarily and sacrificed their life, but also 
from an economic perspective, they offered whatever they had in support of the uprising in 
Bashur. People were also participating all along the borders in Bakur Kurdistan. Similar 
examples came from Rojhilat and Rojava Kurdistan as well. Everybody did something 
according to their ability and their economic position. People from all walk of life and many 
Kurdish intellectuals have shared and felt the pain and sufferings of Bashur brothers; hence 
their physical participation with resources. However, the outcome of that huge participation 
was a dramatic failure. 
Those patriots and intellectuals from Bakur and Rojhilat have participated in Bashur’s 
struggle and deeply interacted and formed groups to start the guerrilla war in Bakur and 
Rojhilat Kurdistan. However, the tragedy of the KDP-Turkey leaders’ trails and the KDP-
Iran leaders’ handover to the Shah regime of Iran by the KDP-Iraq leadership was a strategic 
failure of the KDP-Iraq in relation to Bakur and Rojhilat. If they had been allowed to spread-
out the guerrilla war in Bakur and Rojhilat by the KDP-Iraq and Mustafa Barzani, would the 
Bashur liberation movement have had failed in 1975? A similar situation happened to the 
KDP-Iran in Rojhilat Kurdistan between 1979 and 1983, too.  
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Today, the second decade of 21st century, the components of Kurdistan National 
Liberation Movement has become significant actors at the internal, regional and international 
level. At the beginning of the twentieth century there was a very weak and loose national 
feeling with no well-organised political leadership. However, today significant changes are 
taking place; the Middle East is in the process of transformation, the process of democratic 
reforms has started, and brutal autocratic dictatorship are one by one leaving the stage. 
Bashur Kurdistan despite all difficulties is paving the road towards independence, Rojava 
Kurdistan’s political and military actors are in the evolution process, the Kurdistani forces are 
in a close relationship to them, and they are controlling most of Rojava Kurdistan’s 
geography. Rojhilat Kurdistan and Islamic Republic of Iran are in a critical situation, the US 
and Israel are making plans for a strike; Bakur Kurdistan in its consistent continued 5th 
decade of the political, ethno-national civil strife and high-intensive guerrilla war, and today 
has proved its strength that the Turkish State is searching for ways to negotiate and resolve 
the Kurdish question. 
From 2010, the so-called Arab Spring started in Tunisia and spread out to North Africa 
and the Middle East. The dominant autocratic and totalitarian regimes in Tunisia, Libya, 
Egypt and Yemen collapsed, and when the change wind arrived in Syria the worst civil war 
emerged. Turkey supported Al-Qaida related Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood 
organisations to prevent Rojava Kurdistan from gaining its legal legitimate status.  However, 
Rojava Kurdistan’s political parties chose to support a peaceful transformation and avoided 
their cities and towns from being destroyed in the battlefields. All the political parties in 
Rojava Kurdistan joined one of the two councils; the ENKS Syrian Kurdish National Council 
– Encumena Niştimanîya Kurdên Syria – and the MGRK Peoples Council of Western 
Kurdistan – Encumena Gelê Rojavayê Kurdistan. The ENKS was supported by the KDP and 
PUK, while the MGRK was supported by the PKK. Despite the political differences, the 
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PKK, KDP and PUK at least had a compromise and brought both fronts into one mechanism 
that is called the DBK – Desteya Dilinda Kurdî – Supreme Kurdish Committee, which was 
not allowed to function because of the Turkish state’s intervention.  
At least in the contemporary Kurdish history the repeated internal civil strife between 
the predominant parties has been prevented by the Kurds of Rojava Kurdistan. The political 
parties in Rojava are in the process of proving that they have learned lessons from their 
brothers’ failures in the past, and also in the contemporary political events in Bashur 
Kurdistan between the KDP and PUK, and between the PKK and KDP. The Kurds lost the 
opportunities in 19th and 20th centuries, because of their internal challenges and internal 
fights. The 21st century has been entitled a ‘Kurdish century’ by many, if Kurdish political 
parties are united in a democratic national congress. The transformation and paradigm change 
of the PKK will be studied in the mentioned period of 1973 to 2016.  
Outline of the Thesis	
 
The first chapter has been an explanation of why this research has been conducted; it 
has compared previous ontological –the study of being, in other words Kurdistan and the 
PKK - and epistemological - the theory of knowledge, and how the PKK’s transformation 
became knowable - explanations, according to which the territory called Kurdistan is an 
internationally unrecognized country. The previous theories and concepts can be used to 
explain the role of the different actors. However, it is the concept of stateless nation and 
nationalism in Kurdistan, which has evolved and moved towards becoming a social 
movement. One of the differences of this research is identifying that ethnic-state nationalism 
of Turkey and religious-state nationalism of Iran and their established institutionalization 
over the long run in history became the elements, which have strongly prevented the 
emergence of an independent Kurdish nation-state and. The ethnic and religious nationalism 
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of these two countries not only have been sponsored at the state level, but it has been deeply 
embedded in the society by direct state policies, based both on Turkish and Persian 
nationalisms. Hence, ethnic and religious nationalism in Iraq and Syria, in comparison to 
Turkish and Iran, does not have that historical established institutionalized character and has 
a weak social support base, because the states of Iraq and Syria are just recent mandates of 
Britain and France.  
Chapter two focuses on the definition of the nation from Anthony Smith and national 
identity and nationalism. These three concepts have caused the birth of national liberation 
movements. Inequality and oppression by a state on other ethnic and national components has 
produced primordialist, ethno-symbolist modernist nationalist sentiments. Particularly, the 
contemporary literature after the 1975 failure in Bashur Kurdistan has caused the formation 
of the pluralistic political environment, and many new political entities in all parts of 
Kurdistan emerged. A comparative analysis of this pluralist political environment through the 
reading of internal and external knowledge/literature will support the analysis of how 
nationalism reflected and shaped the political ideological and philosophical foundation of the 
contemporary political revolutionary discourse in Bakur Kurdistan, and from the other three 
parts of Kurdistan, too.  
Chapter three explores the evolution of Kurdish nationalism and the radical emergence 
of the PKK. It considers the short historical background and the emergence of political 
parties in Kurdistan, and how they reacted in the geo-strategic and geo-political nature of 
Kurdistan. As a trans-state or inter-state and inter-national question, issue or problem, it has 
inevitably caused the actors acting for its self-determination to have the same characteristics. 
This dialectical phenomenon resulted in the actions, reactions and interactions not only 
among the hegemonic states but also between Kurdistani political actors too. It elaborates the 
British, French, Russia, Iran and Turkish post-WWI policies towards the independence of 
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Kurdistan and their impacts and influences on political actors of Kurdistan. One of the most 
significant causes of the PKK’s paradigm change was the multiple regional and global 
players’ dealing with the Kurdish question. In general, the chapter deals with the definition of 
the Kurdistan question, taking into account political actors, the KDP’s domination Kurdistan 
National Liberation Movement and the way these actors dealt with the two Super Powers of 
the Cold War in the last twenty years. The charismatic leadership of the KDP and its 
influence on all Kurdistani people as an unrivalled actor had an impact on the social, cultural 
and political life from 1914 to 1975. The focus is specifically on the six political journeys of 
the Barzani family and their significant role in the ranks of the KDP. Mustafa Barzani as the 
leader of the most oppressed nation, devoted his life for the liberation and freedom of 
Kurdistan, started his journey from Barzan to Bitlis in the early ages as a messenger, then 
again from Barzan to Erzincan, where he was exiled to southern Iraq, then  to Suliamania, 
before he escaped to Barzan during the WWII. The chapter will talk about his participation in 
the formation of the Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad, his exile in the Soviet Union in 1958 
and his return to Iraq in 1961 where he restarted a war, which had failed in 1975, until his 
tragic death in March 1979 in the US. The KDP, under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani 
negotiated with almost all the relevant actors of the Kurdish question. The KDP’s national 
strategy from reformation to revolution and the tragic failure of 1975 caused a pluralist 
political environment, particularly in Bakur Kurdistan; the emergence of the PKK and 
reformulation of a national liberation strategy, the divorce of the Kurdish left from the 
Turkish, ideological confrontation with the KDP oriented nationalism, and finally the PKK’s 
next wave of changeto a broader platform from Ankara to Bakur Kurdistan.   
Chapter four focuses on the radical national and political strategy of the PKK. The 
PKK unlike the all other Kurdistani political parties does not have an organic primordial root 
from traditional Kurdish nationalism. On the contrary, as a political-national actor, it was 
  
	 40	
formed in the network of undergraduate university students in Ankara, the capital city of 
Turkey. How a group of young energetic students highly influenced by the Leftist 
Revolutionists formed their ideological and political network in Ankara and started to 
disseminate their political views in the Bakur Kurdistan provinces constitutes agreat 
historical event in Kurdish history. How did they challenge the political environment of the 
Bakur Kurdistan provinces, which were already occupied by other Kurdish political groups? 
How did they open a way for their arguments? Even if they started their activity in 1973, it 
was from 1978 to September 1980 that this ideological group became a party and it was in 
the process of promoting a guerrilla war, which prevented by the 12 September 1980 coup 
d’état.  The raids of the army weakened the PKK, thousands of its supporters were 
imprisoned, hundreds of the active members were killed and few hundred managed to leave 
the country. The chapter will analyse how the PKK managed to return and start a guerrilla 
war, and continued to challenge the KDP-Iraq, which was an established party with a great 
political and diplomatic experience, but was also a hegemonic dominant actor in all parts 
especially in the Botan, Colemerg, and Mardin provinces of Bakur Kurdistan among tribal 
leaders. In mid 1980s the PKK insisted on leading the Kurdistan National Liberation 
Movement and challenged all Kurdish and Turkish political organisations in Bakur 
Kurdistan. The PKK had a multifaceted struggle against the state, the Kurdish informers and 
collaborationists, Kurdish nationalists and reformists, Turkish leftists and Turkish ultra 
nationalist fascist organisations. The PKK relocated its cadres in Lebanon and Syria after 
guerrilla trainings in order to launch a guerrilla war when the 12th coup d’état took place. 
Finally, it analyses how the PKK returned from Syria and Lebanon back to Kurdistan  
Chapter five is concerned with how and why the PKK became the dominant hegemonic 
actor in Bakur and in Rojava. It explains and analyses how the PKK became a clandestine 
underground political party and established a guerrilla army and a popular front opening its 
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associations in most of the European countries and organised and mobilized Kurdish people 
around the world. The resistance of the PKK opened the door to legal political activities and 
became an interlocutor of the Turkish state announcing various ceasefires in order to solve 
the Kurdish question peacefully and democratically. When the state of Turkey changed its 
mind and showed it wanted to solve the Kurdish question peacefully and democratically the 
Kurdistan parliament in exile was established. When the dialogue and ceasefires started, it 
was the start of the PKK’s reformation.   
Chapter six focuses on the transformation of the PKK and investigates why the PKK 
needed a paradigm change. An ideological and political change and transformation was the 
hardest time the PKK ever faced in its history. It changed its national strategic goal of 
National liberation to democratic liberation. Although the PKK started some slight changes 
much earlier, however, the arrest of its leader was a huge blow and transformation speedup 
after Öcalan’s imprisonment. Despite all the good will the PKK showed the Turkish state, the 
state did not give any concessions. The search for a political and democratic peaceful solution 
started to disintegrate. The chapter finally assesses the formation of the KCK and its 
performance in Kurdistan.  
Chapter seven studies the implementation of the PKK’s Democratic Confederalism 
project. The paradigm change of the PKK brought with itself a new terminology and new 
definitions, which never have been used before such as democratic republic, democratic 
nation, and democratic autonomy. The chapter will explore and outline this terminology 
within the PKK’s framework. How the PKK has tried to implement its radical democracy, 
also known as democratic Confederalism, in civil society organisations and with 
decentralization and the devolution process. The chapter ends with an assessment of whether 
a democratic confederalism solution is possible.  
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Chapter eight shows the findings based on the practical implementation of the paradigm 
change and transformation of the PKK, and its shift towards radical democratic politics and 
democratic Confederalism starting from Bakur and Rojava, which has been accepted neither 
by Turkey nor Syria. The failed state of Syria still does not accept that the cantonal system of 
Rojava Kurdistan can possibly bring peace and stability. More importantly, moving towards a 
non-violent struggle will bring more people together and, in a more democratic environment, 
the political parties from the four parts of Kurdistan could work in a peaceful regional 
environment. This can totally change the traditional political landscape in Kurdistan and open 
the gate of democracy among the Kurds and their neighbours in the Middle East. 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the last quarter of the twentieth century - from 1970 onwards - the PKK 
emerged as radical movement among patriotic nationalist revolutionary leftist university 
students, in its ideological and theoretical discourse that defended a very unusual political 
tradition, which later became dominant in Turkey and Bakur Kurdistan. On the one hand the 
group built up its theoretical and ideological programme and its main discourse, but on the 
other hand, it struggled against Turkish leftist social-chauvinists and Kurdish nationalists. 
The Turkish state was proposing its ethno-nationalist ideology and strategy to the educated 
stratums of the society in Ankara the capital city of Turkey. By 1978 the PKK became one of 
the most influential political organizations defending Kurdistan as a classic colony. It was 
under the attack of Kurdish nationalist reformists, the Turkish left, the state and the Kurdish 
feudal tribe leaders. The PKK managed to survive from that huge attack from all sides and 
went a step further as an illegal political revolutionary party with the organisation of a 
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guerrilla army relying on the support of a wide popular front, while acting through diplomatic 
channels in order to communicate to the international community.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of socialist system, the PKK decided 
to reform its ideological, theoretical and political structure. As a revolutionary national 
liberation movement the PKK based its long-term strategy on three stages of the people’s war 
concept: defence, balance and offence. However, the collapse of the Berlin Wall inaugurated 
a new world’s political order. This had a huge impact on the PKK and called for a reform in 
its ideology that could not be based on the Cold War concepts any longer. 
The international conspiracy, which ended with handing over the PKK leader to the 
Turkish State, was a devastating blow to both the PKK itself and to all Kurds around the 
world. It was again the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, his lifetime loyal comrades, and the 
PKK organization that transformed the conspiracy to an advantage to negotiate with the 
Turkish state saving the hopes of the Kurdish masses. This was achieved due to the 
organization’s inheritance and its transformation into a new paradigm, but also avoiding an 
ethnic war between Kurds and Turks. The new paradigm transformed the goal of an 
independent, united and democratic Kurdistan to a Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan in the 
format of Democratic Confederalism of Kurdistani communities. In short the PKK attempted 
and focused on leaving the idea of the armed struggle in order to embrace the concept and 
paradigm of a democratic peaceful form of struggle, if Turkey was to comply with the rules 
and regulations of the European Union. 
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Chapter 2  
Theory and Methodology 
Introduction 
 
As the result of denial policies of Turkification and extermination of the Kurdish nation 
by the Turkish State, the national liberation discourse developed and caused Kurdish 
energetic university students to organise a party to defend national right to self-determination 
for Kurdish nation and its country Kurdistan. The paradigm change from national liberation 
(Armed Struggle-Guerrilla War) to democratic liberation (Non-Violent-Democratic-Political 
Struggle) of the PKK needs to be analysed through theoretical approaches of nation, national 
identity, national liberation and nationalism. The Kurdish question was seen by all Kurdish 
political parties including the PKK as a matter of the right to National Self-Determination. 
This has become an international question since the Kurds are divided into four different 
states. This chapter will approach this unresolved question by applying three different 
theories of nationalism: primordialist, ethno-symbolism, and modernist-constructivism. The 
formation of a nation and national identity as cultural, sociological and historical 
evolutionary process in the formation of nationalism as an ideology constitutes the first step 
towards the formation of a social movement (Smith 2001: pp. VI). This idea constituting 
further stage is the rationale of this research. Nationalism (in the case of an oppressed nation) 
does not emerge from nowhere, but from social, cultural, historical and ethnic roots. Even if 
such roots are fictive as Smith argues, nationalism is an ideology and a movement that must 
be closely related to national identity, a multidimensional concept, and extended to include a 
specific language, sentiments and symbolism (Smith: 1991, p. vii). The national liberation 
movement is the political movement of a nation, national identity and nationalist 
phenomenon. Although it has been suggested that the nation is created by nationalism as a 
social construct, nevertheless it has strong historical, social, cultural, territorial, and ethnic 
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roots. Of course, the paradigm of modernity should not be ignored. In the case of oppressed 
nations it is more visible how nation, national identity and national liberation discourses are 
interlinked. These concepts were the fundamental discourses during the bipolar world from 
the WWI until 1989 when the Soviet Union and its satellite states of the socialist system 
totally disappeared from the world stage.    
The first part of this chapter deals with the definition of nation, national identity, 
nationalism and national liberation in relation to the evolution of nationalism in Kurdistan. In 
particular, it will focus on whether the evolution of nationalism in Kurdistan is purely 
primordial, ethno-symbolist, and modern, or a synthesis of all of these. 
This approach aids the search for the answers regarding the questions that are 
concerned with the origin, development, reformation and transformation of the PKK in 
relation to its role in the evolution of national liberation and national identity. What is the role 
that the PKK has played in the KNLM (the Kurdistan National Liberation Movement) and 
why the reformation transformation processes occurred? Is it the transformation closely 
related to internal dynamics of its origin and its development, or to the external dynamics 
such as the collapse of the bipolar world? The concepts of nation, national identity, 
nationalism and national liberation will answer these questions of formation, transformation 
and re-transformation of the PKK’s political and national discourse in the coming chapters. 
At the end of this chapter, a methodology and literature review explores recently 
produced academic knowledge on the subject of the PKK in connection to nation, 
nationalism, national identity and national liberation movement in Kurdistan, which are at the 
heart of this thesis. Although external factors become significant in the paradigm change and 
transformation of the PKK after the Cold War, internal demands of Kurdish people in Bakur 
and Rojava Kurdistan in particular, have been either an independent state or at least a 
federalist state solution.	
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The Nation 
 
Definition of the nation is a problematic topic, since none of the most famous 
academics of the field of nation, nationalism and ethnicity –Anderson, Smith, Hobsbawm, 
and Renan agree on a well-defined meaning. Nevertheless, at the middle ground it could be 
argued that a shared language, culture, long history, geography, and a shared goal of their 
future are the parameters of a people that make them as a nation. In order to analyse the 
strategic goal of the national liberation movement initially led by the PKK Bakur Kurdistan 
that then spread out to all four parts, the concepts of nation, national identity, national 
liberation and nationalism extraordinary role they played must be analysed, too. The above-
mentioned concepts as the theoretical perspectives of the movement attracted people to be 
organised, mobilised and politicised for revolution. The concepts of nation, national identity, 
national liberation and nationalism were the paramount factors in of the PKK. Hence the 
theoretical base of this research has been developed through this lens. 
During the Cold War era, most of the conflicts were in the so-called the Third World 
between colonised groups of people. They were mainly fighting for their right to national 
self-determination and independence against colonialist states and imperial capitalist powers. 
The bipolarity of the world was an opportunity to those oppressed people if their geo-
strategic and geo-political situation were in interest of any of those powers, would have 
economic, political and diplomatic significant support. This happened in China, Cuba, 
Vietnam, Laos, Mozambique and many more. Most of them had a significant economic, 
political and diplomatic support from the Soviet Union against so called US led imperialist 
system. Most of those conflicts were resolved after long series of armed resistance, called 
national liberation war, majority of them successfully adopted a Marxism-Leninism ideology 
in the struggle of an oppressed nation striving for self-determination. Their definition of a 
nation was based on what Marx, Engels, Lenin or Stalin had theorised. Although most 
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Marxists were not in favour of Stalin, his analysis of a nation was widely accepted among 
Chinese, Vietnamese, and Mozambique national liberation movements. In that case, from a 
Marxist perspective, what is the definition of a nation? As cited in the book of Nationalism 
by Smith and Hutchinson from Joseph Stalin: the concept of nation undoubtedly is the most 
problematic and contentious term (Smith: 2001, p 10). Charles Tilly described it as one of the 
most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon (Tilly: 1975, p 6).   
A nation has primarily been defined as a community of people, but not one that is racial 
or a tribal; for example the modern Italian nation, which, consists of Romans, Teutons, 
Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs and so forth. The French nation was formed from Gauls, Romans, 
Britons, Teutons, and so on. The same is applicable to the British, the Germans and others, 
who were formed into nations from people of diverse races and tribes; therefore firstly a 
nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historical community of people (Stalin: 1973, p.57-61).  
Secondly, unquestionably the great empires of Cyrus and Alexander could not be called 
nations, although they were historically consisted of people from different races and tribes. 
They were not nations, but loosely connected conglomeration of groups, which fell apart or 
joined together according to the victories or defeats of this or that conqueror. This was also 
the case in the conquests of the Ottoman, Russian and Mongolian empires. Thus, a nation is 
not a temporary or loosely, ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of people 
(Ibid, p. 57-61). 
But not every historically stable definite community constitutes a nation. The 
Ottomans, who ruled the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans for a stable period of 
history from 16th to 19th century, never became a nation. What distinguishes a national 
community from a state community? A national community is inconceivable without a 
common language, which is not a necessity for a state community. The Czech nation in 
Austria and the Polish in Russia would be impossible if each did not have a common 
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language, whereas the integrity of Russia and Austria is not affected by the fact that there are 
a number of different languages within their borders. We are referring, of course, to the 
spoken of languages of the people and not the official government languages (Ibid. p. 57-61).  
A nation starts with a definite, historical and a stable community with one of the 
characteristic feature of having a common language. A common language is possibly used by 
more than one nation as in the example of the US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and so 
on. A common language is for every nation, but not necessarily several languages for one 
nation. There is no nation, which at one and the same time speaks several languages, but this 
does not mean that there cannot be two or more nations speaking the same language as in the 
above example. But do the English, American and Canadian or Australians not constitute one 
nation in spite of their common language? Because they do not live together within the same 
geographical location, but inhabit different territories. A nation is formed only as a result of 
lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people living together generation after 
generation. But also people cannot live together for lengthy periods unless they have a 
common territory. For example the Americans and Englishmen are the same nation living on 
the same territory as one nation in England. But some of them emigrated from England to 
America, and over the course of time, permanently and stably living within the same 
territory, has resulted in the formation of the American nation. So, the different territory led 
the formation of a different nation, the American nation. The English and Americans speak 
the same language, but they are two separate nations.  
Another interesting example concerns the Arabs. There are twenty-two Arab countries 
divided into different geographical territories, but speaking the same language. Although 
connected geographically, their habitat had been divided between different imperial powers 
of the time due to colonisation. From Morocco to the United Arab Emirates, almost all of 
North Africa and half of the Middle East speak the Arabic language. More than twenty-two 
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countries speak one language, divided into different nation-states. Those Arab states are 
mostly based on one clan or tribe, and they have close economic and political interests with 
powerful international actors.  
Spain and most of the Latin American countries are speaking the same language but are 
living in different geographical territories; for example Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina and 
many more. Therefore, the second characteristic of a stable, historical and definite 
community is a common territory (Ibid. p 19). 
A third requirement for a community of people to be called a nation is their connection 
through economic relations and interactions. The transformation of the social and economic 
relations from the feudal serfdom to the more advanced capitalist economic developments 
and the mass production of means open the ways of communications. Economic development 
introduced new ways of communications and interconnectedness among people. Social, 
economic and cultural life style was transformed from closed village local life to a broader 
regional and country level. This transformation took place through a common economic life 
and economic cohesion. Therefore, the isolated middle age closed village local life 
completely opened up by capitalist economic relations (Ibid. p 20). 
The fourth characteristic is a national character, which is the specific spiritual 
complexion of the people forming a nation. For example Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and 
Turkey they claim that they speak the same language, nevertheless constitute three different 
distinct nations. Arabs constituted of twenty-two national entities but almost speak one 
language. But the territorial distance between them, and the unique life conditions have 
modified their psychological make-up and national character. Thus a common psychological 
make-up, which manifests itself in a common culture, is the fourth characteristics of a nation. 
From this theoretical perspective, based on the Marxist definition by Stalin, a nation is: 
A historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common 
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language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common 
culture (Hutchinson &Smith: 1994, p20). This definition is based on objective factors. The 
subjective definition is in the example of Benedict Anderson, such as basing a nation on 
attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments as an imagined political community. Max Weber was 
on the other hand mentioning that the purely objective criteria of a nation such as having a 
language, religion, and territory always fail to include some nations. Conversely, subjective 
definitions generally take too large a catch of cases (Smith: 2001, p 11).  
According to Smith the nation is a felt and lived community; a category of behaviour as 
much as imagination, and one that requires certain actions from the members. But it is neither 
a state nor an ethnic community. It is not a state because, the concept of the state relates to 
institutional activity, while that of the nation denotes a type of community. It is not an ethnic 
community because, despite some overlap in that both belong to the same family phenomena 
(collective cultural identities), though it is a community whose members share a homeland 
and culture. The ethnic community usually has no political referent, and in many cases lacks 
a public culture and even a territorial dimension, since it is not necessary for an ethnic 
community to be in physical possession of its historic territory. But a community, as Smith 
continues, must occupy a homeland of its own at least for a long period of time in order to 
constitute itself as a nation. The nation also needs to have an evolved public culture and 
desire some degree of self-determination. On the other hand, it is not necessary for a nation to 
possess a sovereign state of its own, but an aspiration for a measure of autonomy coupled 
with the physical occupation of its homeland (Smith: 2001, p. 12). 
David Miller offers definition that is similar to that of Stalin and Smith’s, but that 
differs greatly from Anderson’s. Miller defines a nation as (1) constituted by shared belief 
and mutual commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a 
particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture 
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(Miller: 1995, p. 27). The issue with Smith and Miller’s definitions of a nation is that the 
importance of the language of a community as constituting a nation is overlooked. Language 
is one of the fundamental elements and distinguishing factor of a nation. Ernest Renan 
defines the nation in this way: 
A nation is a soul and a spiritual principle. As he says two things, which strictly 
speaking are just one, constitute this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in 
the present. One is the common possession of a rich legacy of memories; the other is 
actual consent, the desire to live together, and the will to continue to value the heritage 
that has been received in common. (Renan 1996: 57-8) 
 
Renan’s definition is a clear link between past and the present. He links the past and the 
present through memories and history as a rich legacy with the present will and the consent 
of living in purely based on subjective elements. Purely basing the concept of the nation on 
the mentioned subjective factors seems an incomplete definition and explanation of a nation. 
It is very complex and difficult to find a common definition of a nation from scholars in 
the field of nation and nationalism.   
Smith bases his argument heavily on ethno-symbolism, Hutchinson on cultural and 
political elements, Anderson on an imagined political community, and Hobsbawm on an 
invented tradition. However, at some point most of the mentioned scholars of the field of 
nation and nationalism seem to overlap in their ideas. For example, nations are the name of 
progressed and developed cultural, social, historical ethnic communities that had lived over 
long historical continuity as groups on a permanent geographical territory. On that theory, 
they have had a continued historical legacy. That territory and history had shaped a common 
language, culture, costumes, traditions and a psychological make-up. As the results of all 
these, they have developed a language for common understanding and communication. 
Therefore, nations are not just a social construct that suddenly appeared by the industrial 
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revolution and through the emergence of the capitalist economic system (Smith 1999: p. 11), 
but as named human populations that have evolved over the long period of history. 
The debates on nation that occurred during the 1960s and 70s Turkey led to the PKK’s 
founding, with the aim of defending the Kurdish people as a separate nation than the Turks. 
Their long history embedded in the geography of Kurdistan, their culture, social life, and 
economic relations tells story than the Turks. The reason of its birth and foundation was 
thinking differently on nation and national question in the political debates of the time. 
Kurdistan was defended as a different country than Turkey, and Kurdish people a different 
nation than Turkish nation. Therefore the national right to self-determination was a natural 
and universal right of Kurdish people. Moreover if the national right to self-determination 
was not accepted by Turkish state, Kurdish activists had the right to organise their people for 
national liberation if not by peaceful means, then through a violent struggle as a necessity. 
These ideas were developed through debates on whether Kurdish people were a nation or not. 
Most of Kurdish political organisations and parties emerged on the bases of the sharp debates 
on Kurdish national question and their national right to self-determination. The major 
difference between the PKK and all other Kurdish parties and organisations was how soon to 
start a national liberation war against Turkish state’s colonialist rule. Amongst all of them, 
the PKK was the one that wanted to start as soon as possible, because the PKK believed that 
the objective and subjective conditions for Kurdistan national liberation had ripened enough. 
Therefore the question of nation or Kurdish national question was the most important topic of 
1960s and 70s of Turkey and Bakur Kurdistan. National self-determination was the 
fundamental reason for emergence of the PKK and its national liberation struggle. 		
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National Identity 
 
National identity means belonging to a territory/homeland, sharing experience and 
memory of the past and present, having distinct symbols and language, which means the 
holder of the identity-individual and collective-, is a separate phenomenon. Identity has been 
identified and understood firstly as “a ground or basis for of social or political action,” 
secondly “a collective phenomenon”, thirdly “a product of social or political action”, fourthly 
“a core aspect of (individual or collective) selfhood,” and fifthly “as an evanescent product of 
multiple and competing discourses” (Brubaker, 2004, p. 33-34). These five mentioned 
elements of the concept of identity also combine people’s names, languages and cultures. The 
way people live and behave towards others is also a part of identity. Social and political 
conditions cause production of multiple collective actions by individual and collective 
identities. 
 National identity means belonging to a distinct territory, culture, shared experience, 
national symbols, language and public duties; it means belonging to a nation. The nature 
causes and consequences of national identity are collective phenomena (Castells 1997: p. 6). 
Therefore, a community of people, whether it has its own state apparatus or not, is a distinctly 
different nation as long as the people share collective cultural and lingual characteristics on a 
distinct geographic territory and feel different from other human populations. As Guibernau 
points out that creation of national identity, is it a phenomenon of both individual and 
collective emerged with the conditions of modernity? Developments of printing made 
education more advanced, and led to the expansion of vernacular languages and cultural 
developments in nineteenth century Europe (Guibernau: 1996, p. 66). More advanced and 
sophisticated printing caused expansion of written materials, which helped increase the 
outreach of advanced literacy among the communities, and helped the rise of a sense of 
national consciousness. Advancement of literacy pushed cultural developments and played a 
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decisive role in the expansion of vernacular languages and the sense of belonging to a 
community and collective identity (Ibid. p. 66). This modernist understanding of national 
identity has been criticised by scholars of the field of nationalism such as Smith, Kedourie, 
and Hutchinson.      
The Soviet Union from the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution to the 1991 Perestroika and 
Glasnost reforms had accommodated hundreds of different national identities and fifteen 
republics under the umbrella of a socialism aiming at a classless and stateless society. Even 
the ruling communist party in 1970s and 1980s were insisting that economic developments 
together with a social, cultural and political progression of the population would have 
reached the stage that all ethnic and national identities were going to disappear soon in the 
wider community created by the Soviet system (Sakwa 1998: pp. 66-70). After Gorbachev’s 
Perestroika and the Glasnost reforms, the Soviet Union collapsed and the fifteen republics 
declared their independence. In the Soviet Union, territories of the Eastern European 
republics also had a similar situation. Czechoslovakia was divided between two different 
nations and Yugoslavia into seven different nations (Brubaker 1996: p. 23-54). The purpose 
of mentioning these examples is that ethnic and national identities can be silenced for a 
period of time, but cannot be annihilated and assimilated forever. From 1917 to 1991, the 
Soviet Union tried to unify different ethnic communities under the umbrella of a classless 
society. The outcome after seventy-four years of experience was a deeply divided union of 
different ethnicities and classes, which finally collapsed and led to hundreds of ethnic, class 
and religious conflicts.   
In the case of Aztecs and Incas in the American continent as well as in Anatolia with 
Armenians, Greeks, Pontus and Kurds, the territory was totally cleaned-up from its 
indigenous inhabitants by the newcomers.  However, in the twenty-first century Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria are still trying to get rid of the Kurdish question through assimilation policies 
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following the examples used in the past against Assyrians, Armenians, Jews and Kurds again. 
So the existence of ethnic human groups and their cultural and social evolution into larger 
human populations and distinct nations inevitably led toward the idea of national self-
expression. This national self-expression in the case of oppressed and colonised people has 
caused national liberation wars. Since the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, the number of the independent states has doubled. There are also hundreds of ethnic 
and national groups in their struggle for their right to self-determination across the world. The 
main cause of all national secessionist movements and ethno-racial and ethno-national 
conflicts in different parts of the world in reality is the belonging to different ethnic-national 
groups. Anthony Smith has repeatedly discussed in academic circles that the power and roots 
of ethnicity is not something that happened simultaneously, but something that has 
accumulated through a millennia of experience, cultural developments and historical legacy.   
As Smith clearly points out, national identity and the nation are complex constructs 
composed of a number of interrelated components – ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and 
legal – political. These components signify the bonds of solidarity among the members of 
communities united by shared memories, myths and tradition that may not find expression in 
states of their own, but are entirely different from the purely legal and bureaucratic ties of the 
state (Smith: 1991, p. 15). Conceptually, Smith puts the nation at the core of national identity, 
and highlights it as a multidimensional entity with a civic, territorial and ethnic dimension.  
Therefore, national identity becomes a persistent and flexible force in modern life and 
politics and combined effectively with other powerful ideologies without losing its character 
(Ibid. p.15).  
National identity during the post-colonial era was combined with a socialist ideology 
and became the guiding theory of national liberation movements in Vietnam, Mozambique, 
Guinea and Cuba, and many more. Nation and national identities became the fundamental 
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elements of national ideology in multi-ethnic states, were combined with leftist ideologies, 
and led national liberation struggles against the dominant ethnic national groups. Hence, 
many conflicts still exists today such as Kurdistan with Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria and to 
some extend with Armenia and Azerbaijan; Baluchistan with Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan; 
Kashmir with Pakistan and India; Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Georgia and Russia and 
so on. Among all these mentioned ethno-national conflicts, whether we identify them as 
ethno-national minorities or not, the worst case of all is the case of Kurdistan. Baluchistan, 
Kashmir, Abkhazia and Ossetia all somehow have been recognised either as autonomous 
regions and now enjoys an official status. However, in Kurdistan’s case, with the exception 
of than Bashur part of Kurdistan which still has massive unsolved problems with Iraq, the 
community still has not been recognised even as a minority. The struggle of oppressed ethnic 
and religious groups, and ethno-national entities against the oppressor nation-states are a 
struggle for survival, for the preservation of their identities. The conflicts between Kurdistani 
people and Turkish, Iraq, Iran and Syrian states are fundamentally based on identity. Those 
states mentioned earlier have constitutionally denied the Kurd’s identity, thus leading to the 
Kurds fighting for their identity to be recognised.  
We can find similar cases of legally recognised nations without an independent status 
in the United Kingdom, Spain and Belgium, which can be compared distinctly with what 
happens in the cases of Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the United 
Kingdom since 1997, the process of devolving the power to the regions, the evolution of 
national identity has been flourished in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. When different 
ethnic identities are allowed express themselves democratically they do not cause any 
violence. For example, the Northern Ireland conflict continued for decades but since 1997 it 
has had a dramatic decrease and currently Northern Ireland has opted for a peaceful solution 
of the problem through a power sharing agreement between the Unionists and Sinn Fein.  
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The Labour government in United Kingdom permitted Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland to establish their national assemblies. Interestingly, these assemblies have not become 
the source of division and separation; conversely they have even made the communities 
closer as the unity of differences. Even the municipalities have a strong autonomy of 
governing local governments. The power of the centre has been reduced, whereas the powers 
of the local councils/municipalities have increased. Therefore the Scots, Irish, Welsh even 
Cornish identities are not in such a violent conflicts as seen in the Middle East.   
When the opportunity for freedoms and democratic right of expression is given, as in 
the example of United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium, the level of violence decreases to none, 
although there are some incidents from time-to-time, overall the results are within a 
democratic peaceful coexistence and solved through peaceful non-violent means. When the 
Welsh, Scottish, and Irish express their national identities without any restriction and defend 
their national rights peacefully, then there would not be any need for violent conflict. When 
the law and the status of all entities guarantee the democratic preservation of their ethnic and 
national rights and duties, there is no need to apply to the violent means of struggle. In the 
United Kingdom, rights and freedoms of expression of all national and ethnic entities have 
been protected, and even in presence of any claim for separation and secession, non violent 
acts are committed to this scope.  
In Spain, the situation of Catalonia and the Bask national identity in the democratic and 
decentralized system is similar to some extent with the Welsh and Scottish national identity 
within the United Kingdom. Their democratic rights and freedoms have been protected, and 
they are free to express their differences with different regional flags, in the education 
system, and with regional parliaments. In the Belgium federalism, different nationalities have 
given democratic protection. In Switzerland’s twenty-six Cantons, legal protection has been 
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provided for different national identities to govern themselves, and it is the most democratic 
system in terms of protecting different national identities. 
When national identities are allowed democratic expression and the environment to 
flourish in literature, education and in self-governing, they become closer rather than 
conflicted. The EU is an obvious example. Travelling from Spain to Stockholm and from 
Lithuania to Italy and Greece, there are no customs imposing travel restriction, or demanding 
national identity cards, or the payment of customs. If the democratic experience of the 
European Union supported by economic justice and fair economic investment in the less 
developed parts of Europe succeeds, then the 21st Century would definitely see the EU’s 
successful story in all other parts of Asia and Africa.  
During the Cold War era the dominant discourse in the case of oppressed nations, was 
fighting against imperialism. This principle was supported by the international socialist 
system led by the Soviet Union, as it happened in the case of China, Vietnam, and Cuba and 
so on. However, after the demise of the Soviet Union in the world political system and the 
end of Cold War, the strategy of national liberation totally went under reconsideration. This 
was because the popular strategy in the colonised nations’ war was setting up a guerrilla war 
as part of a Soviet led socialist camp. According to the guerrilla war strategy, a long period of 
an asymmetric war continued and the equilibrium of defence, balance and offence war tactics 
followed. Especially in the balance stage, foreign help was needed. This help was provided 
by the socialist camp, which happened in the case of Cuba, China, Vietnam, Mozambique 
and Laos. The collapse of the socialist camp left the national liberation movements of the 
colonised peoples without support. Hence, national liberation strategy had to be reconsidered. 
Instead of campaigning for a long-term popular war, it would be better to concentrate the 
effort on creating the legal background in support of democratic forms of struggle in order to 
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solve conflicts through negotiations and dialogue, as between Israel and Palestinians, and 
between the East Timor and Indonesia.  
The concept of nation is embedded deep in people’s culture, language, long history, and 
geography, which they share over centuries through their way of life and psychological 
behaviour in sharing a common destiny. From this common perspective the treatment of the 
Kurdish nation led to a rise of new defences with a strategic goal of Kurdistan national 
liberation as a nation among the society of the nations in the world Kurdish nation must have 
their national identity. The right for a Kurdish national identity was the second fundamental 
reason of the PKK’s emergence. 
 
Nationalism 
  
Nationalism is, first of all, a doctrine of popular freedom and sovereignty. The people 
must be liberated and must feel free from any external constraint, they must determine their 
own destiny and be masters in their own country, they must control their own resources, and 
they must obey only their ‘inner’ voice (Smith & Hutchinson 1994: pp. 4). In the case of the 
oppressed nations as in Vietnam, Laos, Mozambique, Angola and Guiana during the post-
Second World War period, nationalism was used as an ideology of national liberation against 
colonialism and imperialism. As Smiths states: 
We could, equally, catalogue the benign effects of nationalism: its defence of minority; 
its rescue of ‘lost’ histories and literatures; its inspiration for cultural renascences; its 
resolution of ‘identity crisis’; its legitimation of community and social solidarity; its 
inspiration to resist tyranny; its ideal of popular sovereignty and collective 
mobilization; even the motivation of self-sustaining economic growth (Smith 1991: p. 
18). 
 
  
	 60	
During the Cold war era, nationalism to some extent had played a positive role in the 
case of oppressed nations against imperialism and colonialism. Conversely in the case of 
oppressor nations, it had played a very negative role. For instance, the policy of creating one 
nation and one language, accumulation of the state power on the hands of one ethnic group to 
be only the hegemony, and abandoning all the other ethnic groups (Kirisçi & Winrow 1998: 
pp. 23). That negative role of power and hegemony accumulating in the hand of one national 
group and a nationalist ideology in the form of one nation state had devastating results of 
denial, ethnic cleansing and genocides in many regions of the world. Not a very distant past, 
but a recent past has witnessed devastating examples in Europe, Africa, America and Asian 
continents. Genocides were committed as the result of extreme nationalism in the examples 
of Aztecs and Incas in America; Jews and Romans in Europe; Armenians, Assyrians, 
Yezidis, Greeks, Pontus by the Ottoman Empire, and then by the new Turkish republic 
against Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds. So, nationalism before the collapse of the Cold War 
had played these two different functions positively and negatively. In the post-Cold War era, 
and particularly in the multipolar and globalized world, nationalism has become an impasse 
(Ozkirimli 2010: pp. 1-7). 
Primarily Nationalism is an ideology, but also as a social movement and a symbolic 
language that explores its meanings, varieties and sources as Smith states in all his scientific 
works on nationalism. It brings together people who share similar characteristics such as 
culture, language, history, and territory and in so many cases, systems of beliefs. However, 
there are different varieties of nationalism. Although these variations define nationalism 
differently, the source and subject of all variants is only one: the nation. That source starts 
from a single individual then continues to a family, from a family to a clan and from a clan to 
a tribe; from a single tribe to a tribal confederation, then to an ethnic group, and finally from 
a larger community of ethnic groups to a nation. All the developments regarding nationalism 
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are as an ideology coming from the cultural roots of ethnicity, and then the nation to be 
organised in a state apparatus. The state is as an apparatus to coordinate social, cultural, 
economic, and political institutions of a nation.  
The nation-state concept previous to the Cold War was the ultimate goal in the case of 
national liberation movements in colonised peoples/nations in many parts of the world. 
However, in the globalized world and in the era of democracy, human rights and equal 
opportunities to be defended by the rule of democratic laws, the ultimate goal of creating a 
nation-state for each nation has changed. The concept of the European Union and its 
evolutionary process moving from the union of states to the union of people’s local 
governances, and removing the barriers of artificial borders between peoples is becoming a 
widely accepted concept. Therefore, Europe was the birthplace of nationalism and since the 
Westphalia in 1645 the nation-state, but now has become the birthplace of the rule of 
democracy and democratic local self-governances, if the process continues in this trajectory. 
So the concept of the EU become a new system after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
particularly single market, single currency and removal of borders between members 
sounding new progressive political global system that small nations can continue their 
existence under that umbrella.  
 
Primordialism: Primordialist theorists have seen the nation as a natural existence, 
rather than a social and cultural occurrence, granting communities as primordial or natural in 
origin, or which are intrinsic to human evolution (Smith 1998: Ch.7). For the primordialist, 
nations are the foundations of human history, extensions of primitive kinship groups with 
common ancestry and clear social and territorial boundaries; they can forge out of a variety of 
elemental aspects such as language, race, religion, and custom, whereby nations and their 
characteristics can be distinctively identified from one another. These theories are most 
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sharply criticised for giving biological accounts of nations, which in fact are better seen as 
cultural and political phenomenon (Puri 2004: p.44). Kinship, culture and common social 
territorial boundaries are some elements of nations and nationalism.   
The primordialist paradigm in the theory of nationalism is not a monolithic category. 
According to Smith, it is identifiable in four different versions: the ‘nationalist’, 
‘sociobiologist’, ‘culturalist’ and ‘perennialist’ approaches. The common denominator of 
these approaches is their belief in naturalness and/or antiquity of nations (Özkrimli 2010: 50).  
According to Smith there are at least two kinds of Primordialism: the first is the 
‘sociobiological’ version, and the second is the ‘cultural givens’ of social existence, which is 
the more influential of the two (Smith 2001: 52). However, according to Ethno-Symbolists, 
the primordialists fail to sufficiently account for the role of history and culture in the 
emergence of nations and nationalism. 
Ethno-Symbolism: The ethno-symbolist paradigm is an alternative kind of socio-
historical and cultural analysis to primordial and modernist paradigms of nationalism; it 
provides a midway approach between primordialists and modernists as historical ethno-
symbolism. According to ethno-symbolists, modern nationalism did not appear out of 
nothing, but has clearly pre-modern antecedents. Smith clearly analyses that the rise of 
nations is predicted on the basis of ‘ethnic cores’, developed from pre-modern ‘ethnie’ whose 
members possess a collective name, share a myth of common ancestry, possess one or more 
differentiating elements of common culture, share historical memories, associate themselves 
with a specific ‘homeland’ and have a sense of solidarity for a section of the population 
(Smith 2001: p.13). The power of ethno-symbolism comes from history of myths, memories, 
traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritage. The ethno-symbolist account gives more weight to 
subjective elements of memory, value, sentiment, myth and symbol, and that it thereby seeks 
to enter and understand the inner worlds of ethnicity and nationalism (Ibid: p.57). 
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As in the case of Gaelic revival in the late nineteenth century Ireland, (Huthchinson 
1987: chap. 4-5) the relationship between various elites and the lower strata – the people– 
was represented through cultural traditions. Cultural traditions, and partly in consequence of 
their vernacular mobilization, influenced the intelligentsia, political leaders and bourgeoisie, 
by constraining their innovations within certain cultural parameters and by providing motifs 
and personnel for their cultural project and political goals (Smith 2001: p.57). The second 
concern of ethno-symbolic account is the complex relationship between past, present and 
future and the place of ethnies and nations and collective identity in history.  
For Smith the nation is neither as natural nor perennial as primordialist claims, nor has 
it been fabricated without historical and cultural roots and ethnic connections, as some 
modernists would have it. While modernists like Hobsbawm (1990) dismiss the importance 
of ethnicity in the rise of nationalism, for Smith, nations have evolved around “ethnic cores.” 
According to Smith (1998), the creation of national identities without ethnic bases is doomed 
to oblivion.     
Modernism: The modernist paradigm is a process and product of socio-economic 
developments in Europe, which have come to existence with the foundation of French 
Republic and economic industrialization. ‘The French Revolution inaugurated not just a new 
ideology, but a new form of human community, a new kind of collective identity, a new type 
of polity and, in the end, a new kind of inter-state order. In the conjunction and interlinking 
of these novel phenomena, is mirrored the new world order of modernity’ (Smith 2001: 47).  
Smith divides modernism in two forms: chronological and sociological. The first one is about 
ideology, movement and symbolism as relatively recent; and the latter is qualitatively novel 
that in the form of innovation and an updated version of something far older. Modernist 
paradigm has been considered in four varieties: socioeconomic, socio-cultural, political, and 
ideological and constructionist. 
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‘Socioeconomic version of nationalism and nations is derived from economic and 
social factors as industrial capitalism, regional inequality and class conflict. According 
to Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter, specifically national sentiments and ideals are 
aroused by relative deprivation between regions within modern states or classes across 
states, between the underdeveloped peripheral and developed core regions or between 
core and peripheral elites backed by the newly mobilized ‘masses’ of the periphery 
(Hechter 1975; Nairn 1977).  
 
Fledging Kurdish nationalism up to the WWI was mainly led by mostly tribal elements, 
because the economic and social relation was based on a feudal mode of production with the 
feudal means of the production. Mainly those people living in the plains were cultivating the 
land by wooden-frame plough (with iron Ploughshare), drawn by oxen or a mule and reaping 
with sickle and/or scythe. The other portions of people were living at the mountainous 
villages in a semi-nomadic way, maintaining animals as their source of living and income 
(Bruinessen 1992:16-16). However this situation to some degree inevitably transformed 
industrial machineries was introduced in Kurdistan as the means of production; it caused 
thousands of people to become jobless and move to the bigger cities of Turkey as seasonal 
workers, such as Istanbul and Izmir. Although the education was entirely based on the 
assimilation and total extinction of the Kurdish nation and language, the memory, belonging 
and the socialization process of the young students, particularly of those from Bakur 
Kurdistan in Turkey, reacted in opposition to the state’s official ideology. Those students and 
the seasonal workers in the real life were faced with many questions, which contradicted with 
their real situation. They become the source and elite of the leading Kurdish nationalism with 
a leftist identity in contradiction to the state and the state’s Kurdish feudal landowners and 
tribal leaders.  
Socio-cultural forms of nationalism and nations are sociologically necessary 
phenomena of modern, industrial epoch, emerging in the transition of ‘modernization’. 
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Nations are expressions of literature, school-transmitted ‘high culture’ supported by 
specialists and by a mass, standardized, compulsory, public education system. By training a 
mobile, literate workforce, nations in turn support industrialism, just as the latter encourages 
nationalism (Gellner 1964, ch.7; 1973; and 1983).  
The political version of nationalism and nations are forged in and through the modern 
professionalized state, either directly or in opposition to specific (imperial/colonial) states. 
For theorists like John Breuilly, Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann, not only is the modern 
state the best predictor of nations and nationalism, its relationship with society forms the 
crucible for re-integrative nationalism, which is the inevitable concomitant of state 
sovereignty (Giddens 1985; Breuilly 1993; Mann 1995).  
Ideological form focuses on the European origins and the modernity of nationalist 
ideology, its quasi-religious power and its role in breaking up empires and creating nations 
where none had existed. Elie Kedourie has traced nationalist ideologies to the impact of the 
Enlightenment and Kantian ideas of self-determination, and ultimately to medieval Christian 
millennial doctrines; he has demonstrated their destructive effects on non-European peoples 
when discontented intelligentsia adapted these chiliastic European doctrines to their native 
ethnic and religious traditions (Kedourie 1960; and 1971: Introduction).  
Constructionism is a rather different form of modernism in that, though it assumes that 
nations and nationalism are wholly modern, it emphasizes their socially constructed 
character. Nations according to Eric Hobsbawm owe much to ‘invented traditions’, which are 
products of social engineering and are created to serve the interests of ruling elites by 
channelling the energies of the newly enfranchised masses. Benedict Anderson, on the other 
hand, views the nation as an imagined political community, which fills the void, left by the 
decline of cosmic religions and monarchies at the point, where new conceptions of time and 
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‘print capitalism’ made it possible to imagine nations through linear time (Hobsbawm and 
Ranger 1983; Anderson 1991)’ (Smith 2001: 46-7).  
Primordialism, ethno-symbolism and modernist theories briefly explained above 
underline that none of these theories could be the single satisfactory source of explanation. 
Although all of them have strong arguments, however, nationalism as a more recent ideology 
came to the stage with economic progression of capitalism and industrial revolution. Since 
the French revolution, it has become the source of the nation-state. Modernist theories have 
collectively added to our understanding of nationalisms and nations as modern and their links 
with other structures and practices of modernity (Puri 2004: p.43).   
The modernist varieties of nationalism are highly relevant to the comparative analysis 
of political parties in Kurdistan and in a nation without its own state. These four versions 
constitute the fundamental theoretical base for writing this dissertation. The paramount 
complexity of the political, social, cultural, lingual, and economic situations and conditions 
of the communities of people of Kurdistan can be explained through these theories. 
Inevitably this complex situation had its impact on the nationalist and revolutionary, political 
organisations and parties who are struggling for the freedom and liberation of Kurdistan. 
The discussion of this thesis on nationalism and the goal of the PKK were creating a 
Kurdish nation state, the module of nationalism the PKK sought was a combination of ethno-
symbolist, modernist and some elements of primordialist, collectively called patriotic 
nationalism. At the beginning it was named Kurdistan Revolutionaries and later became 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party. In the PKK’s first written manifesto, it repeatedly declared that 
any group of people in their historical evolution that had not created their own state would 
face an extermination and extinction. Such as the examples of Aztec and Inca people in 
America and Assyrian and Armenian people in Anatolia. But those people who created their 
own states have been moved to an upper stage of historical evolution and became honourable 
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members of civilised society. The PKK’s manifesto also explained Kurdistan not only as the 
home of Kurdish people, but also the home of Armenian and Assyrian people, too. So the 
nationalism of the PKK had chosen initially not only a patriotic but also a democratic 
nationalism too. Chapter seven and eight will analyse whether this patriotic and democratic 
nationalistic approach had been dropped and transformed, and if so to which kind of 
nationalism. 
 
National Liberation 
 
The concepts of the nation and national identity have been significant elements of 
nationalism as an ideology in the case of oppressed nations during the twentieth century. 
Nationalism was the ideology for fighting for freedom and national liberation during the 
colonial rules of colonialists in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The October Revolution in 
Russia created a wide geographical territory for many different ethnic and racial entities to 
live under the political ideology of socialism. Socialism became widely accepted as the 
preferred political system among the labour movements in the industrialized countries of 
Western Europe, as well as in the colonized territories and people across the world.  
The First World War created a bipolar world; a Capitalist Western consisted of 
America, Western European countries, and a Socialist Eastern World consisted of some 
Eastern European, Central Asian countries and Russia. The Second World War almost 
separated the Balkans and Eastern European countries from the Capitalist Western World. 
So, the Socialist system became the victorious and strongest system. In the socialist 
discourse, the twentieth century is defined as the era of the decline of Capitalism and 
Imperialism, the victory of Labour movements in the developed capitalist countries, and the 
struggle of national liberation movements in the colonized territories. Hence national 
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liberation movements in the colonized countries were accounting their political allies the 
socialist countries, labour movements and those national liberation movements were 
successfully becoming victorious, or were on the way to victory. 
 After the WWII the Chinese national liberation struggle gained victory. It became a 
courageous example to the colonized peoples struggle for freedom in India, South East Asia, 
Africa and Latin American and Middle Eastern counties. The Soviet Socialist Republics 
supported the National liberation movement of the people of China. The fundamental 
definition of a national liberation movement was to be against imperialism and be guided by 
a socialist ideology. Almost all of the national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America and the Middle East put socialism in their programme as an economic system, 
and Marxism and Leninism’s ideologies as the only guidance for their liberation and 
freedom. 
The methodology of achieving their national liberation was organizing educated youths 
from the universities and founding the guerrillas’ armies. Guerrilla war strategy was 
successfully followed in China, Vietnam, and Laos in Asia, Mozambique, Angola and 
Algeria in Africa, Cuba, Brazil, and Nicaragua in Latin America. In the Middle East the 
Palestinians also followed the path of guerrilla war and have had considerable support from 
the twenty-two Arab countries and fifty-five Islamic countries, as well as the Soviet Union 
and all other countries that had defined themselves as socialist supporting the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO). Not only was the socialist system supporting these struggles, 
but also the labour movements and socialist parties in the Western world were supporting all 
those anti-imperialist national liberation movements in the colonized world, too. As Hoffman 
and Graham state: 
 ‘The right to national self-determination is a right held by individuals and not by a 
collective. It is individual Kurds who (should) claim the right to nationhood rather than 
en entity called Kurdistan. Kurdistan exists because individuals identifying themselves 
as Kurds imagine it as a community. There is, however, a problem of circularity: Kurds 
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identify with Kurdistan because they believe Kurdistan exists, such that their believing 
Kurdistan exists does not bring Kurdistan into existence. In response, it could be argued 
that Kurds have to believe that Kurdistan exists independently of their beliefs even if, it 
only exists because lots of people style themselves ‘Kurds’ and identify with a 
particular land mass, language, customs and so on. On this argument all ‘social entities’ 
are necessary fictions’ (Hoffman & Graham: 2009. pp. 277-8).  
 
Since the discussion of this thesis is based on nationalism and creating a Kurdish nation 
state, the module of nationalism the PKK sought was called patriotic nationalism, which was 
a combination of Primordial, Ethno-Symbolist and Modernist. In that discourse of patriotic 
nationalism the ultimate aim of the PKK was to create a nation state for the people of 
Kurdistan via national liberation war. The founder of the PKK at that time mainly arguing 
that any group of people who have been able to create their own state, they gained its 
independence and freedom, who have not been able to establish their own nation state faced 
slavery, assimilation, extinction and genocides, the examples of Aztecs, Incas, Armenians, 
Assyrians and to some degree the Kurds. 
It was patriotic nationalism that gave support to the PKK to become a mass mobilised 
movement. As much as the PKK defended the idea of Kurdistan national liberation, Kurdish 
national identity and creating Kurdish nation state, all stratums of Kurdish society were 
supporting the PKK. The examples of 1989 to 1999 in all parts of Kurdistan and especially in 
Bakur and Rojava Kurdistan are self-explanatory. All the associations of the PKK in 
Diasporas named as Kurdistan National Liberation Front, Kurdistan Parliament in Exile, 
Kurdistan National Liberation Army aimed towards national liberation and no less than that. 
Moreover the first written document of the PKK, which is called the manifesto-Path of 
Kurdistan Revolution-is the fundamental document that expresses the primordial loyalties in 
the past historical evidences of the Median Empire (the ancestors of the Kurds). It bases its 
resistance to Legend Kawa the Blacksmith and his struggle against the Assyrian Empire and 
celebrating Newroz as the New-year, and declaring the PKK as the representatives of the 
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proletariat of Kurdistan. A combination of primordial loyalties, ethno-symbolic elements and 
modern constructivist tenancy explains the PKKs patriotic nationalism for Kurdistan national 
liberation strategy. 
 
Methodology 
 
Gathering essential data for my research and analysing them in appropriate 
methodological order, this study has applied a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach 
emphasises two main points, which are crucial for this thesis. Collecting data through various 
methods and analysing data through interpretive process of qualitative approach. The 
Methodological framework has been developed through a combination of the available 
academic literature on Kurdish question, through interviews, and mainly observatory data by 
the analysis of many political documents and processes. The available academic literature on 
the concepts of nation, national identity, nationalism and national liberation movement theory 
is drawn mainly from Smith, Brubaker, Hobsbawm and Anderson regarding its application to 
Bakur and other parts of Kurdistan. This research specifically focuses on the PKK’s 
transformation from national liberation to democratic liberation through four stages of 
formation, reformation, and transformation, and will finally analyse whether, according to the 
theory the retransformation process through strategic changes would be possible. The spread 
of the PKK’s ideological political and national understandings and paradigm from Bakur to 
Rojava will play an important testimony of this retransformation process.   
The Path of Kurdistan Revolution (first manifestation of PKK’s ideology) was the first 
concrete and precise ideological, political and national paradigm of the Kurdistan 
Revolutionaries after a small group university drop out students founded the PKK. Prior to 
the manifesto, there was a written document called, ‘Dogru Yolu Kavrayalim – 
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Understanding the Right Path’, which was a programme for how to become a party in 
Kurdistan. This manifesto, which was also called Serxwebun, which means independence, 
was followed by four or five more issues before the chief of general staff of the Turkish army 
made the coup d’état of 12 September 1980. These documents were fundamental sources for 
this research, because they were the first official written documents of the Kurdistan 
revolutionaries who later became the PKK. These display their vision of history, politics, 
philosophy, society, economics and the ideology including their strategy for the Independent, 
United and Democratic Kurdistan. In order to achieve an independent, united and democratic 
Kurdistan, a professional revolutionary party must be organised. For example, from these 
documents it is clear that the party should organise a guerrilla army, then the party and the 
guerrilla army should be supported by a national liberation popular front. This ideological 
and political understanding of the PKK will be investigated, analysed and explained in this 
study. 
A political revolutionary students group from 1970 to 1978 had organised itself and 
moved to Bakur Kurdistan’s provinces and towns, gaining a considerable qualitative and 
quantitative support mostly from the most disadvantaged stratums of Kurdistan’s society. On 
the 26-27thNovember, Kurdistan Revolutionaries held a clandestine meeting in Amed (in 
Turkish, Diyarbakir) province. During this first congress, the movement called itself PKK. 
From 1978 to 1984 the PKK was organizing its guerrilla war. On 15th of August 1984 the 
PKK declares its guerrilla war against the Turkish state in the towns of Eruh (Eruh is a small 
town of Siirt province in Bakur Kurdistan/Turkey) and Shemdinli (Shemdinli is a very 
strategic small town in the triangle of Iran, Iraq, Turkey belongs to Hakkari province in 
Bakur Kurdistan). The guerrilla units were under the name of Hêzên Rizgarîya Kurdistan-
HRK- Kurdistan Liberation Units, but in 1986 during the PKK’s third congress the name was 
changed to Artêşa Rizgarîya Gelê Kurdistan-ARGK- Kurdistan Peoples Liberation Army. In 
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1985 the PKK also announced the formation of its national front Enîya Rizgarîya Netewîya 
Kurdistan-ERNK- Kurdistan National Liberation Front. As mentioned earlier, the PKK had 
also established its official ideological organ Serxwebun in 1982. This has been published 
monthly and so far 424 issues have been released. All this material is available on the Internet 
and it constitutes the sources of the PKK’s official ideological political stand. 
The national and political environment from very early education in the primary school, 
then in middle and secondary school through family members who were teachers we had 
connections to those who were acting as Kurdistan Revolutionaries in our home town. This 
connection continued and my fieldwork observations for my research developed when I 
revisited my home town after 35 years. I visited local municipality, local legal party (HDP 
and DBP) party branches in Dogubayazit, Van, Bitlis, Amed/Diyarbakir, Mardin, Cizre, Urfa 
and Adiyaman. My aim was observing how the Democratic Liberation project works and 
whether that project fulfilled the demands for National Liberation. At the time of my field 
observations in Bakur Kurdistan, the PKK in Qandil, and the PKK leader Ocalan in Imrali 
through the HDP were engaged in a dialogue process with the AKP government. There were 
no fighting and no clashes between those political opponents at the time, to some degree a 
political openness was in force. However, everybody was aware of that neither the Turkish 
army and nor the AKP government in favour of a peaceful settlement to Kurdish question and 
that calm environment was messenger of a heavy storm.   
From the field it was obvious neither the AKP government want to declare it will 
accept some political and cultural rights to Kurdish people and to some degree accept a local 
self-governance to Kurdish municipalities, nor the PKK was convinced to accept disarm the 
guerrilla army before any negotiations for a peaceful settlement. The municipalities in Bakur 
Kurdistan were on very dangerous junction between the AKP government and the PKK. The 
people of Bakur Kurdistan were overwhelmingly expressing their desire a peaceful 
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settlement. However, the TAF and the AKP government with ultra-nationalist the MHP were 
in favour of restarting operations against the PKK guerrillas in all parts of Kurdistan mainly 
in Bakur, Bashur and Rojava.  
What I observed also was that the municipalities and HDP and BDP local branches 
were not fulfilling the demands of their constituents. For example they could have had 
cooperatives, volunteers to create employment in their local municipalities. They also could 
visit villages and create village educational centres. I observed the huge gap between their 
words and their practices. They did not have to relate themselves to the PKK ideologically 
and politically, as long as they were branches of the HDP and DBP and their run 
municipalities they could have been very successful and becoming the role module in any 
city and towns of Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey. However, their short comings in all the fields 
of social, cultural, political and economical life and not taking the interests of their local 
constituents left them in a ruined political conclusion. 
I witnessed exactly similar short coming problems in the Maxmur refugee camp 
(Maxmur camp was set up by Saddam Hussein for those Kurds from Sirnak province in 
Bakur Kurdistan fled from Turkish attacks and their villages were burned and bombarded in 
1994 and 95), too. People in the refugee camp have been politicised and follow political 
developments and Turkish state and AKP government did not make any official statement to 
accept any kinds of national, political and cultural rights. People were also discussing that the 
PKK has dropped down all national demands, while Turkish state does not accept any 
demand and that was a dilemma.  
Similar observations were also seen in Qandil Mountains too among guerrillas and 
guerrilla leaders as well. Although my fieldwork was co-incident to the so-called peace 
process, it was easily observable that nobody believed that a peaceful settlement would take 
place. Although ideologically the PKK insists on not demanding a Kurdish nation state, but 
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in the field in the ranks of new guerrillas to their commanders all were in the opinion 
eventually something similar to a state must be there in order to govern and manage daily life 
in the society. 
Finally my observations in Bakur Kurdistan, in the Maxmur refugee camp, in Qandil 
Mountains and in Brussels with the PKK, HDP, DBP and KCK officials and ordinary people 
trying to understand whether the PKK truthfully approaching to do politics in a more 
democratic environment according to its transformation to Democratic Liberation or not and 
how it was developing its democratic autonomous Kurdistan project via municipalities in 
Bakur Kurdistan. The Turkish state has always seen Kurdish question as the question of 
terror and separatism. Any kind of talks and acts in regard to Kurdish question has been 
considered a threat to the integrity of monist Turkish state. All those officials were 
interviewed were aware of Turkish state’s official ideology of Turkification. In spite of 
knowing that with democratic methods Turkish state will not come to the table of 
negotiations, trying to implement democratic liberation concept was wasting time and 
opportunities of Kurdish population. In addition to the qualitative materials, this research 
utilises a first-hand observation in the Qandil Mountains and direct/indirect interviews with 
the KCK officials regarding their sincerity on the process of transformation. In Brussels, 
multiple observations and interviews on the activities of the KCK, their officials and their 
views on the transformation process of the PKK were conducted. In Bakur Kurdistan, 
observations were carried out in order to assess the services and activities provided by 
municipalities. 
 
Literature Review 
 
There are three other important sources, which are fundamental for the study of the 
development of the PKK; one is called the Role of Force: Kurdistan National Liberation 
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War, and the other Kurdistan National Liberation Problem and the Path of its Resolution, 
and the Problems of Personality and Organizing. These three books are important in the 
PKK’s history. The first book is about the organisation and the launch of the guerrilla war, 
the second one was about how to organise and mobilize the masses to include them in the 
liberation popular front, and the last one talks about how to reorganize the party and improve 
the personality of the revolutionaries. These three books along with Path of Kurdistan 
Revolution are important classics of the PKK, and the Declaration on the Democratic 
Solution of the Kurdish Question. In addition to these books, and the Serxwebun monthly 
journal, Abdullah Öcalan’s several books, Cemil Bayik, Murat Karayilan, Duran Kalkan and 
Mustafa Karasu’s writings and books have been used. 
 Until the last quarter of the twentieth century there were only very few sources 
available on Kurds and Kurdistan. The available sources in Turkey were destroyed thanks to 
the constructed state’s official ideology that categorised everybody as Turkish. Turkish 
official state ideology was constructed on creating one nation, one language, one culture, one 
people, one country and one flag in order to complete a purified Turkish nation-state. 
Therefore, all different ethnic groups not accounted as Turks suffered strict assimilation 
policies. Even the words of Kurds and Kurdistan were removed as well as the essay written 
by Kurdolog Minorsky from the Islamic Encyclopaedia in all Turkey’s libraries.     
The Kurdish National Movement: its origins and development, written by Wadie 
Jwaideh is one the most important literature on Kurds in the mid twentieth century. It is one 
of the unique examples that put the Kurds equally on the same level of Persians, Arabs and 
Turks in the Middle East as a nation. Jwaideh analyses the strategic importance of Kurdistan 
and strategic role-played by the Kurds in the long run history of the region. He compares the 
Kurds’ case among three nations (Arabs, Turks, and Persians) and four states (Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria) in the region, with the Scots and English. Although the researcher mainly 
  
	 76	
based the study on Southern Kurdistan, this book is one the fundamental aspiring texts of the 
current available sources. Jwaideh is one the unique researcher predicts the geostrategic 
importance of Kurdistan’s geography and its strategic importance in the future. It is 
interesting that this great scholar (Jwaideh) of Kurdish Studies book was reedited by Martin 
Van Bruinessen and was published in 2006 after his death; there is a coincident-shared 
strategic vision between Jwaideh and the contemporary revolutionist movement in Kurdistan.  
A Modern history of the Kurds by David McDowall is one of the most comprehensive 
books so far to have written on the Kurds’ modern history. The book has rich historical and 
contemporary evidences and differs from the earlier sources written by Minorsky, Nikitine, 
Edmonds, Eagleton, and so on. McDowall deals with modern history of Kurds; it is a source 
that this research has benefitted from, in its discussion of contemporary political issues in 
Kurdistan. It is a modern history of parts of Kurdistan, and the political parties and 
organisations of Kurdistan. It is a historical, political and unique study of our modern times. 
Agha, Sheikh and State (1992), written by Martin Van Bruinessen, explores Kurdish 
society and rebellions in Kurdistan and the leadership of those rebellions. Martin as a young 
European researcher was interested in doing research in 1960s and 70s in Kurdistan’s four 
parts. Via Iran in 1970 he successes clandestinely to cross the border of Iran and Iraq by his 
Kurdish agents to do his fieldwork in Bashur Kurdistan and closely observe Mustafa Barzani 
led national liberation movement. Bruinessen mentions that at last quarter of twentieth 
century Kurdish nationalism is evolving to a modern nationalism (Bruinessen 1992: pp. 316). 
Another academic work is Abbas Vali’s Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism 
(2003) is unique academic critique on the origin and development of Kurdish nationalism. 
Abbas Vali offers a comprehensive critique of Jamal Nabaz’s primordialist approach and 
Amir Hassanpour’s ethno-symbolist approach, and argues that nationalism is a modernist-
constructionist ideology in general and mainstream Kurdish nationalism is primordialist. 
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Vali’s argument in academic writings and produced knowledge on Kurdish nationalism and 
Kurdish national identity is one the strongest and most unique. As a professor of political 
theory, this study has benefitted from his essays on Kurdish national identity and modernist-
constructionist approach.  
Michael Gunter, an authority on the question of Kurds and Kurdistan, explores political 
parties and has interviewed Jalal Talabani, Massoud Barzani and Abdullah Ocalan. Two of 
his books were crucially important for this study; the first one was ‘The Kurds Ascending 
2008’ and the second one was ‘Out of Nowhere – The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War 
2014’. The former discussed the PKK’s and Öcalan’s approach to Turkish state and the 
solution of Kurdish question. Öcalan’s statements via his solicitors and his declaration of 
democratic solution have been critically approached. The latter is about two different 
approaches of the PKK and the KDP-Iraq and their modules in Rojava Kurdistan. Both deal 
with contemporary issues, similar to this study; for instance, the transformation of the PKK 
and its democratic liberation project and the implementation of the project of Democratic 
Confederalism. 
Robert Olson’s ‘The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said 
Rebellion, 1880-1925’ published in 1989 studies the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. 
Olson argues that Kurdish nationalism had had three stages from Sheikh Ubaydullah first 
stage, then the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments second and the Kurdish national 
organisations in Istanbul during 1908 to 1920 and the Sheikh Said Rebellion. But also Olson 
argues and gives evidence that the Great national assembly in 1922 in Ankara accepted 
constitutional status and recognition of Kurdish autonomy in Kurdish majority cities and 
areas. Olson also widely researched Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria and their alliance against 
Kurdistan National Liberation Movement/s and especially Turkey’s active role in the NATO 
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against the PKK. Furthermore, Olson closely examines PKK’s political and ideological 
effects on Kurdish society in Turkey and Bakur Kurdistan, which are important for this study.  
Ali Kemal Özcan’s research ‘Turkey’s Kurds –A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and 
Abdullah Ocalan – 2006’ touches upon the Kurds in Turkey and their rebellion under 
leadership of Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK. It is an analysis of the PKK and its ideology and 
the members of the PKK and what caused those members to join the struggle of the PKK 
against Turkish state. According to Özcan, the nationalist ideology the PKK has followed at 
the beginning has been transformed to nationalismless nationalism. 
Cengiz Gunes ‘The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey – From Protest to 
Resistance – 2012’. It discusses contemporary Kurdish protests in 1967-69 and emergence of 
the PKK. He suggests that the emergence of the PKK and its resistance against the military 
coup of 1980 in Turkey and its continuation has put impact on not only Kurdish society, but 
also Turkish society too.  Gunes touches on the transformation of the PKK and its legal 
political struggle in Turkey and parliamentary legal political activities, and analyses how the 
PKK has become a hegemonic actor in Bakur Kurdistan especially after the imprisonment of 
Ocalan and the transformation towards democratic political and parliamentary politics. 
‘The Kurdish Question and Turkey –An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict – 
1998’ by Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow analyses possible solutions by specifically 
looking at Secession, Consociationalism, Forms of Autonomy, Federal Schemes, Provision of 
Special Rights, Further Democratisation and Multiculturalism. The authors do not suggest 
any specific solution that define Kurdish question as the question of a nation and should or 
ought to be solved through the concept of national right to self-determination. They insist that 
the PKK is a totalitarian organisation, and that it would not be possible to negotiate any 
possible peaceful settlement with the Turkish state. As if the Turkish state is a liberal 
democratic state similar to Switzerland, Belgium, Spain or the UK. Interestingly few years 
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later, after this was conducted, the Turkish state officially negotiated with the PKK in Oslo 
for more than two years.  
A recent study by Seevan Saeed ‘The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey - From 
the PKK to the KCK– 2015’, explores the deadlock of the PKK in its political project that 
caused the organisation to move from one dimension to a multidimensional wider 
organisation. At the emergence, as a political and national entity, the PKK was the result of 
Turkish state’s assimilation and Turkification policies in 2005 the struggle of the PKK 
transformed to multidimensional organisation of the KCK and the PKK become only a small 
part of the KCK system.  
The focus and argument of this study differs from these aforementioned studies. The 
reason is Kurdish question is the question of nation that has been divided, partitioned and put 
under a strict policy of annihilation, assimilation and extermination by two powerful states of 
Iran and Turkey, and the two Arab states of Iraq and Syria. The struggle of Kurdish political 
organisation is a struggle of self-defence and universally legitimate for national right to self-
determination. I argue that if the PKK leader was not imprisoned, the PKK would not drop its 
strategic goal an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan. Although that goal could not 
be achievable in the circumstances of 1990 and 2000, but today in 2016-19 unexpected 
changes are inevitable. The PKK will retransform its paradigm as it transformed national 
liberation. The biggest impasse against a peaceful settlement between the peoples of the 
region is historical ambitions of Turanism and the Turkification mentality of Turkish state. 
However, because the Kurdish question is the question of a nation and has lived in Kurdistan 
in entire history, and its history and culture deep rooted and embedded in the land of 
Kurdistan, it has moved far beyond the borders of the Muddle Eastern region and has become 
an international question. The solution of this question is not a matter of democratisation of 
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Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Syria. The solution is the recognition of universal national right to self-
determination. 
 
Conclusion 
Concepts of nation, national identity, nationalism and national liberation war were the 
main discourses of the 1970s, 1980s, and to some extent the 1990s in Kurdistan’s four parts 
and in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Kurdish national, political and social movements argued 
that the Kurds are a nation and should have the right to national self-determination, including 
the right of having their independent statehood. This approach was widely discussed among 
national liberation movements in the colonized countries. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syrian 
communist parties and leftist socialist movements rejected the arguments of the right to 
national self-determination being interpreted as independence by Kurdish national and 
political organisations. Therefore Kurdishnational and political movements separated their 
organizational away from them and organised independently in different parts of Kurdistan. 
Those arguments were the main cause of emergence of the PKK. In Turkey including most of 
leftist organisations led by Communist Party of Turkey,refused to accept Kurdish people as a 
nation and also refused to accept Kurdistan as country. Turkish state’s official ideology of 
Turkification not only indoctrinated ordinary people and state’s bureaucrats but also had 
indoctrinated the leftist and communist Turkish organisations too against universal rights of 
national right to self-determination. 
The era was unquestionably and undoubtedly accepted as the era of fundamental 
victory of socialist camp and the collapse of imperialism socialist, leftist and Kurdish patriot 
nationalists. Hence, Kurdish national and political organisations were ideologically and 
philosophically accounting themselves a part in the socialist camp. However, the 1991 
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collapse of the socialist camp was the biggest bluff to all national liberation movements and 
to labour movements and Kurdistan national liberation movements, too.  
The terms of nation, national identity, nationalism and national liberation will remain in 
the political debates for an uncertain amount of time, because they just have not appeared 
with the October Revolution in 1917. These concepts are related to ethnic, lingual, cultural, 
social, psychological, historical and geographical developments of human kind through an 
evolutionary process of thousands of years. The Kurdish question is not a simple matter of 
democratisation of Turkey in Bakur Kurdistan. Bakur Kurdistan is the largest part of Greater 
Kurdistan; hence Turkish statesmen are well aware of that sooner or later the people of Bakur 
Kurdistan will move towards an internationally acceptable solution. Therefore the Turkish 
state did whatever it could to assimilate the Kurds in Bakur Kurdistan, to make them forget 
their national identity and national language and culture in order to completely assimilate.  
After the collapse of the socialist camp, Kurdistan national liberation movement 
thought that it had lost one of its future credible supporters. However, the history of the 
Soviet Union’s socialism proved that the Kurdish question would not disappear in Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria. In fact it was Soviet Union that made good relations with the new 
Turkish republic and supported it. However, winning the war against the four nation-states in 
the Middle East could end very difficultly for a nascent movement such as Kurdistan national 
liberation movement(s), particularly in Bakur Kurdistan because of the NATO’s support of 
the Turkish army. 	
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Chapter 3 
Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism and Radical Emergence of the PKK 
Introduction 
 
 
Chapter two discussed the concepts of nation; national identity, nationalism and 
national liberation as fundamental pillars of the evolution of Kurdish nationalism and the 
concept of Kurdistan National Liberation in the last quarter of 19th and throughout the 20th 
century’s rebellions and insurgencies. These concepts were the fundamental reasons of the 
PKK’s emergence. In order to understand the paradigm change and transformation of the 
PKK from National Liberation to Democratic Liberation, the emergence and development of 
Kurdish nationalism needs to be overviewed. From the beginning of the 19th to the first 
decade of 20th century, most of the rebellions were led by Kurdish local princes, tribal 
leaders, Sheikhs and Mollas. Starting from the first decade of the 20th century the social 
composition of the leadership slightly changed. A tribal leader, Sheikhs and Mollas’ effective 
leadership was handed over to their urban sons educated in the Ottoman Sultan’s state 
schools in Istanbul (Bruinessen 2003: ch.3). The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
emergence of the new Republic totally denied the Kurdish Question. Prior to the PKK in all 
parts of Kurdistan’s political parties, the leadership from 1920 to 1970 at the hands of 
Kurdish aristocratic families educated tribe leader’s sons. But this time the defenders of the 
Kurdish cause and the leaders of a new national liberation movement would have to come 
both from peasantry and urban educated university students mainly belonging to the poorest 
strata of Kurdish society. This change has totally impacted the nature of the leadership of 
contemporary political parties in the last quarter of twentieth century Kurdish nation 
liberation struggle. 
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After the end of WWI the Ottoman Empire vanished, the Ottoman occupied Kurdistan 
was divided into three parts by the Sykes-Picot secret agreement between Britain, France and 
Russia (after the October Revolution in Russia, the Russian army withdrew from Kurdistan). 
The new rulers were not from the Middle East but from Europe. The Kurdish-Ottoman-Iran 
interrelationships were over, and to be replaced with new multi-actors; two European 
Christians, another Euro-Asian and two Middle Eastern Muslim states. Divided, partitioned 
and under the policies of annihilation and assimilation, Kurdistan became a trans-state and an 
international colony/question/issue between five different states.  
Kurdistan was divided between the Ottomans and Iranians into two parts. The Ottoman 
part was divided between the British and French and their mandate regimes of Iraq and Syria 
on one side, and the Middle Eastern states of Turkey and Iran as the inheritance of the 
Ottoman and Persian Empires on the other side. In this way, the Kurds found themselves with 
no national and political status, totally a stateless nation. The situation caused a reactionary 
response from the Kurdish side; as such, Kurdish nationalism inevitably assumed a 
multifunctional and multidimensional character in reaction against the new powers. The 
centre of Kurdish nationalist elite’s organisations moved from Istanbul to Cairo, Damascus, 
Baghdad, and Beirut then to Berlin, Paris, London and Genève.  
 The partition of Kurdistan opened the way to Kurdish nationalism with more than one 
centre and characterized by multiple actors. Prior to the Ottoman failure, Istanbul was the 
centre for Kurdistan and Kurdish nationalists. In the beginning, the Kemalist republic 
promised that an autonomous Kurdistan would constitutionally be guaranteed. At the first 
written constitution in April 1920 Kurdistan was recognized, until the republican leaders 
secured the republic and turned their back by changing the constitution in 1923, and totally 
denying any existence of Kurds and Kurdistan (Olson: 1989, pp.40).     
  
	 84	
Chapter three explores the evolution of Kurdish nationalism in the geo-strategic and 
geo-political environment of Kurdistan, which has become a trans-state, inter-state and 
international question after the WWI. Inevitably it has caused the Kurdish nationalist actors 
acting for its self-determination to have the same characteristics of multiplicity. This 
dialectical phenomenon resulted in the actions, reactions and interactions not only among the 
hegemonic states, but also between Kurdistani political actors too. This chapter elaborates the 
British, French, Iranian and Turkish post-WWI policies towards the Kurds’ ambition for 
independence, and their impacts and influences on the political actors of Kurdistan. In 
addition, this chapter offers an overview of the emergence of the modern active political 
parties in all four parts of Kurdistan.  
The KDP-Iran dominated Kurdistan National liberation Movement was active in 
Rojhilat Kurdistan (Mahabad) for a short period of time (1942-47). Soon after, the KDP-Iraq 
was established under the leadership of educated townspeople of Suliamania, Kirkuk and 
Hewler. Its members chose Mustafa Barzani as their leader in exile. The KDP under the 
leadership of Mustafa Barzani negotiated with almost all the relevant factors involved in the 
Kurdish question (McDowall 1997 pp. 231-60). The KDP’s national strategy was to gain 
regional autonomy for Bashur Kurdistan, but the tragic failure of 1975 insurgency caused the 
start of a new pluralist political environment in Bashur Kurdistan. The political and historical 
analysis of this failure and its impact on the evolution of Kurdish nationalism, in particular, 
the KDP’s 1975 failure was the main catalyser for the emergence Kurdistan national 
liberation new movements in Bashur as well as in Bakur Kurdistan. These new movements 
adopted a completely different programme, strategy, and ideology, which represented the 
whole Kurdish nation and not just one tribe as before. The failure of the KDP, which, 
similarly to all past rebellions, had resulted in the most significant event in Kurdish history, 
and caused the emergence of modern radical political actors in Bashur; the PUK – the 
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Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – and the PKK – Kurdistan Workers’ Party. While the PUK was 
born as a reaction to the KDP-Iraq from inside, the PKK was totally different because it did 
not have any links to the KDP what so ever.  
 The PKK emerged as a modern radical revolutionary national liberation movement due 
to two very close major historical and political reasons; the first being that Kurdish 
nationalism failed from the beginning of 19th to the last quarter of 20th century in all parts of 
Kurdistan, and second due to the failure of the Turkish democratic revolutionist leftist 
movements in Turkey. The PKK was not the source of the Kurdish problem. On the contrary, 
it was the result of the excessive force of assimilation, annihilation and elimination of the 
reality of Kurds and Kurdistan carried out by multiple regional and global players. The 
chapter concludes talking about the emergence of the PKK as the interpreter and the 
representative of the vast majority of the society against the four states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq 
and Syria, and it presents itself as an alternative to the tribal Kurdish political leadership that 
dominated the four parts of Kurdistan for a long time aiming towards national liberation of 
Kurdistan. 
Historical Background 
 
The mountainous region between the Iranian plateau and Anatolia from east to west 
and between the Caucuses and Mesopotamian deserts from north to south had accommodated 
many different ethnic and religious entities. Historically, this geography has been the home of 
many civilisations. Assyrian, Armenian, Kurds and Kurdistani peoples are the latest 
inhabitants of Kurdistan. After the end of the mandate regimes in Iraq and Syria, the British 
and the French left. The geography today is mainly claimed by Kurdish patriotic 
organisations, starting from the provinces of Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, Erzincan, 
Erzurum, Kars, Ardahan, and Iğdır in Bakur Kurdistan (Turkey); towards the cities and towns 
  
	 86	
of Maku, Khoy, Urmia, Sanandaj, Hamadan, Kirmanshah, Loristan, Iylam and Shush in 
northern part of Khuzestan in Rojhilat Kurdistan  (Iran); through the towns and cities of 
Badra, Hamrin, Kirkuk, Mosul and Sinjar in Bashur Kurdistan (Iraq); all the way to Hasake 
to North of Rakka towards the Kurddag in Idlib province – Qamishlo, Kobani and Afrin - in 
Rojava Kurdistan (Syria). This geographical picture of Kurdistan, which has accommodated 
many ancient civilizations, empires, and states over thousands of years, is mostly a 
mountainous region(Jwaideh 2006: pp.3).  
The Assyrian, Armenian and Kurdish inhabitants of this geography, called Kurdistan, 
so far have survived from direct and indirect extinction by the powerful foreign rulers. 
Assyrians are very scarce now, and occupy the regions around Mardin in Bakur Kurdistan, in 
Urmia and Salmas in Rojhilat (Eastern), in Hewler (Erbil) and Duhok in Bashur (Southern) 
with a small portion in Jazeera/Hasake province in Rojava (South-western) Kurdistan.  The 
Armenians, after the genocide of 1915carried out under Ottoman rule, lost all their southern 
territory, where they lived with the Kurds for thousands of years in a coexistent social and 
cultural brotherhood (Izady 2009: pp. 163-4). The Kurds have survived in large numbers in 
Kurdistan, despite the direct denial policies of the powerful four nation-states mentioned 
above. Along with Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians, some small portions of Azeri’s, 
Turkmens, Turks, Arabs and Persians have also been living in Kurdistan’s divided four parts. 
Although the inhabitants of Kurdistan have lived and shared the territory over the centuries, 
the creation of four nation-states in the Middle East has caused ethnic, religious, sectarian 
and civil wars as well as dramatic demographic changes.  
The Kurds and Persians (Farsi) had a close relationship over the centuries, until the 
appearance of Turkic tribes from central Asia to Iran, and then towards Anatolia. The name 
of Iran didn’t signify only one single ethnic group but a common name identifying groups of 
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peoples from different ethnic and religious communities, which were historically, culturally, 
socially, and linguistically close to each other. Iran was an empire ruling from India to central 
Asia and from Egypt to the Constantinople (Jwaideh 2006: pp. 11). The appearance of 
Turkish tribes and their occupation and settlement in Iran, Kurdistan and Anatolia with the 
establishment of two strong empires of the time - the Seljuk and Ottoman in Anatolia and 
Safavids in Iran, made them the strongest powers of the time. The Safavids claimed to be 
Kurdish in origin and had later converted to Azeri-Iran identity.  The Azeri are of Turkic 
ethnicity and live in Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabil, and Zanjan under the Persian domination, which 
caused the demographical change of the Kurdistan region. The Azeri population increased 
between Persians, Kurds and Armenians; a tendency that can be observed until now due to 
their exodus and incursion through north of Tehran, Qazvin, Tabriz and Urmia.  This route 
was the cause of the conflict that finally caused the total extinction of the inhabitants (Izady 
2009: pp. 46-8). This route starts from central Asia to north Iran and from Horasan to Tabriz 
towards Erzurum and Sivas to central Anatolia towards Constantinople.  
The Kurds and Arabs’ relations were not strong, until the emergence of Islam. From the 
seventh century onwards, when Islam was spread out and expanded as a new religion in the 
Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the relations deteriorated when all 
the populations in the region had Islam imposed as the dominant religion. Muslim Arabs 
became the third rulers of Kurdistan after the emergence of Islam. Persians were the oldest 
rulers of Kurdistan followed by Arabs and Turkic dynasties. Turkic dynasties before entering 
Anatolia and Kurdistan in 1071, made a strategic alliance with Kurdish dynasties. The first 
alliance of Kurds and Turks in 1071 in Malazgirt resulted in the historical failure of 
Byzantium (McDowall 2000: p.23), and opened the gate of Anatolia to Turkic dynasties. The 
second alliance of Kurds and Turks was in 1514 during the Chaldiran war between Turkic 
dynasties, Ottomans and Safavids. And the third alliance was in 1919, at the Sivas and 
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Erzurum Congresses. Amongst all of the three mentioned alliances, the Kurds turned out to 
be the losers. 
Ethnic Turks were Sunni Muslims, who ruled the Ottoman Empire. Overtime, the 
Safavids in Iran, also ethnically Turks, became the representative of the Shi’a Muslims. 
Kurdish dynasties’ alliances were a major force in the triumph of the Ottoman Empire against 
the Safavids Empire, a factor, which opened the gate of today’s Middle East and North Africa 
to the Ottomans. The third Kurdish and Turkish alliance was between 1919 and 1921 during 
the war of independence, which resulted in the birth of a new Turkish republic after the 
collapse of Ottoman Empire. If the Kurds had not allied with the Ottomans, they would have 
never been able to win the Battle of Marj Dabiq against the Mamluk of Egypt in August 1516 
(Ibid: pp. 27-31). 
In the three mentioned alliances, Kurdish dynasties were deceived by Turkic dynasties. 
In 1071, they should not have intervened in Kurdish affairs. That alliance to some extent was 
successful 1514 finds the allied as equals against the Safavids until 1639 when the Ottomans 
agreed with the Safavids the partition of Kurdistan into two parts. This was an overt breach of 
the 1514 agreement, mediated by Idris Betlisi between Yavuz Sultan Selim and Kurdish 
Princes of the time (McDowall 2000: pp. 28- 36).  
Between 1514 and 1639, Kurdistan’s biggest part was under Ottoman jurisdiction. 
From 1639 to 1806 the Ottomans were engaged in Europe and in the Balkans, and Kurdistan 
enjoyed a period of economic and cultural flourishing. From 1800 onwards, the Ottomans’ 
centralisation policy, which for a limitation of Kurdish princes’ power and which introduced 
compulsory conscription, caused major clashes between the Ottoman rule and Kurdish 
princes and dynasties. From the beginning of 1800 to the end of the WWI, the clashes 
continued. 
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In 1919 the new world system was taking its final framework. Turkish leaders, high 
army commanders of the Ottoman Empire, promised that a Kurdish and Turkish Republic 
would be built in accordance to the National Pact. The result of that alliance this time meant 
the total denial of all ethnic entities; mainly Assyrians, Armenians and Kurds in Kurdistan. 
The inhabitants of Kurdistan during the empires up to the final division of Kurdistan between 
the new actors did not face any policies of denial, assimilation, annihilation or elimination. 
This policy of total denial, assimilation, annihilation and elimination of all ethnic and 
religious differences in the new Republic of Turkey became an official state policy enshrined 
in the new constitution. The four nation-states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria established 
their national policies, each imposing one nation, one official language, one country and one 
flag (Ibid: Chapter. 9). 
As mentioned earlier, Kurdistan was divided into two parts between Ottoman and 
Safavids empires in 1639 by the Kasri-Shirin treaty. The Ottoman part of Kurdistan until the 
beginning of 19th century was a semi-autonomous region. When the Ottomans failed to 
capture Vienna, the centralization of power put an end to the semi-autonomous status of 
Kurdish principalities. The Kurds started a series of rebellion throughout the 19th century. At 
the beginning of 20th century, Kurdish political organisations came to existence in Istanbul. 
Kurdish tribal leaders, Sheikhs and educated Kurdish army officers engaged in political 
activities.  At the end of the WWI, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and Kurdish political 
organisations found themselves in a complicated political situation. The Ottomans ruled 
Bakur Kurdistan which was divided into three parts between the British, French and new 
republic of Turkey by the treaty Lausanne while, with the Treaty of Turkmanchai, the 
northern part of Rojhilat Kurdistan was again divided between Russian Tsar and the Qajar 
dynasty in 1827s (Ibid: pp. 70). 
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From the beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain, Germany, France and Russia 
also intervened in the political and economic affairs of Ottomans and Iranians. Consequently 
they had relations with the Kurdish dynasties under the jurisdiction of Ottomans and Iranians, 
too. Germany, Britain, France and Russia were strong powers and all of them competed to 
control the land occupied by the Ottomans. The central crossing point was Kurdistan. 
Germany established the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, Russia had aspirations in the Middle East, 
North Africa and the Constantinople and Dardanelle Strips, France and Britain also wanted to 
limit the influence of Russia and Germany. Finally, the division of the Ottoman Empire was 
put into practices with the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916.   
The First World War resulted in the failure of Germany and in the consequent 
disappearance of German influence in the Middle East. Russia was going through a 
revolution, and this affected its power in other areas of the world. Only Britain and France 
played their roles in dividing the massive land ruled by the Ottomans, which brought an end 
to the Ottoman Empire.  
To summarize, Kurdistan was first divided into two parts between the Safavids and 
Ottoman Empires. The Safavids ruled Kurdistan was divided between Russia and Safavids in 
the 1820s. The Ottoman ruled Kurdistan was divided into three parts: one part under rule of 
France that later on was transferred to Syria; another part under the rule of Great Britain that 
later transferred to Iraq, and the third part was annexed by Ottoman land that became the new 
Turkish republic (Ibid: pp. 210-220). 
Although at the end of the WWI the league of the Nations through the Treaty of Sevres 
promised an Independent Kurdistan, this was not implemented because of the interests of the 
great powers of the time as well as of the internal divisions of the Kurds and their lack of 
political leadership. If at that time, Kurdish political organisations that were mainly based in 
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Istanbul – Istanbul was also under the control of Britain, France and Italy –had a political 
unity and an organised armed force, the future would have been definitely different. 
Between 1920 and 1938, four majors and more than twenty-eight medium scale 
uprisings were launched against the new republic of Turkey only in Bakur Kurdistan, though 
none of them was successful. After those uprisings, important demographic changes took 
place through special state security executive orders and forced settlements. The Kurds were 
forcibly removed from their homeland and replaced by Turks that had immigrated from the 
Balkans.  
 In Rojhilat Kurdistan, the Simko Agha Shikak’s rebellion against the Shah of Iran 
lasted for more than twenty years. Simko looked for foreign help, firstly from Russian Tsars, 
and then when he was convinced that Russian support was not possible, he turned his 
direction towards Baghdad and tried to convince the British diplomatic mission to support 
him. None of those attempts were successful. Finally Simko was assassinated in a strategic 
plan in Shino town of Rojhilat Kurdistan in 1930. During WWII, the Soviet Union supported 
KDP-Iran when it declared the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad city, an experiment that 
lasted for about a year and ended with the execution of the president of the republic in 1947.    
In Bashur Kurdistan, Sheikh Mahmoud was against Iraq’s monarchy and he did not 
obtain the support of the British. Mustafa Barzani in 1931, 1945-7, and 1958-75 led the 
Kurdish uprisings against the Iraqi state; unfortunately, none of those uprisings were 
successful.  
Rojava Kurdistan, after Kochgiri in 1921, Sheikh Said in 1925, Agirî in 1927-30 and 
Dersim in1937-38, became the centre for those who fled because of their involvement in the 
Bakur Kurdistan rebellions. Those who fled from the mentioned rebellions in Bakur created 
political and cultural associations in Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Those activities, 
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particularly the cultural ones, along with the publishing houses, played a very important role 
in Kurdish communities in Lebanon and Syria, and spread out to other parts of Kurdistan as 
well.   
Because of its geo-strategic and geo-political situation placed between Asia and Europe 
and at the centre of the Middle East, Kurdistan has always been targeted and often occupied 
by the powerful actors of the time; the Persians, Alexander the Great of Macedonia, the 
Roman Empire, the Byzantium Empire, the Islamic and Abbasid Empires, the Ottomans, the 
Sasanian and Safavids, the Russian Tsars, and finally the British and the French.. The peoples 
living in those areas suffered enormously. Many civilizations were removed and the people 
were massacred. It seems that the demography of Anatolia and Mesopotamia changed very 
often because of those occupations. 
Anatolia had been cleansed from the Greeks and the Pontus people; Kurdistan from 
Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians who suffered the same destiny, in particular with the 1915 
the Armenian Genocide. The foreign occupiers against the indigenous peoples of Assyria, 
Armenia and Kurdistan committed all those massacres and genocides. 
From 1975 to the present, too many Kurdish political organisations in four parts of 
Kurdistan have struggled for national political rights and the freedom of Kurdish people. This 
short historical overview shows that the inhabitants of Kurdistan did not have an ambition to 
occupy or attack to their neighbours. In contrast, the newcomers always became the 
occupiers. The next section analyses the history of the emergence of these nationalist political 
Kurdish organisations, and their dominance in different parts of Kurdistan.   
Emergence of Political Parties in Kurdistan 
 
The Ottoman Centralization policy started in Kurdistan, when it could not occupy 
Vienna and lost its confidence of succession Europe (Pope and Pope 2011: pp.28). The 
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spread of a national consciousness among the East European, the Balkan countries and Arab 
people in the Middle East and North Africa against the Ottoman rule combined with the 
British, France and Italy’s intentions to divide the Ottomans ruled territory, put pressure on 
the Kurds who were asked to pay more taxes and provide soldiers for the Ottoman Empire 
army. These measures were undermining the power of Kurdish Princes and dynasties (Klein 
2011: pp. 6). A series of uprisings took place throughout the 19th century. The most effective 
ones were: Abdurrahman Pasha of Baban 1806, Mir Mohammad of Rawanduz 1815-30, Badr 
Khan Beg 1840-45 and Yazdan Shear 1850-55ofBotan.Thesewere all against Ottoman’s rule, 
and continued throughout three quarters of the 19th century. The most interesting one was 
Sheikh Ubaydullah Nihri’s against the Ottoman and the Qajar rule in Iran. Sheikh 
Ubaydullah asked for help from British Consulates in Tabriz and in Bashkale-Van, but no 
positive answers were given (McDowall 2000: pp. 53). The 19th century Kurdish rebellions 
or uprisings failed and all Kurdish dynasties fell under the control of the central authority of 
the Ottoman Sultans and Iran Shahs. 
The Ottoman Empire put an end to the local governance of Kurdish Princes in 
Kurdistan after Sheikh Ubaydullah Nihri. In order to fill the vacuum of power left by Kurdish 
Princes from 1880’s onwards, Hamidiye Cavalries were established with the support of the 
Kurdish tribal leaders. These cavalries acted under the orders of the Ottoman army and were 
called to defend the land from Russian attacks and from Armenian insurgency. They were 
also used to prevent Kurdish uprisings against the state. Olson argues (Klein 2011: pp. 175) 
that the Hamidiye Cavalry needs to be considered from 1990 to 1914 as the fulcrum of the 
emergence of Kurdish nationalism (Ibid: pp. 175). The role they played in the oppression of 
the Armenians still prevents these two nations in co-existing as they had in the time before 
the Armenian genocide. The Ottoman Sultan established Hamidiye Cavalries from tribes, and 
the commanders of the Cavalries were from the head of Kurdish tribe leaders. Each Cavalry 
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regiment was separately under strict control of the Ottomans Fourth Army based in Erzincan 
(Ibid: pp. 3). The institution of these cavalries caused a further division of the Kurds into 
tribal lines. The main concentrations of the Hamidiye Cavalry regiments were the provinces 
of Erzurum, Bitlis and Van, where Kurds and Armenians had lived together for thousands of 
years.  
Later it was the CUP – Committee of Union and Progression – and the coup supported 
by the Sultan that put an end to the Hamidiye Cavalries, which changed their name to the 
Light Tribal Cavalries. At that point they were still taking their orders from the Fourth Army 
based in Erzincan. When the Hamidiye Cavalries were established, for their sustainability 
and continuity, the tribal leader’s sons and relatives were taken to Istanbul for education and 
to attend the army training schools. Few of those educated and trained individual elites were 
appointed to high positions in the Ottoman civil, bureaucratic and diplomatic services.      
Just before this time, the first Kurdish nationalist organisation had been established in 
1878 in Nihri, but had unfortunately lived for a very short time, recognised as the Kurdish 
League. This short-lived Kurdish League only played its role until the failed uprising of 
Sheikh Ubaydullah in 1881. Sheikh Ubaydullah tried to convince the British to get 
diplomatic and political help, however, because of his relations with the Ottomans and the 
interests of Russia and Great Britain in Iran, this diplomatic effort failed.  
The Coup of CUP opened up a new opportunity to the educated Kurdish elite in 
Istanbul from 1908 onwards to establish Kurdish nationalist organisations. The first one was 
the – Kurdistan Terraki ve Teavun Cemiyeti – Kurdistan Society for Progress and Mutual 
Aid, sometimes called – Kurdistan Taali ve Terraki Cemiyeti – Society for the Rise and 
Progress of Kurdistan. The leadership of the society consisted of prestigious Kurdish 
dynasties or principalities, some educated Kurdish bureaucrats, tribal leaders and tribal 
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Hamidiye commanders. The Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan was led by a 
handful educated Kurdish elite in Istanbul, among them, Amin Ali Badr Khan from Botan, 
Sheikh Abdul Qadir from Nihri of Shemzinan, and General Sharif Pasha a Baban from 
Suliamania; all of whom were hostile to the Unionists/CUP. Similar Kurdish groups were 
established in Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Mosul and Baghdad (McDowall 2000: pp. 93). These 
attempts by Kurdish educated elites show that they were in activity to bring different Kurdish 
groups in a united front from the Ottoman occupied Kurdistan. They were against the CUP’s 
centralization policies. However, they were only staying in Istanbul and they did not organize 
a national unity among Kurdish tribes. In addition, they did attempt to establish any armed 
force. At that time, the Hamidiye Cavalry remnants were available in Botan, Serhed, Amed 
and Ruha (Urfa); there were strong and powerful Kurdish tribes able to rise in favour of 
Kurdish political and cultural rights. This meant that when the Ottoman Empire disappeared 
after WWI, the Kurdish leadership did not take that opportunity to secure their rights 
domestically and internationally. 
At the end of the WWI, the League of Nations was established. The Ottoman Empire 
collapsed and the victorious powers were in Istanbul. Kurdish organisations of the time in 
Istanbul were not able to secure their rights neither domestically nor internationally. 
Although the Sevres Treaty was provided for the right of establishing an independent 
Kurdistan, the Kurdish leadership was not united in implementing it. In Kochgiri, in 1921, 
the rebellions and its attempts aimed at securing the Sevres Treaty were not successful. In 
Lausanne in 1923 the Lausanne Treaty replaced the Sevres and on the ashes of the Ottoman 
Empire a new republic emerged. Taking the advantages of the Lausanne Treaty, the new 
republic of Turkey denied all ethnic, political, cultural and social rights of Kurdish people. A 
policy of total denial was enshrined in the constitution of Turkey.  
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As the reaction of those polices, a new organisation called Azadi (Freedom) in Erzurum 
in Bakur Kurdistan was established by Yusuf Zia Beg scion of the old princely house of 
Bitlis and one of the Kurdish deputies who lost his seat in the Grand National Assembly in 
1923. Khalid Beg Jibran, probably a founding member of Azadi, who in his time had 
commanded the two Hamidiya regiments raised from among his tribesman; his kinsman by 
marriage, Sheikh Said of Palu, whose reputation as a leading Naqshbandi sheikh made his 
taking a place of pilgrimage for the devout; finally Captain Ihsan Nuri Pasha and Yusuf Zia’s 
brother Riza, fellow officers in the Seventh Army Corps quartered at Diyarbakir where, no 
doubt, they encouraged by the local branch head, Akram Beg Jamilzada (McDowall 2000: 
pp. 192-3). The leadership of the Azadi organisation understood the real attention of new 
Kemalist republic, and were therefore preparing for a general uprising in 1925. However, the 
early birth of the uprising caused the failure, and the leadership of Azadi was hanged in Bitlis 
and Diyarbakir. Also the Sheikh Said led uprising failed during the end of the spring of 1925. 
Some of the local leaders of the Azadi were able to seek refuge in the French mandate of 
Syria. 
Komala-i Serbakho-i Kurdistan – The Association for the Independence of Kurdistan –
in Silemani, Bashur Kurdistan, in 1921 (McDowell 2009: pp. 174) was established by a 
handful of educated townspeople. They were aiming for an independent Kurdistan, and 
hostility towards Baghdad’s rule as well as Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji’s tribal rule. The 
Sheikh closed down their weekly paper, Bang-i Kurdistan. Although they did not organise an 
uprising, however, their cultural activities continued in different forms. Sheikh Mahmoud 
Barzanji’s revolt also failed in Bashur Kurdistan.  
With the ruthless suppression of Kurdistan between 1924 and 1927 by the new 
Kemalist republic, the remnants of Azadi from Sheikh’s said revolt sought refuge in Syria 
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and Lebanon. In October 1927, some of those exiles met in Bhamdoun, Lebanon, and 
established a new party, Khoybun or Xoybun (The Independence). Khoybun was active in 
Rojava Kurdistan and moved from Beirut-Damascus-Aleppo to support and lead Agirî/Ararat 
in Bakur Kurdistan. They were also active internationally through an alliance with Armenian 
Liberation Movement.  
Khoybun actively tried to support and lead the Agirî Revolt in Bakur, in Rojava, Bashur 
and Rojhilat Kurdistan. It went even further to launch a guerrilla war from Rojava and Bakur 
Kurdistan in order to draw attention to the Turkish army attacks in Agirî Mountain.  The 
result was again failure, and the leader of the Agirî Revolt, Ihsan Nuri Pasha, sought refuge in 
Iran and lived there until 1976 when he died from an accident.   
Rojhilat Kurdistan was not immune from these Kurdish revolts. Simko Shikak was one 
of the most resilient Kurdish tribal leaders in Urmia and the surrounding areas of Rojhilat 
Kurdistan. He was active from 1905 to 1930 until he was assassinated in Shino town. 
However, Simko’s revolt caused many problems between Kurdish people and Assyrians. 
Many Kurds joined his revolt from Bakur and Bashur. Simko’s revolt also failed as the 
previous Kurdish revolts in Bakur and Bashur because of the lack of organization of national 
unity and not organizing a national army with an effective leadership.  
During WWII in Mahabad, Komalay Jiyanaway Kurd – The Society for Revival of the 
Kurds – (Komala JK) emerged in September 1942, which then evolved to Kurdistan 
Democratic Party; PDK-Iran in Rojhilat Kurdistan. In the four parts of Kurdistan, for the first 
time in Rojhilat Kurdistan a political party was supported by the Soviet Union. The KDP-Iran 
was also supporting the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union was preventing Germany’s 
expansionist policies towards the north and north-west of Iran in favour of Socialist system. 
Rojhilat Kurdistan is situated at west and North West of Iran. The KDP declared the 
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Kurdistan Republic on 22 January 1946, and it collapsed in December of 1946, lasting less 
than a year. Kurdistan republic with the capital city of Mahabad came to the political arena 
with the direct support of the Soviet Union and collapsed because of the Soviet Union; the 
US and Great Britain declared victory and withdrew their military forces from Iran. After the 
failure of the Kurdistan republic the President of the republic with two of the KDP-Iran 
leadership were executed, and the KDP-Iran continued to exist until 1979 when the Iranian 
Popular Revolution occurred. This time an intellectual called Doctor Abdurrahman Qassimlu 
led the KDP-Iran and Mahabad became the centre of political and national struggle of 
Rojhilat Kurdistan.  
In Bashur Kurdistan after Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji’s revolt in Suliamania and 
Kirkuk, Kurdish patriots and leftist townspeople founded the four small organisations of 
Brayati (Brotherhood), Darkar (Woodcutters), Hiwa (Hope), and Azadi (Freedom), which 
were active from 1930. When the KDP-Iran emerged in Mahabad it had a direct impact on 
Suliamania and Kirkuk’s educated stratum of society. Those educated townspeople of Bashur 
Kurdistan belonging to the four small organisations previously mentioned, together organised 
the KDP-Iraq in August 1946 in Bashur Kurdistan. The KDP-Iraq in Baghdad-Suliamania 
and Kirkuk became the most effective underground political party after the failure of the 
Republic of Kurdistan in Rojhilat at end of WWII. 
The KDP-Iraq emerged at the beginning as a Bashur branch of KDP-Iran. However, the 
failure of the Kurdistan republic, the execution of Qazi Mohammed the president of the 
republic and the general secretary of the party the KDP-Iran, lost its influence and 
dominance. Mustafa Barzani was chosen as the general secretary of the KDP-Iraq, while he 
was in Mahabad as the Chief of General Staff of the Peshmerga Forces. When the republic 
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collapsed, Mustafa Barzani moved Bashur and then to the Soviet Union and stayed there until 
July 1958’s coup.   
In 1957, Osman Sabri, Abdul Hamid Derwish and Nureddin Zaza founded the KDP-
Syria following the example of the KDP-Iraq. The Syrian government used to imprison and 
then send its leaders into exile. In 1958, a coup d’état took place and an amnesty was issued 
which allowed Mustafa Barzani to be returned from the Soviet Union to Baghdad. At that 
stage, the KDP-Iraq was recognised as a legal political party and it started to participate in 
political activities in Baghdad and Bashur Kurdistan’s major cities and towns. The 1961 
rebellion was led by the KDP and Bashur Kurdistan becomes the source of revolutions for 
Kurdistan patriots from four parts of Kurdistan. The KDP-Iraq became a prominent actor not 
only in Iraq and Bashur Kurdistan, but also in all parts of Kurdistan.  
When the KDP-Iran emerged, it was considered as the mother party to the KDP-Iraq; 
from 1958 onwards especially after the 1961 uprising, the KDP-Iraq took over the leadership 
and played the role of mother party in four parts of Kurdistan. However, this approach caused 
clashes between both KDPs. A group of KDP-Iran very well educated university students and 
intellectuals led by Abdullah Muini, Sulaiman Muini, Ismail Sharifzadeh moved to Bashur 
Kurdistan. The KDP-Iran leadership was divided into two groups. The secretary of the party 
Ahmed Toufiq was supporting Mustafa Barzani while the majority of the cadres of the KDP-
Iran were supporting leftist ideology and socialism.  
 In Bashur Kurdistan the KDP-Iraq leadership was also not united. There was a deep 
ideological and political conflict between Mustafa Barzani, Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal 
Talabani led factions. Mustafa Barzani’s leadership forced the Ahmed and Talabani faction to 
leave the KDP-Iraq, who fled to Iran in 1964. Later, Ahmed and Talabani factions from Iran 
moved to Bashur and reunited with Barzani. Then, in 1966 they went to Baghdad, and in 
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1966 they were reunited with Barzani’s leadership again. Finally, in 1970 the Iraqi 
government and the KDP-Iraq leadership agreed on an autonomy agreement, which was 
declared on 11th of March 1970. The origin of their disagreement was Kirkuk and this 
continued until 1974 when the fight started with the government of Iraq. 
After the 1938 Dersim Genocide, Bakur Kurdistan’s political situation underwent a 
very long period of silence. However, in 1965 the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Turkey - 
KDP-Turkey was established. Although the KDP-Turkey chose a passive mode of struggle 
with a reformist programme, the state and government of Turkey killed the leader of the 
KDP-Turkey in an orchestrated accident and imprisoned the other leaders. The KDP-Turkey 
from its birth was prevented from producing a radical programme and radical mode of 
struggle.  
Young educated wealthy Kurdish university students and intellectuals were 
sympathetic to nationalist ideas and they were supporting Mustafa Barzani; the KDP-Turkey 
obviously was a branch of the KDP-Iraq. Those educated Kurds in Istanbul and Ankara were 
politically active within the Workers’ Party of Turkey. From 1969 onwards those students 
left Turkish Workers’ Party and organised some legal organisations under the name of 
Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths – Dogu Devrimci Kulturel Ocaklari – DDKO. After 
the 12 March 1971 coup in Turkey, the majority of active Kurdish and Turkish leftist 
students were imprisoned. In 1974, with the general amnesty, those prisoners were released 
and most of them participate in different Kurdish and Turkish political organisations.    
The collapse of the KDP led rebellion in 1975 caused a deep division within its 
leadership and it was fragmented into different factions. From 1958 to 1975, within 17 years, 
the KDP-Iraq leadership had enormous geo-political and geo-strategic opportunity to secure 
national and political status for Kurdish people within the state of Iraq. The political and 
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diplomatic situation of the Middle East was providing this opportunity. That opportunity for a 
successful resistance was once again lost because of ineffective leadership, this time led by 
Mustafa Barzani and the leadership of the KDP-Iraq.   
On 6th of March 1975, Iran and Iraq agreed in Algeria to terminate their disagreements 
and hostilities. Iran stopped supporting the KDP-Iraq led revolts, and in return Iraqi 
government’s concessions to Iran about the three small islands in the Gulf and border 
disagreements of Shat al Arab. The leadership of KDP-Iraq, Mustafa Barzani, failed and left 
Bashur seeking refuge in Iran and European countries.  
During that turmoil, Jalal Talabani organised a new movement separate from the KDP-
Iraq. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the PUK, emerged with leftist ideas as a united front 
consisting of three political factions of Bashur Kurdistan. Mainly, they were from Suliamania 
and Kirkuk and to some degree from Hewler as well. The PUK had its first congress in 
Damascus and was supported by Syria. From June 1976, the PUK became a major opposition 
to the KDP-Iraq. Jalal Talabani as the representative of the KDP-Iraq (prior to separation 
from the KDP-Iraq) in Damascus and Beirut had a wider relationship with both camps of the 
time.  
Political parties and political organisations emerged as the mean to defend national and 
political rights of Kurdish people in four parts of Kurdistan at different times and in different 
situations. Pre and post WWI, Kurdish political and cultural organisations mainly failed to 
achieve any gains to secure national and political rights for their people. The opportunity of 
WWII, which caused the weakness of Iranian state in governing Rojhilat Kurdistan, resulted 
in the declaration of Kurdistan Republic, which, as mentioned above, failed due to the lack of 
support from the KDP-Iran. The KDP-Iraq led revolt of 1961-75 also failed. The failures of 
Azadi, Xoybun and the KDPs had a consequence, which was the birth of the PKK between 
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1972 and 1978. First it started with just one man and later from 1973 onwards, it consisted of 
a clandestine group of students willing to continue the struggle. This struggle evolved to 
become the PKK and a guerrilla movement spread out to four parts of Kurdistan. However, 
the PKK also has not made any concrete victories so far unless if it secures Rojava Kurdistan.     
 
Domination of the KDP in all parts of Kurdistan 
 
Kurdistan National Liberation Movement (KNLM) in the post WWII world, allied with 
other struggles for independence, carried out similar independent struggles to other oppressed 
nations such as in Vietnam, Cuba, Mozambique and others. Most of those independence 
struggles were supported by the Soviet Union.  The KDP-Iran was supported by the Soviet 
Union as well, and it was with the direct support of the Soviet Union that the KDP-Iran 
declared the Kurdistan Republic. At the end of the WWII, the Soviet Union withdrew from 
Iran and the result was that the Kurdistan Republic collapsed within less than a year. After 
the collapse of the Kurdistan Republic, the KDP-Iraq and its leader Mustafa Barzani assumed 
leadership. As Mustafa Barzani had been in the Soviet Union for eleven years, he could 
obtain Soviet support for the KNLM. Kurdish political parties and their activists of the time 
were mostly leftist and socialists supporting Soviet Union’s policies. Between 1958 and 
1975, Bashur Kurdistan became the centre of Kurdish nationalism for all parts of Kurdistan. 
From 1958 onwards, the new government of Iraq and the KDP-Iraq were supported by the 
Soviet Union. 
The KDP-Iraq led by Mustafa Barzani was the most prominent political actor of all 
KDPs in four parts of Kurdistan. The KDP-Iraq during its formation up to the return of 
Barzani from Soviet Union in 1958 was always very fragmented. Those fractions were: 
conservatives mainly from tribal leaders, Patriot socialists, and Nationalists and Communists. 
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As soon as Barzani arrived in Baghdad, the sleeping cells awoke causing a fraction, which 
was officially recognized in 1964.  
During the Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad, the KDP-Iraq was supposed to be a branch 
of the KDP-Iran. However, that situation changed after the collapse of the Kurdistan 
Republic. During the revolt in Bashur from 1961 to 1975, the KDP-Iran did not have any role 
and was acting as the KDP-Iraq’s Rojhilat Kurdistan branch. Ahmad Toufiq, the general 
secretary of KDP-Iran, followed exactly the same political programs of the KDP-Iraq and 
took orders from it. This situation caused internal divisions of the KDP-Iran. In fact the 
popularity of Barzani and its leading role of the Peshmerga war against the Iraqi army 
brought most of political organisations in four parts of Kurdistan under the umbrella of the 
KDP-Iraq. KDP-Iran lost its leading role and began to take orders from Mustafa Barzani. The 
majority of the leaders of the KDP-Iran did not accept Mustafa Barzani’s close relations with 
the Shah of Iran.    
A young educated group of KDP-Iran cadres led by Ismail Sharifzadeh, Abdullah 
Muini and Molla Aware took a revolutionary and radical approach. Almost forty young 
educated university students left their studies and joined the KDP-Iran in Bashur Kurdistan. 
As soon as they realized KDP-Iran’s leadership was in line with Mustafa Barzani’s 
conservative ideas, their internal debates increased and first fragmentation took place in mid 
1960s. Most of them returned to Rojhilat Kurdistan in 1967-68 to start a guerrilla war in 
which most of them were killed. 
In Bakur Kurdistan the KDP-Turkey was established by a group of Kurdish patriots and 
led by Faik Bucak, a prominent lawyer from the well-known tribe of Bucak from Siverek of 
Urfa province. Faik Bucak was killed in a car incident in Urfa. Dr. Şivan (Said 
Kirmizitoprak, a medical Doctor from Dersim) and Said Elçi (a lawyer from Bingol) were in
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Bashur Kurdistan and both lost their lives in a tragic conspiracy and designed plot. This party 
was not immune from the KDP-Iraq’s conservative political approach. The KDP-Iraq was 
claiming to be the mother and dominant party of the KNLM. For this reason, it was not 
letting KDP-Turkey and KDP-Iran act against Turkey and Iran. Therefore, a faction of KDP-
Turkey and KDP-Iran took a radical approach against the conservative policies of Mustafa 
Barzani and the KDP-Iraq, a move that they paid for with their lives. 
KDP-Syria was already established in 1957 and was led by Osman Sabri an intellectual 
and patriot activist from the Sheikh Said’s rebellion from Adiyaman (a province in Bakur 
Kurdistan on the western side of the Euphrates), who moved to Damascus after the failure of 
the rebellion. KDP-Syria was the third KDP to be established from the remnants of the 
Xoybun. They had learnt from the failure of the Agirî rebellion.  
The KDP-Iraq from 1958 to 1975 became the absolute dominant political party in all 
four parts of Kurdistan. The Kurdish rebels thought that, due to his experience in the Soviet 
Union, the Mustafa Barzani leadership would carry out a successful revolt, which would be 
an example to the other three parts of Kurdistan. Therefore, he gained the support of the 
majority of Kurdish people from four parts of Kurdistan. Most of the socialist and patriotic 
educated intellectuals and ordinary people joined the revolution and became Peshmerga. The 
KDP-Iraq and its leader Mustafa Barzani gained the respect at a national and international 
level.  
However, Mustafa Barzani’s leadership was not able to take advantage of that national 
unity and national support from all parts of Kurdistan. The KDP-Iraq and it leadership did not 
organise and did not educate their people. They did not make a strategic choice between foes 
and friends. The collapse of the revolution meant the end of the KDP-Iraq’s domination in 
the Kurdish political arena. The end of the KDP-Iraq domination opened up a new era for 
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educated, but also the most disadvantaged stratum of Kurdish people to organise themselves 
and their society in order to regain the lost opportunities. 
 
Failure of the KDP in 1975 and its Fragmentation 
As mentioned earlier, if the KDP-Iraq had released itself from its tribal and family-clan 
relationship, and if it had made a strategic choice of foes and friends, the direction of the 
revolution of Bashur Kurdistan would have definitely been different. Domestic, regional and 
international situation provided the opportunity of securing the national-democratic rights of 
Kurdish people. The agreement between the KDP-Iraq and the Iraqi government on 11th 
March 1970 was a great achievement. However, the KDP failed to take the initiative to 
convince the Iraqi government that they would not continue relations with the Shah of Iran 
and will stay as a part of Democratic Iraq. The 1975 failure was again a dramatic recurrence 
in Kurdish history. The conservative leadership with its policies caused another national 
failure in Bashur Kurdistan, which affected the national psychology of four parts of 
Kurdistani people and to some degree showed the idea that a Kurdish unification would not 
be possible under the KDP-Iraq leadership.  
There was a huge reaction against of the KDP leadership after the 1975 failure. The 
party further fragmented into more than five different fractions; these fractions were led by 
Jalal Talabani who founded the PUK, Mahmoud Osman who founded KDP-Fourth Congress, 
Ali Asker who founded the Socialist Movement, and Noushirwan Mustafa who founded the 
Komala and Pasok party.   
The KDP-Iraq leadership accepted the failure and tried to bring all the fractions into 
one united front. However, it was too late. The KDP-Iraq lost its effective leadership not only 
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on Bashur Kurds but also on all Kurds around the world. KDP-Iraq lost its prominence and 
lost its dominance in all parts of Kurdistan. The entire sister organisations of KDPs in all 
parts of Kurdistan were fragmented into different organisations.  
Most of the villages of Southern Kurdistan were razed by the regime. Vietnam style 
camps were established. For example, all the geographically strategic villages were destroyed 
and tens of inhabitants were forced to reside in military camps in the desert.  
Hundreds of thousands of people became asylum seekers in Iran and thousands of those 
people clandestinely found shelter with their relatives in Bakur Kurdistan; and the Turkish 
authorities were aware of some. The KDP-Iraq also knew that their members were among 
them. Residents of both sides of the borders between Bakur and Bashur were relatives. After 
the failure of 1975 the KDP-Iraq started to reorganize in the areas close to Bashur in Bakur 
Kurdistan. To what degree Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) was aware of the 
KDP-Iraq’s presence in mountains of Bakur is not known.  
The KDP-Iraq and the PUK in the spring and summer of 1978 in Hakkari province of 
Bakur Kurdistan both involved in a civil war. While both parties were from Bashur Kurdistan 
their battlefield was Bakur Kurdistan. The reason for their fight was that the Hakkari 
province was the border of Bahdinan region of Bashur Kurdistan where KDP-Iraq and 
Barzani were dominant. The PUK wanted to cross from that area to reach Syria to bring guns 
and ammunition to fight the Baghdad regime. As a result of the fight from the PUK side, 
almost 800 Peshmerga lost their lives due to the internal fragmentation and ideological 
division of the KDP-Iraq. This event happened only after three years from the formation of 
the PUK and caused serious damage not only to PUK but also to the entire Kurdistani people. 
The collapse of the KDP-Iraq led revolt in Bashur Kurdistan meant the collapse of the 
domination of Barzani family. A new stage of Kurds and Kurdistan’s Pluralist political 
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environment not only in Bashur, but also in other three parts of Kurdistan was born. In 
Bashur, except for KDP-Iraq, leftist socialist movements emerged. Similar examples 
followed in Bakur and Rojhilat and Rojava Kurdistan too. Most of the factions in the four 
parts of Kurdistan to some degree were related to the KDP-Iran or the KDP-Iraq.  
During the popular revolution of Iran in 1979, the KDP-Iran took the initiative and 
returned from exile and liberated almost 40 % of Rojhilat Kurdistan and was negotiating the 
autonomy with the Iranian government in Tehran. This time the KDP-Iraq allied with Iranian 
Revolution Corps, and began operations against the KDP-Iran Peshmergas and Rojhilat 
Kurdistan from 1983 onwards controlled by Iranian security forces with the help of the KDP-
Iraq (my personal observations). Afterwards, the 1975 failure the KDP-Iraq firstly played a 
negative role in Hakkari, Bakur Kurdistan against the Peshmergas of the PUK, secondly in 
Rojhilat Kurdistan against the KDP-Iran, thirdly by inviting Saddam Hussein’s four hundred 
tanks and taking control of Hewler from the PUK, and fourthly in its alliance with Turkish 
state against the PKK guerrillas from 1983 up to now. The KDP-Iraq had an opportunity to 
play a very negative role in leading the KNLM, however the facts on the ground tell a 
different story. 
The emergence of the PKK, which is unrelated to the KDPs, broke the taboo of 
traditional Kurdish nationalism led by primordial tribal, sheikhs and princes. Those who 
organised the PKK were all from the poorest stratum of Kurdish society. This will be 
explained later in further detail. 
 
The Impacts of the Failure of Bashur on the other three parts of Kurdistan 
 
The most disastrous impact of the failure of 1975 was on Bashur Kurdistan. The people 
lost their confidence with the leadership and its political project. More than 5000 villages 
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were razed. The entire cultural and social history destroyed and the people of those razed 
villages were exiled to southern Iraqi deserts for cultural, linguistic and national assimilation. 
Those who actively participated in the revolution found refuge in Iran, Europe and the US. 
It was history repeating itself in Kurdistan. Why did the political leadership not take the 
initiative of holding conferences for their militants in order to analyse what went wrong? 
Why did the Peshmerga force collapsed leading to hundreds of thousands people becoming 
refugees in Iran? Why did the leadership choose to move to America and Europe, leaving the 
masses under the boots of the Iran and Iraq’s armies? It looked like the leadership had signed 
an agreement with the Shah of Iran not to start a struggle against Baghdad in change of a 
comfortable life in Karaj, Tehran, London, Paris, New York and many more.  
Mustafa Barzani was sick with cancer and moved to America for treatment. The most 
crucial impact was on Bashur and Rojhilat and to a small degree on Rojava Kurdistan. Bakur 
Kurdistan was already undergoing a very harsh attacks treatment by the Turkish army. The 
most important result was the KDP-Iraq losing its monopoly of Kurdistan Liberation 
Movement in all four parts of Kurdistan. The pre 1975 era was the era of the dominance of 
the KDP-Iraq all over Kurdistan. Although the failure had a negative psychological impact on 
all parts of Kurdistan, at the end of the monopoly of the KDP-Iraq was a positive 
development in terms of opening space for new, modern, democratic and radical movements. 
The Emergence of the PKK 
 
The emergence of the PKK is somehow the story of the childhood of its founder 
Abdullah Öcalan. He grew up in a typical Kurdish small village and it was during his primary 
school education that he conceived his future political organisation. As a very talented 
schoolboy he shows his passion to the village Mosque’s Imam, school’s teachers as well as 
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his family and the village population. At the age of 10-12, he rejects old rules and traditions 
of the village and the family.  
Bakur Kurdistan, Turkey and then the Middle East were to observe a new radical 
emergence, which were unusual in other political entities up to 1973. In Bakur Kurdistan, up 
to the emergence of the PKK, a Kurdish Prince, a Sheikh or a tribal leader led all the revolts 
and uprisings. Since the birth of the PKK, the political landscape of Bakur Kurdistan, then 
Rojava Kurdistan changed quite considerably. This time the leaders of Kurdistan national 
liberation would be from the most disadvantaged and the poorest stratum of Kurdish society.  
Bakur Kurdistan underwent a period of total silence when in 1938 the Turkish Armed 
Forces – the TAF – committed its atrocious genocide in Dersim. The families of the 
participants of Sheikh Said, Agirî and Dersim were sent to exile in Anatolia for assimilation. 
In Turkish official communications, Bakur Kurdistan is just an East and South East region of 
the seventh regions of Turkey. A special East Reform plan was implemented to totally 
assimilate and annihilate Kurdish existence. In order to implement that plan, a Martial Law 
was declared in Bakur and continued until the 1950s. During this decade those Kurds 
attending universities in Istanbul, Ankara and in Amed united publishing journals in order to 
preserve the sense of Kurdish identity, which was developing among young educated 
university students and intellectuals. Turkish leftist organisations were already active in 
universities. By the 1960s, with the impacts of Cuba and Vietnamese Guerrilla wars, Kurdish 
and Turkish university students were also slowly moving from a passive mode of struggle to 
a more radical one.  Some Turkish and Kurdish university students went to Syria and 
Lebanon to undertake guerrilla training and education. They returned to Turkey and started a 
guerrilla fight against the Turkish state at the beginning of 1970s.   
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The 12th March coup crashed all political organisations harshly. Turkish left collapsed 
and failed to lead a revolution and the attempts of launching a guerrilla war failed 
dramatically. The leaders of the guerrillas were either killed or executed. Kurdish nationalist 
activists were imprisoned, and after 1974 general amnesty released.   
Abdullah Öcalan was a student during that turmoil. In one hand he had witnessed his 
family and villages traditional life, later, after his education in Ankara; he became a civil 
servant in Amed – the unofficial capital city of Bakur Kurdistan – and observed closely the 
social, cultural and political daily life of the people. On the other hand, as an anti-
traditionalist in Istanbul and Ankara, he witnessed radical Turkish and Kurdish political 
activists’ struggle and how they sacrificed their life for freedom, justice, equality, democracy 
and socialism. He expressed the idea that ‘Kurdistan is a colony’ and there was no possibility 
to do legal politics freely in order to obtain an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan. 
He participated in students’ protests and demonstrations, and he was imprisoned in 1972. 
While in prison he decided what he wanted to do once release. He decided that in order to 
survive the Turkish state, he should establish a strong and equipped group supported by 
scientific, independent knowledge, and independent from both the Primitive Collaborationist 
Kurdish Nationalists and the Kemalist Turkish Social-chauvinist Left. 
As Ismail Beşikçi (Beşikçi 2004) mentions, the PKK does not have a pre-historical 
legacy, in other words it is unlike the other Kurdish organisations and cannot be explained as 
the historical primordial continuation of Kurdish nationalism. Nevertheless, carrying some 
primordial and ethno-symbolic elements, the PKK is a modernist occurrence Kurdish 
nationalism history. At its emergence, its overwhelming concentration on national elements 
over the years by changed domestic and international factors has moved from nationalism 
towards women liberated ecologic democratic socialism.      
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The future of the PKK will define itself as different in terms of ideology, organisation, 
political stance, political culture, research and analysis methods, historical analysis of history, 
politics, and social reality from other parties.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The evolution of Kurdish nationalism in Kurdistan has not taken a straightforward 
process. It has taken a very complex and complicated time to ensure survival to today’s 
modern era. The complex and complicated nature of Kurdish nationalism is hidden in the 
diversity of wider contexts. The Kurds are divided socially, culturally, politically and 
geographically. Above all, Kurdistan’s land has been divided since 1639 into two parts and 
from 1923 into four parts between four nation states. Tribal and clan lines are still strong in 
many rural and urban areas of Kurdistan. In Bakur Kurdistan, there are divisions among 
Sunni, Alevi, and Yezidi in terms of religion and in terms of dialect Kurmanj and Zaza; In 
Rojava Sunni, Alevi and Yezidi; in Rojhilat Sunni and Shiite, Yaresan/Ahl Al Haq Kurmanj 
and Soran; in Bashur Sunni, Shiite, Yezidi, Yaresan/Ahl Al Haq and Shabak with Soran, 
Bahdinan and Hawaraman/Goran. Organising a united national liberation movement with 
these differences can be the most difficult national liberation movement in the whole world.  
Above mentioned complex and complicated social, cultural, political and geographical 
divisions in Kurdistan have always prevented Kurdistan national liberation movement to 
achieve its national and political goals; these domestic and regional complex issues, with no 
international support in modern times, have made the problem even harder. During the whole 
20th century Bakur, Rojhilat and Bashur Kurdistan actively resisted for their rights but all 
have failed. In Rojava, cultural resistance and a passive mode of struggle had been significant 
until 2011.  
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This chapter has provided the historical background of the evolution of Kurdish 
nationalism and explained its failure in guaranteeing the national and political rights of the 
Kurdish people. Although there have been social, cultural, political and geographical 
boundaries in front of Kurdish political parties of the time, there had also been opportunities 
if the political parties would have had sacrificed their family and tribal interests to their 
national interest’s to make gains. For example, at the same time the Sheikh Said Rebellion 
was occurring in Bakur, Simko’s Rebellion was happening in Rojhilat and Barzanji’s 
Rebellion in Bashur. If they had collaborated, the Sevres Treaty would have been 
implemented. The failure of not implementation of Sevres Treaty was the huge division 
among Kurdish leadership; some were supporting the Sultan, some supporting Kemalists and 
some of them supporting British who were based in Istanbul and Baghdad. A disunity at the 
top level of Kurdish leadership caused the 20th century was lost as 19th century with no gains 
for Kurdistan. The last quarter of the 20th century gave birth to the PKK, which since 1970s 
has continued its struggle in different modes. The PKK’s radical emergence and its radical 
modern programme and radical guerrilla movement was going to be a big surprise. The 
biggest surprise in Kurdish national liberation will only happen when the PKK/KCK, PUK 
and KDP with all the other Kurdish political, cultural, and civil society organizations leave 
their group interests behind talk and walk nationally. 
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Chapter 4 
The PKK as a Radical National and Political Movement-Formation 
Introduction 
 
Chapter four focuses in depth on the formation and emergence of the PKK as the most 
radical ideological, political and national movement of 1970s in Bakur Kurdistan. It will also 
explain how its influences gradually expanded to the other parts of Kurdistan. The PKK is 
unlike all other Kurdistani political parties, which do not have an organic primordial social-
root (related to Kurdish princes, Sheiks, or tribal leaders). For instance, the Badirkhan family, 
the Nihri family, the Barzani family, the Talabani, Seyid Riza, Sheikh Said or the Shikak 
tribe leaders such as Simko Shikak all belonged to the KNLM at a time of Kurdistan history, 
and all failed. Most of the tribal leader’s sons somehow led parties in Bakur, Rojava, Rojhilat 
and Bashur Kurdistan. Qazi Mohammed, Ihsan Nuri Pasha, and Khalid Beg Jibran were not 
related to these families. On the contrary, the PKK as an ideological-political-national actor 
was formed among the network of undergraduate university students in Ankara the capital 
city of Turkey, whose members came from the poorest stratum of Kurdish society. Abdullah 
Öcalan, Ali Haydar Kaytan, Cemil Bayik, Mustafa Karasu, Riza Altun, Mazlum Dogan, 
Mehmet Hayri Durmus and Ibrahim Aydin (an additional four members were Turkish: Hakki 
Karer, Baki Karer, Kemal Pir and Duran Kalkan) were students highly influenced by the 
Leftist Revolutionary Socialist ideology and who formed their ideological and political 
network in Ankara where they started to discuss their political discourse in Bakur Kurdistan 
provinces. They challenged the already occupied political space in Bakur Kurdistan 
provinces with Kurdish political groups mostly supported by the KDP-Iraq. The group 
approached the other Kurdish and Turkish leftist organisations in that period, from 1973 to 
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1978 as an ideological group, mainly focused on political research and investigation before 
evolving into a party as the PKK on 27th November 1978.  
From November 1978 to September 1980, the PKK entered its most difficult time in 
the history of its formation because of the harsh measures taken by the Turkish state, which 
wanted to destroy it totally. The party’s national liberation discourse and the way it had 
analysed the Kurdistan Liberation struggle with the purpose of the Kurdish question was seen 
by the Turkish state as a danger posed to its stability. This was because of the radical 
revolutionary relationship and ideological orientation of the PKK with the Turkish left, 
combined with Kurdistan patriotism. According to Cemil Bayik, to a great extent the PKK 
did try to make an impact and influence the Kurdish nationalist organisation of the time in 
Ankara to act together on the principles the PKK stood for, but none of them accepted their 
ideological and political principles. 
According to the PKK’s historiography, it had offered other Kurdish nationalist 
organisations in Ankara and in Amed (Diyarbakir in Turkish) to get together in a united front 
to debate the Kurdish Question and create a national front. However, the mentioned Kurdish 
political organisations rejected the idea (Bayik 1998: pp.85-6). The chapter will also look at 
reformulation of a national liberation strategy and ideological confrontation with the KDP-
Iraq oriented Kurdish nationalism in all four parts of Kurdistan and, finally, it will talk about 
the PKK’s platform aiming at establishing political relations with Kurdish parties and other 
organization in the Middle East such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. The PKK 
had the opportunity to receive guerrilla training in the Palestinian camps before the 1980 
coup in Bakaa valley, Lebanon. Unlike other Kurdish organisations, the PKK did not choose 
to be a refugee organisation outside Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey, rather it wanted to use the 
wider platform of the Middle East for education, training and to gain the skills of guerrilla 
tactics in order to launch a long-term guerrilla war against the military coup in Turkey. After 
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the 12th September 1980 military coup, most Turkish and Kurdish liberal and leftist 
organisations left Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey to reach European countries, and over time 
they were passive from the political developments and lost their strength. Those who resisted 
in the prisons and continued the struggle actively in all spheres of life gained strength from 
people, and mobilised the people into politically strong movements. 
The formation of the Kurdistan Revolutionaries then became the PKK it was a radical 
revolution in the history of evolution Kurdish nationalism and it broke the taboo of traditional 
Kurdish nationalism and revolted to synthesis of primordial, ethno-symbolist and modernist-
constructionist contemporary patriotic nationalism.  
 
Emergence of the ‘Kurdistan Revolutionaries’ in 1973-1978 and the 
Multiple Challenges 
 
The radical emergence of the PKK in Bakur Kurdistan’s political history started with 
the idea of national right to self-determination for the Kurdish nation, and was discussed in 
all political debates of the time in Ankara and Istanbul. In one of the DDKO (Devrimci Dogu 
Kultur Ocaklari, Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths) seminars, the topic was whether 
‘Kurdistan is a classic colony’ or not. The Seminar was given by Abdullah Öcalan as one of 
the university students and a member of the DDKO. He argues that ‘Kurdistan is a classic 
colony in its kind and its existence even had been denied and policies of annihilation and 
assimilation have been in practice.  The only way of its liberation would be through a 
prolonged popular armed struggle’. This idea was put forward by the future PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan in that seminar, according to Sherefettin Kaya and Serhat Bucak (A History 
from Fire- A documentary recorded by researcher Ahmed Hamdi Akkaya, available on 
YouTube) whose presence created a fear among the DDKO members. Such a radical 
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emergence had never publicly been heard because the aim of DDKO was promoting cultural 
matters and organizing social events. Between the audiences there were three prominent 
DDKO activists Musa Anter, Sherefettin Kaya and Serhat Yusuf Bucak who met Öcalan after 
the seminar in order to know who he was. After that speech, the DDKO Istanbul branch 
terminated Öcalan’s membership because of his radical approach to the Kurdish Question 
(Yucel 2014: pp.110-112).    
As mentioned earlier, Abdullah Öcalan was born in very poor village family in Amara 
(Ömerli in Turkish) village belonging to Halfeti town of Urfa province close to the Euphrates 
banks, from a Kurdish father and a Turkish descent mother. His native language was Kurdish. 
The village life style gave him the opportunity to observe closely daily life, culture and social 
relations among the villagers and to witness their daily struggles for survival. For five year 
she went to Cibin village very day, five miles away from Amara (Ibid. pp. 65). When he 
finished primary school he could not go on with his studies because there was no middle 
school in the area. Due to a dispute between his brother and father, he ran away from his 
village to live with his elder sister, who was married in the Nizip town of Gaziantep province. 
As a hard studying bright student he passed all his exams and finally gained a place in 
the examination for entering a boarding school in Ankara. He mentions that he was very keen 
and passionate to go the military academy, but because of his age he was refused to enter the 
required exam process. Instead, he was given a place at the Land Registrar Cadastral Survey 
Boarding School in Ankara. By moving to Ankara, he enters a new world; according to his 
explanations, everything was new to him in that ‘big city’ (A History from Fire). 
In the village of Amara, just like majority of Kurdish children, he grew up in a 
conservative Sunni Muslim family, practicing fasting and praying five times a day and going 
to the Mosques where he gained the attention of the village imam. According to Öcalan, once 
the imam mentions: ‘Abdullah if you practice like this and continue consistently, and then 
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one day you will fly to the sky and become an angel’. When he was in Ankara, he 
continuously attended the Mosque and kept fasting and praying. He attended the anti-
communist seminars and wanted to learn about all the political debates of the time.  
Suddenly, Abdullah Öcalan finds the Alphabet of Socialism by Leo Huberman on his 
bed at the boarding schools dormitory, and as a very curious student he opens the book and 
read in his final year of the study. As a conservative but talented student, he had many 
questions in his mind. He later explained that he found many answers for these questions in 
that small book. He says to himself that ‘Mohammed lost and Marx has succeeded’. From 
that moment on, he continued to read books about the philosophy of Marx and Engels, 
dialectical materialism and the evolution history with the world political history and the 
history of Turkey and Kurdistan. The difficulty was that there were no books about the 
history of the Kurds and Kurdistan. Although the aim is not to be biased about Öcalan, the 
aim is to analyse the emergence of the PKK, the characteristics of the PKK are all hidden in 
the socialisation process of Öcalan.  
 Öcalan’s political socialization process started from the village where he was born. His 
primary education was in a neighbouring village Cibin, an Armenian village, which became a 
Turkish populated village after the Armenian Genocide. Walking with his schoolmates, the 
first stage of his socialisation was completed when he successfully finished primary school. 
The second stage of his socialization happened when Abdullah Öcalan involves in an 
argument with his family –father and young brother- and fled from his home and his village 
to his elder sister’s home in the neighbouring town of Nizip. Young Öcalan learned how to 
live far away from home and entered a wider world. He studied very hard and worked harder 
than everyone, becoming a much respected young student. At the final year of the Middle 
School exams he went to live in Ankara as previously mentioned, where he had the 
opportunity to lead an independent life from his family. 
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His third stage of socialization started in Ankara when he started secondary education 
at the state boarding school. It was at that time that he started to search for a solution to the 
problems of the community where he came from, and found the book that changed his life, 
the Alphabet of Socialism. That book changed his philosophy of life; he concentrated on 
reading books on socialism, nationalism and Kurdish and Turkish history. This third stage is 
very important because he moves away from idealistic and conservative religious beliefs to 
convert to dialectical materialism and socialism. 
The fourth stage of his socialization happened when he graduated from high school and 
was appointed as an assistant at the land registry office in Amed, the unofficial city of Bakur 
Kurdistan. Amed as a very ancient city has been the home for many civilisations and its 
ancient walls have surrounded one of the most unique cities of the world. The people, the 
city, the walls and the socio-cultural life had a huge impact on young Öcalan. It was in Amed 
when he heard people talking about the KDP’s struggle and its leader Mustafa Barzani. The 
ancient walls of Amed, and the socio-cultural daily life of the people made him reflect more 
deeply about past, present and future of Kurdish people (Öcalan 2012: 218). He wondered 
about the questions of why the people had no rights, why they were in such a situation, and 
he began to wonder about what needed to be done in order to solve the situation. In Amed, he 
prepares for University exams and gets a place at Law Faculty of Istanbul University in 1970-
71 academic years. At the same time he transferred his Land Registrar Office assistant job in 
Amed/Diyarbakir to Besiktas in Istanbul so that he could study and work at the same time. 
The fourth stage of young Öcalan’s socialisation is another highly critical one: either he 
would engage in a corrupted civil servant bureaucracy, or he would leave his job. One year in 
Amed gave Öcalan enough experience to choose which way to go. His experiences in Amed 
become the foundation of his political future.  
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He had succeeded in his aim: to work in Istanbul as a civil servant and as a student at 
university, to be involved in political activities and becomes a member of the Eastern 
Revolutionary Cultural Hearts- DDKO. As it was mentioned earlier it was at that time that he 
presented his first seminar and met three Kurdish patriotic intellectuals: Musa Anter, 
Sherefettin Kaya and Yusuf Serhat Bucak. In the seminar he presented his thesis on Kurds 
and Kurdistan. The theme was ‘Kurdish people are a nation’ this nation has been colonised 
and ‘Kurdistan is a Classic Colony’. ‘Therefore the only way of being free is to struggle 
through prolonged popular war to gain national right to self-determination and having an 
independent, united and democratic Kurdistan will be through an armed struggle’. This idea 
was not accepted by Kurdish nationalist of the time was seen as very dangerous political 
approach.  
 
Öcalan’s interest in the political issues of the time, and more importantly his ideas 
about the Kurdish question in Turkey, constituted a national security threat to the Turkish 
state. Kurdish nationalists were also not in favour of Öcalan’s ideas. At Istanbul University’s 
Law Faculty Campus Öcalan attended the seminar of Turkish leftist students’ leader, Mahir 
Chayan.  His revolutionary leftist manner attracted Öcalan when he talked about the Kurdish 
National Question.   
 The 12th March 1971 coup d’état took place and most of the leftist organisations were 
closed and martial law started to govern Turkey. Leftist students’ protests and their 
demonstrations were against the military coup, which killed the leader of the THKP-C 
People’s Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (in Turkish-Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi ve 
Cephsei) in Kizildere, Ordu province in Black Sea region of Turkey. Young Öcalan 
participated in the demonstrations and became one of the leftist revolutionary university 
students’ leaders. Imprisoned in April 1972, he quietly observed the prisoners, among those 
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leftist political prisoners he became friends with Ibrahim Aydin, a leftist university student 
from Dersim (Tunceli in Turkish). He was released in October 1972 after seven months in 
captivity. His first duty was to pass the exams in two weeks time. He passed all exams with 
merit and did not lose his state bursary. Soon after his release, his cellmate Ibrahim Aydin 
was released too. They met with another friend called Fehmi Yilmaz. Yilmaz told Öcalan that 
he knew two Turkish friends from the Black Sea region. Öcalan met Hakki Karer and Kemal 
Pir, both of who became Öcalan’s friends for life (Yucel 2015: pp. 143).    
This is the PKK’s fermentation or Incubation period. Öcalan was in search of quality 
not quantity, in other words he looked for permanent, talented, fulltime professional 
revolutionary candidates. It took a little long, but in the end he found what he was looking 
for. At first he brought together about eight Kurdish university students in Ankara and on 21st 
March 1973 they went out for a picnic to the Çubuk Dam. He explained to them what his 
intentions were. He explained that ‘the Kurds are a nation and their country called Kurdistan 
had been colonised and divided into four parts and that its natural and national existence has 
been denied’. He goes on that ‘it needed a very hard struggle and sacrifices to be freed’; 
‘would you be with me’? Öcalan tested their reactions and opinions. Abdullah Öcalan, Ali 
Haydar Kaytan, Mustafa Aksakalli, Halil Aslan, Musa Erdogan, Ismail Bingol, Faruk 
Vakifahmetoglu and Imad. Among these eight friends only one, Ali Haydar Kaytan stayed 
with Öcalan and the others left their friendship within one or two months for forever. Some 
continue their political activities in liberal organisations and some have left their political 
activities (Ibid: 154-155). Öcalan’s first attempt did not produce a positive outcome, because 
he tried with his Kurdish friends to set an organisation. However, his friends were from 
feudal wealthy families and that is why they were not in favour of radical political activities. 
He continued and resisted until he found those he had in his mind, because due to the 
oppression in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey, there was the possibility to find the social capital 
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to lead political mobilization. By the end of 1973 he was leading a ground of university 
students in Ankara, all of them influenced by leftist Marxist-Leninist ideology, focussing 
specifically on Kurdish national question and the right of separation as an independent state 
of Kurdistan in context of national right of self-determination. 
The small group of higher education students led by Öcalan first manifested their 
ideological principles according to which Turkey consisted of two nations, the Kurds and 
Turks. Turks had authority and power over all state institutions. The Kurdish nation has been 
subjected to Turkish states’ assimilation and annihilation policy. The Kurdish nation and their 
country Kurdistan had been divided, partitioned, and colonised by the four nation-states of 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. At the centre of the Middle East, this nation needs to have its 
national right to self-determination to be recognized. In order to gain its right to national self-
determination the people need to be organised and mobilized by an ideological and political 
organisation. All the participants of the debates were ideologically and theoretically 
convinced that Kurdistan was a colony and the only way out of its colonization was 
organizing an ideological and political underground party to lead a popular front and armed 
struggle, without which Kurdistan would not be free and Turkey would not be democratic.  
The group around Öcalan had become a very different group in terms of ideology, 
theory and practice, way of life, social and cultural relations in comparison to other leftist 
groups and Kurdish nationalist organisations. What Öcalan tried to achieve was security in 
future leadership for a very difficult struggle ahead. They were all university students, all of 
them were the brightest students and all were ready to leave their studies and become fulltime 
revolutionaries to organise Kurdistan National Liberation movement and leave their life in 
Bakur Kurdistan (Jongerden and Akkaya 2012: pp. 4).  
They approached Turkish Leftist organisations and offered them the opportunity to act 
together as Kurdish and Turkish revolutionaries while trying to organise a legal platform. For 
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this purpose they founded the ADYOD, Ankara Democratic Association of Higher Education 
(in Turkish Ankara Demokratik Yüksek Ögrenim Dernegi) in November 1973. Öcalan and his 
friend Hakki Karer were its administrators, but Öcalan was also the chairman. In 1974 the 
CHP party won the election and Bulent Ecevit became Prime Minister. His government 
issued general amnesty and most of the leftist prisoners were released. Öcalan’s attempts 
failed, so the only way to succeed was to concentrate on the Kurdish Question and organise a 
national liberation movement similar to the Vietnamese (Ibid: pp. 3).  
Before establishing a new group, as a last chance, Öcalan approached Kurdish 
nationalist and leftist organisations such as the DDKD –Revolutionary Democratic Cultural 
Associations – (in Turkish Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Dernekleri), TKDP – Kurdistan 
Democratic Party of Turkey – (in Turkish Türkiye Kurdistani Demokratik Partisi) and TSKP 
– Kurdistan Socialist Party of Turkey – (in Turkish Türkiye Kurdistani Sosyalist Partisi) 
offering them a chance to act together as one front organisation. The offer was rejected, but 
they offered Öcalan membership into their organisations. After this rejection, the group 
decided to act independently. Kurdish Nationalist organisations, even harsher than the 
Turkish left, did not allow the group to enter Bakur Kurdistan’s political space especially in 
the provinces of Amed, Mardin, Hakkari, Siirt, Muş, and Van, because these provinces of 
Bakur Kurdistan were the most strategic provinces. Those provinces were very important 
especially because the KDP-Iraq had influence through its sister organisations in Bakur 
Kurdistan.  
The group around Öcalan named it as the Kurdistan Revolutionaries while the other 
Kurdish and Turkish groups called them Apocular – the supporter of Apo. The purpose of 
calling the group’s members Apocular was to show that the group was not based on any 
political and ideological principle; rather that it was a group of anarchists. They also labelled 
the group as the National liberation Army and with many other different names. Some of the 
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Turkish leftist organisations such as – Halkin Kurtuluşu – (People’s Liberators) resisted them 
and prevented them from entering the high schools in the province centres and towns 
especially in Dersim, Bakur Kurdistan. 
Both Kurdish nationalists and Turkish Leftist groups used violence against the 
Kurdistan Revolutionists. The Turkish Leftist group called Halkin Kurtuluşu for the first time 
in Dersim on 7th of March 1977 killed a sympathizer of Kurdistan Revolutionaries, Aydin 
Gul. It was considered a serious attempt to prevent the group from entering mainly Kurdish 
Alevite provinces such as Dersim, Sivas, Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Adiyaman and 
Gaziantep of northern and western sides of the Euphrates. Turkish Leftist groups were in 
action and prevented the Kurdistan Revolutionaries group from establishing its popular base 
in their dominated Kurdish Alevite provinces. 
 Kurdish nationalist groups whom before and after the 12th March 1971 coup moved to 
Bashur Kurdistan and were ideologically influenced by the KDP-Iraq, were very active and 
took all possible measures to prevent Kurdistan Revolutionaries from entering Sunni 
dominated Kurdish provinces of Bakur Kurdistan. Kurdish nationalists in a political debate 
killed one of the Kurdistan Revolutionaries’ founding members, Hakki Karer in Gaziantep on 
18th May 1977. It showed that the Turkish left and Kurdish nationalists had both decided to 
prevent the Kurdistan Revolutionaries from gaining a popular base in Bakur Kurdistan’s in 
both Alevite and Sunni provinces.     
The Turkish state was witnessing these developments in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey; 
the political struggle and ideological confrontations turned into fighting and political murder 
between Kurdish and Kurdish, Kurdish and Turkish, and Turkish and Turkish. The Kurdistan 
Revolutionaries from 1975 onward slowly but sustainably relocated its activists from Ankara 
to Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Dersim and Adana. As an active group they decided to 
participate in most of the political debates of the time in Bakur Kurdistan’s major cities and 
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towns. Those confrontations were going on in Ankara among the higher education students 
and in Kurdistan among all the stratums of Kurdish society. The Mobilization of the people 
and support gained by the Kurdistan Revolutionaries was making the other organisations, 
both Kurdish and Turkish, uncomfortable.  
Kurdistan Revolutionaries faced multiple challenges: The emergence of the Kurdistan 
Revolutionaries coincided with a politically occupied space in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey. 
In Turkey the TKP – Communist Part of Turkey – and leftist political organisation with ultra-
nationalists had already filled the political space. Another actor was the Kemalist CHP party 
also acting as a so-called social-democratic party. None of them were letting the Kurdistan 
Revolutionaries hold debates in their territory. In Bakur Kurdistan the political space was 
strictly occupied in two regions. Kurdish nationalists in favour of Barzani, strictly supporting 
the KDP-Iraq in Bashur Kurdistan, would occupy the east of Euphrates River. The Turkish 
leftist and Turkish ultra-nationalists would dominate the west of Euphrates region of Bakur 
Kurdistan. On top of that, the state was also preventing the action of the Kurdistan 
Revolutionaries in towns and cities and in the rural areas supporting Kurdish feudal 
collaborators. Hence, to open a political space was a very difficult process, and defending a 
discussion about Kurds and Kurdistan, at that time like to hold a rock of fire, because of 
Turkish state’s denial policies against the question of the Kurds and Kurdistan.  
The Kurdistan revolutionaries were under heavy attacks from all sides. How did the 
group succeed in such a short time while under attack? The answer is in their birth and their 
loyalty, honesty and belief. The group believed that they were in the right direction and their 
discourse and their practice had to defend the right of oppressed people. That is why people 
supported this discourse and practice day after day. The memory of the past Kurdish 
uprisings against the Turkish state and the state’s harsh suppression of those uprisings was an 
important topic during the debates with people.  
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The Kurdistan Revolutionaries Group Evolves to a Political Party 
 
Kurdistan Revolutionaries made their substantial dynamic base in Dersim, Antep, 
Maraş, Elâzığ, Amed, Bingöl, Muş, Kars, Agirî, Urfa, Adiyaman, Malatya and Batman but 
also in Turkey’s Ankara, İzmir, Adana and İstanbul provinces. Up to 1977, the group had 
made a substantial progression not only in the provinces of the western Euphrates but also in 
the provinces of eastern Euphrates as well. The Kurdistan Revolutionaries had organised a 
qualitative base among teachers and educated people in Urfa, Mardin, Amed, Muş, Bingol, 
Van, Agirî and Kars. Öcalan’s second but most important trip starts from Ankara to Agirî, 
Kars, Bingol, Elazig, Dersim, Amed Urfa and Antep from April to mid May, then returning 
back to Ankara. As soon as he arrives in Ankara, one the group’s prominent members Haki 
Karer was killed in Antep on 18th May by a group called Sterka Sor, a small Kurdish leftist 
group. The Kurdistan Revolutionaries held an extraordinary meeting in Antep and they 
realized that the state intelligence was following them. The group decides that the activities 
had to be either stopped or upgraded to an upper level in terms of organization. In other 
words, they had to go underground but also avenge Haki Karer.   
After the death his best comrade, Haki Karer, Öcalan prepared the party’s programme 
as loyalty to continue his struggle, and the group agreed that revenge should be taken in this 
way in order to promote the struggle and defend the values he died for. Taking revenge in the 
meaning continuation of the aim he struggled for and makes that struggle to be successful. 
The Kurdistan Revolutionaries group had four very important Turkish members: Haki Karer 
and his brother Baki Karer, Kemal Pir and Duran Kalkan. Haki Karer was killed, his brother 
Baki left the PKK in 1993, Kemal Pir lost his life in the famous Amed prison in September 
1983, Duran Kalkan is still one the PKK’s executive committee member.   
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In the anniversary of Haki Karer’ death in the small town of Hilwan in Urfa province 
on 18th of May 1978, the local tribesman that related to MHP ultra-nationalists, killed another 
prominent member of the group, Halil Çavgun. The group responds in the best possible way. 
Their struggle became successful and their mayoral candidate won the election. The 
Municipality of Hilwan became a centre for serving the poor and the group gained prestige 
not only in the Urfa province but also in almost all neighbouring towns and villages.  
On 27th of November 1978, in Fis village in the town of Lice (Amed province), during 
a clandestine gathering, Ocalan brought together 22-25 prominent members from different 
provinces of Bakur Kurdistan. For two days and nights they debated the tasks, statute and 
programme of the party and made plans to establish links between the urban centres and the 
rural mountainous areas in order to prepare for a guerrilla war. They changed the name of 
Kurdistan Revolutionaries to PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
and they called the gathering their 1st congress. Abdullah Öcalan, Sahin Dönmez and Mehmet 
Karasungur were elected as the executive committee. The Central committee was composed 
by Abdullah Öcalan, Cemil Bayik, Mazlum Dogan, Mehmet Hayri Durmus, Mehmet 
Karasungur, Baki Karer and Sahin Dönmez. However, at the end of the 1st congress they still 
did not announce the name for two reasons: firstly, they wanted to announce in a very big 
event to be heard by everyone, and secondly they did want to avoid attraction and attention of 
the state in the meantime.  
The PKK’s 1st Congress delegates were: Abdullah Öcalan, Mehmet Hayri Durmus, 
Mazlum Dogan, Cemil Bayik, Seyfettin Zogurlu, Abdullah Kumral, Ali Haydar Kaytan, 
Duran Kalkan (Turkish), Baki Karer (Turkish), Sakine Cansiz, Kesire Yildirim, Ali Gunduz, 
Huseyin Topgider, Ali Çetiner, Abbas Goktas, Faruk Özdemir, Ferzende Toguç, Mehmet 
Cahit Sener, Mehmet Turan, Sahin Dönmez, Resul Altinok, and Suphi Karakus (Akkaya 
2005: DVD).  
  
	127	
In December 1978 in Maraş the state, ultra-nationalists and the police together with the 
army implemented a plan of killing hundreds of Alevite Kurds in Maraş City, which is 
located between Turkey and the Bakur Kurdistan border. The Kurds in Maraş are mostly 
believed to be an Alevite sect. The Turkish state with ultra-nationalists and conservative 
religious paramilitary groups changed the demography of the city when more than one 
hundred Alevite Kurds killed and thousands were deported (Tunç 2011: pp. 309). The 
government of the time declared martial law in most of Bakur Kurdistan provinces.   
Following the Maraş massacre, in Elazig, another mixed city of Bakur Kurdistan where 
the Kurdistan Revolutionaries were very strong, an operation in May 1979 led to the arrest of 
almost all the members of the Kurdistan Revolutionaries. The group’s newly elected 
executive committee member Şahin Dönmez confessed everything about the organisation to 
the police during his interrogation. The police and intelligence services became aware of all 
information about the group and their members and the nature of their activities (Bayik 1998: 
pp. 285). All secret documents in Şahin Dönmez’s possession were now in the hands of the 
police.  
Cemil Bayik knew about this on his way from Ankara to Elazig. After realizing the 
total collapse of the local branch of the organisation, he tried to escape from the arrest 
without success. According to Bayik, he was released because the informer(s) did not know 
him and he had a ticket showing that he was coming from Ankara and he had a forged 
identity card showing he was a local. Immediately Cemil Bayik moved to Amed and 
informed the group’s founder, leader, and operator Abdullah Öcalan that in a police operation 
all the branch of Elazig city had been arrested (Ibid: pp. 286).  
Öcalan moved from Amed to Mardin and Urfa to meet with the central committee 
members to inform them that they have reached the edge: life or death. In order to save the 
organisation and its continuity, the option of moving out of the country had to be considered. 
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On 1stor 2nd of July 1979, Öcalan with the help of one their local sympathizers in Suruç town 
of Urfa, left Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey to Kobani in Rojava Kurdistan. In the autumn of 
1979, Mehmet Karasungur moved to Rojhilat (Eastern) Kurdistan (Ibid: pp.306).  
Öcalan stayed in Kobani for a few days, and in that period he managed to make some 
contacts and build relations with the people of the town. The aim was to clandestinely move 
to Damascus in order to prepare the ground for the PKK militants to get guerrilla training 
from the PLO. During that time, he travelled without a passport from Bakur Kurdistan to 
Rojava Kurdistan’s town of Kobani to Damascus and to Bakaa Valley in Lebanon, where he 
started educating and training the guerrillas for the Kurdistan National Liberation Movement. 
When Şahin Dönmez returned from the Congress to his working place in Elazig he was 
the executive member of the group. Due to his arrest and collaboration with the police, Duran 
Kalkan replaced him. The Kurdistan Revolutionaries had not declared the PKK yet, but they 
were still the topic of interest in all Turkish media, referred to as Apocular instead. The 
attacks were coming from the Turkish ultra-nationalists of the MHP, Turkish leftist 
organisation, Kurdish nationalist organisations, and Kurdish tribal leaders collaborating with 
the state and the state’s police and armed forces. They were under a comprehensive siege. 
The only way was to open a channel outside of the country otherwise all the members would 
have been arrested.  
	
The PKK Revealed in July 1979 in Siverek 
 
The Kurdistan Revolutionaries kept their congress strictly secret, even from their lower 
cadres. They had divided responsibilities among the central committee members and had 
established regional, provincial and district committees of their party, despite having not 
come out publicly yet (Bayik 1998: pp. 254-55). They were under attack from everywhere. 
Attacks were from the state, from Kurdish nationalist organisations and Turkey’s leftist and 
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nationalist organisations. However inexperienced, but very loyal to each other and active in 
the current political debates, by the time they had already written a comprehensive 
ideological, theoretical and political document as well as their party programme. In each city 
and town they had secretly set up educational groups which gathered everyday for two or 
three hours to read and make group discussions in order to prepare future cadres for 
organizational sustainability.     
Hilwan was the first, and Siverek was the second stage of the experiment to find out 
whether a guerrilla war could be established and survive in the situation and conditions of the 
time. They were to some extend confident that a guerrilla war would successfully survive if 
they were trained for it. There were two very critical moments for them: the first was that 
there was no political space left for political activities under the martial law, and the second 
was the confession of Sahin Dönmez (Ibid: 286). 
As the Turkish state founding principle was based on the denial of Kurds and Kurdistan 
it would not tolerate such an organisation to threaten its territorial integrity and indivisible 
unity. Although the PKK was not officially declared, the state had all the necessary 
information about its political programme and its comprehensive theoretical stand. It was at 
that difficult moment that Öcalan decided to move to Rojava (South-western) Kurdistan. The 
nearest city was Kobani, not very far away from Pirsus where he was. He asked Ethem 
Akçam, one clandestine border trader and sympathizer, to take him to Kobani and asked 
whether he knew anybody there. On 1st of July 1979 they crossed the border to Kobani. In the 
movement’s history, that was the self-exile that would be remembered as the move that 
allowed the survival of the movement. Kobani would become the most important centre for 
the movement not only for Bakur and Rojava Kurdistan, but also for the Middle East and the 
world as well (Ibid: pp. 306).   
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The PKK officially appeared on July 29th 1979 in a semi-successful operation against 
the local Bucak tribe leader Mehmet Celal Bucak who was a Member of Parliament from AP 
– Adalet Partisi – the Justice Party. The operation was not fully successful because the group 
only wounded the tribe leader and lost one of its prominent and well-known cadres, Salih 
Kandal, who was at that time a significant figure of the group in almost in all provinces of 
Bakur Kurdistan. The aim of the PKK was not killing but making him confess to the people 
of Siverek and the region about the atrocities he had committed against them. If the operation 
had been successful, then the outcome of that operation could have been much greater. 
Despite the operation’s lack of success, the PKK was officially declared and the leaflets of 
the PKK were delivered in most of the towns and cities of Bakur Kurdistan. 
The titles of all national Turkish newspapers were about the PKK and its attack on 
Justice Party’s MP Mehmet Celal Bucak. The topic of daily agenda was the PKK and the 
news about it. Most of the news were speculations about how the PKK had removed the state 
institutions in Hilwan and Siverek, and how it had become the dominating Kurdish force in 
the region. The news regarded them as “Kurdish separatist”, “Marxist-Leninist Separatist”, 
“Separatist Anarchists”, and “Separatist Terrorist”; those words and labels were new in the 
political vocabulary of the Turkish state.   
The first duty of Öcalan was to find a place in Kobani and to make relations with the 
people in order to create a network with Bakur Kurdistan. Then he planned to move to 
Damascus and Lebanon to build relations with the Palestinian Liberation Movement for the 
guerrilla training camps. As a leftist revolutionary during his university studies, he knew how 
Turkish and Kurdish leftist revolutionaries went to Damascus and Lebanon for their guerrilla 
training.  Although he faced many obstacles with Palestinian organisations, because Turkish 
leftists and Kurdish nationalist organisations already introduced the PKK as a very dangerous 
organisation by giving incorrect information that the PKK was founded by the US and the 
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Turkish secret police, nevertheless in Damascus he resisted to meet the leaders of the 
Palestinian Democratic Liberation Front (Ibid: 307-8). The attitude about Kurdish people 
among the Palestinian Liberation Organisations was not positive, because during 1961 until 
1975 the Mustafa Barzani led Bashur Kurdistan uprising was supported by Israel.  But also 
since Syria was an ally of the Soviet Union; all regional Communist Parties of the time were 
in Damascus and they had also given incorrect information about the PKK to the Palestinians, 
the representatives of Socialist countries as well as the Communist parties of the region of the 
Middle Eastern countries (Ibid: 389).   
After being released from the Turkish secret police and state oppression, Öcalan found 
the great opportunity to reorganise his party and bring his party cadres for training before 
returning them to Bakur Kurdistan. He found also another opportunity to spread out his 
party’s ideology and manifest among Kurdish people in Rojava, in Damascus and in 
Lebanon. As they declared in their programme they were working ultimately for an 
Independent United and Democratic Kurdistan. Therefore they did not recognise the borders, 
because those borders were drawn against the will of the peoples of Kurdistan. Syria was at 
that time the main supporter of the Palestinian cause, and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation was operating in Syria and in Lebanon. Lebanon’s countryside was mostly 
under the control of the Syrian army.  
The PKK had started to relocate its cadres via Kobani and other towns such as 
Nusaybin and Kaniya Xezalan (in Turkish Ceylanpinar) to Damascus, and to the Bakaa 
Valley in Lebanon to give them guerrilla training before they returned to mountainous-
forested provinces Bakur Kurdistan to launch a guerrilla War. The PKK considered two 
strategic mountain ranges in Bakur Kurdistan: Dersim and Botan. The first group got trained 
and returned to Siverek, Dersim, Kars, Agirî and Batman and tried to set up its clandestine 
guerrilla hideouts in the mountainous forest areas. While the PKK was busy with guerrilla 
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training, a dramatic accident happened when two of its central committee members – 
Mazlum Dogan and Mehmet Hayri Durmus – were arrested while in possession of some 
organizational documents.  Another dramatic incident happened when the guerrilla groups’ 
leaders Kemal Pir and Mehmet Can Yuce were arrested in Batman province while on their 
way back from guerrilla training with all the documentations. It was a significant blow to 
PKK’s guerrilla war strategy, because Öcalan had written orders to the future-to-be guerrilla 
commanders and all those documents were confiscated in that accident. The Turkish police, 
the intelligence and the army became alarmed when they witnessed the preparation of the 
PKK for guerrilla warfare and their regional and international relations for guerrilla trainings 
with the Palestinians, which consequently led to the 12th September coup d’état. 
The emergence of the PKK was seen as an existential threat to the national security of 
the Turkish state. This is because the Turkish state, after the Amed, Agirî and Dersim 
Genocide, was convinced that it had broken the backbone of Kurdish national liberation 
movements and that they would never be able to stand up again. But also when Turkish state 
defeated the Agirî rebellion in 1930, they made a symbolic grave and wrote on the 
gravestone: ‘The Dreamed Kurdistan Graved Here’. The declaration of Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan’s programme aimed at removing Turkish rule in Bakur Kurdistan showed the 
strength of the movement. Not only was the Turkish state feeling uncomfortable, most of the 
Kurdish and Turkish political organisations attacked the PKK very harshly with the 
prominent arrests mentioned above. Although the PKK gained momentum in a short time 
under very difficult circumstances, if it had not lost its most prominent members the future of 
the PKK would have been more successful then it was. 
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Moving to the Middle East and other Parts of Kurdistan 
 
At this stage, the PKK’s struggle was similar to its birth in Ankara, when Öcalan did 
not have anybody to rely on. When Abdullah Öcalan moved to Rojava Kurdistan, Damascus 
and Lebanon another Central Committee member, Mehmet Karasungur, was the first 
commander in charge of the Hilwan and Siverek popular resistances. In the autumn of 1979 
he moved to Mahabad – the Famous city of Rojhilat Kurdistan that saw the Kurdistan 
Republic in 1946 – as the representative of the PKK in Rojhilat (Eastern) Kurdistan 
(Serxwebun 2008: vol. 33, pp. 10). The idea behind this moving to Rojava and Rojhilat 
Kurdistan was to allow the newly established PKK to act more freely and to safeguard its 
members from the huge pressure from the Turkish state’s security and intelligence forces, 
and create new facilities for ideological, political and guerrilla trainings.  
Mehmet Karasungur in Rojhilat Kurdistan was not successful as Öcalan was in 
Damascus and Bakaa Valley. In Rojhilat Kurdistan there were more opportunities than in 
Syria, because after the 1979 popular revolution in Iran, a great part of Rojhilat Kurdistan 
was free from Iranian state’s rule (Ibid: pp. 10). The PKK representative in Mahabad was 
able to build relations with Rojhilat and Iranian political organisations. Despite Rojhilat 
Kurdistan being divided between the KDP-Iran and the Komala (Komalay Shoreshgeri 
Zahmatkeshani Kurdistani Iran) – Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian 
Kurdistan) leftist Maoist organisation and Islamic Republic of Iran, there were great 
opportunities to build guerrilla-training camps close to the mountainous border areas. 
Mehmet Karasungur was also responsible to build relations with Bashur Kurdistan’s political 
parties too. Most of the Bashur political parties were situated in the mountainous areas of the 
border between Rojhilat and Bashur (my personal experience). 
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 The PKK from 1979 onwards had built relations in Syria with Palestinian Liberation 
Organisations, and with some Kurdish political organisations in Rojava. In Bakaa Valley in 
Lebanon, it had been successful in opening guerrilla-training camps with the Palestinian 
Democratic Front in an effort to extend the relations to other Palestinian organisations; it had 
also set up relations with Kurdish Community in Damascus, Aleppo and in Beirut. But also 
Öcalan had successfully set up relations with the PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s leader 
Jalal Talabani who was a well-known Kurdish leader because of the uprisings that occurred 
from 1961 to 1975 in Bashur Kurdistan.  
In Easter Kurdistan, Mehmet Karasungur had set up relations with KDP-Iran, the 
Komala, the Bureau of Sheikh Izzeddin Husseini, Iranian leftist organisations and Iranian 
Tudeh Party (Iranian Communist Party). Those relations did not go further to produce 
constructive collaborations. For example, Rojhilat Kurdistan could have been a very 
important base to safeguard those PKK activists in Bakur. However, Mehmet Karasungur 
was not active enough to create opportunities as Öcalan did in Syria and Lebanon. Although 
the PKK was successful in extending a kind of diplomatic relation from outside of Bakur 
Kurdistan, it failed to prevent imprisonment of almost five thousand of its supporters. In the 
same way it failed in avoiding the leading cadres from the inhumane tortures in Amed prison 
as well as the prison massacres.   
The PKK’s national liberation discourse was different from most of the political parties 
of all four parts of Kurdistan. For instance, the PKK’s ideological discourse was based on 
Independent United and Democratic Kurdistan. A Proletariat led National Liberation 
Movement must have been organised and without armed struggle the liberation of Kurdistan 
it would have been impossible. The PKK challenged two different views: the fist being that 
all four KDP’s were struggling for Democracy for Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria and 
Autonomy for Kurdistan. The second view was that autonomy was not the solution, but 
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independence gained through non-violent actions. These three different views were in friction 
and conflict in all four parts of Kurdistan.  
One of the reasons that Mehmet Karasungur was not able to get permission from 
Rojhilat organisation, the KDP-Iran, to launch guerrilla-training camps was because of those 
different views. The PKK Rojhilat representative from autumn 1979 to September 1980 tried 
hard to open bases in the KDP-Iran controlled areas, but the KDP-Iran officials did not allow. 
Dr. Abdurrahman Qassimlu, the general secretary of KDP-Iran, was in good friendly 
political relations with the French Socialist Party and had diplomatic channels through Iraqi 
government. Massoud Barzani, president of KDP-Iraq, was in a good political relation with 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran and Iraq were at war. KDP-Iran was not keen to provide a base 
to the PKK because it had relations with Turkey. The PKK had relations with the Syrian 
Baath government and the Palestinian organisations. All these relations were offering 
opportunities and advantages as well as disadvantages. Inevitably Kurdish political parties 
were playing the role of proxies rather independent actors as their own.  
Moving from Bakur Kurdistan to a wider environment of the Middle East offered the 
PKK the opportunity to move wider in the Middle East. During the Germany reconstruction 
after WWII, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish people were allowed to work in Germany. In 
the centre of Europe there was a Kurdish Diaspora and after the declaration of 1978’s Martial 
Law in Turkey so many political activists left Turkey and the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe 
became stronger. The PKK used the opportunity of being in Beirut and Damascus effectively 
and transferred some of its cadres to Europe for organisational purposes. It also started the 
publication of its monthly ideological journal, Serxwebun.  
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Reorganization Ideologically, Politically, Militarily and Return to 
Kurdistan 
 
The PKK’s foundation, progression and development in Bakur Kurdistan in 1970’s 
shocked all political actors of the time. It was progressing well among Kurdish society, 
wherever its militants had debates they were quickly supported by a group of people. During 
the 12 September 1980 coup d’état thousands of its supporters were imprisoned and tortured 
and many of them lost their lives (Gunes 2012: pp.98). As explained in the previous section, 
the PKK already relocated some of its cadres for training in Syria and Lebanon. The military 
coup took place on 12 September 1980. Thousands of Kurdish and Turkish nationalists and 
left and right wing political supporters were imprisoned. In Bakur Kurdistan the PKK lost 
many of its supporters, thousands of them imprisoned, some lost their lives in clashes with 
the security forces.  
The PKK relocated a significant number of its members to Syria and Lebanon prior to 
the coup and already made bases in Bakaa Valley. Through Syria a channel was opened to 
the Middle East for the PKK to organise a massive Kurdish community in Germany and 
Europe. It tried to relocate its members and supporters from Turkey and Bakur Kurdistan as 
many as it could to train and educate for launching guerrilla activities (Ibid: pp. 99). At the 
beginning the group had given a great importance to ideological and political education and 
understanding of the group members. Through education, and the reading of historical and 
scientific revolutionary literature, it would be possible to prepare a knowledgeable generation 
to lead Kurdish society. It was a principle of the PKK that any member must first be armed 
with scientific revolutionary knowledge.    
The 12th September coup d’état had silenced all political activities in Bakur Kurdistan 
and Turkey. The PKK tried to work on two fronts: first of all it wanted to bring all Kurdish 
nationalist organisations in a united front. The PKK’s leader visited all Bakur Kurdistan 
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political organisations in Damascus and offered them the opportunity to act in a wider front 
against the military coup (Yucel 2015: pp. 352). Kurdish political organisations declared that 
they were not in favour of launching a violent struggle against the military coup. The turn 
came for the Turkish leftist organisations; Öcalan knew all of them because when in Ankara 
he visited and debated the Kurdistan question with all of them. The offer after long debates 
and discussions was accepted and the FKBDC Anti-Fascist United Resistance Front (Fasizme 
Karsi Birlesik Direnis Cephesi) emerged in 1981 (Ibid: pp. 353). At that stage the PKK was 
not successful in bringing Kurdish political organisations from Bakur Kurdistan in a united 
front. Although the PKK was able to bring seven Turkish leftist revolutionary groups in an 
anti-fascist front, the union did not last long and disappeared in 1983.   
While the PKK has had its comprehensive manifesto in 1978, Öcalan found out that 
those ideological and theoretical writings were not answering the questions of the day. 
Therefore, he prepared three important guiding comprehensive writings, which continued up 
to 1999 as the maxim of the PKK for education: 1- The organizational and Personality 
Problems, 2- The Role of Force in Kurdistan, and 3- Kurdistan’s National Liberation Problem 
and Its Solution. The relocation of its members increased. Those members were trained 
ideologically, theoretically and militarily. Those writings became classics of the PKK for 
education. The PKK held its first conference in July 1981 and its second Congress in August 
1982. On both occasions, Öcalan presented the political reports and emphasized the need to 
expand the strategy and tactics of the revolution for the years to come (Gunes 2012: pp.92).  
Öcalan observed some organizational shortcomings and analysed the problems, then 
offered the solutions on overcoming those organizational problems. In spite of a highly 
ambitious and spiritual standing for high values of Kurdistan revolution, he found again some 
personality problems that needed to be solved. He concentrated on those problems every day. 
Those educated and trained cadres of the party needed to have understood the role of the 
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force in the history of colonialism. Hence Öcalan prepared the Role of the Force in Kurdistan 
Revolution as the scientific explanation of Guerrilla war’s strategy and tactics. As it was 
though, the Kurdistan revolution would the hardest one in the region of the Middle East 
because of its nature; that it has been divided into four parts and each part has been divided 
and ruled strictly by military force. The ultimate aim of the dividers was to remove Kurds and 
Kurdistan from history. The aim of the Force in Kurdistan Revolution was to make sure that 
those Guerrillas knew the difficult task that they were standing for and the difficult days 
ahead.      
 The Second Congress of the PKK was as important as the first one because thousands 
of the members of the organisation were in detention. Nevertheless, the Second Congress 
became the platform for the PKK to reassess its past ten years of struggle and experiences 
and to analyse the causes and reasons of successes and failures. That platform played a 
significant role for the implementation of the strategy and tactics and an opportunity to the 
cadres to debate and express their views for the first time. Having almost relocated 300 
members the PKK gained the greatest opportunity in its ten years history (Marcus 2009: 57). 
More importantly the PKK was able to build strong relations with the PLO, which constituted 
an important step towards diplomatic and political relations to the Socialist system of the 
time.   
	
Conclusion 
 
 Kurdish nationalist leadership failed to be united during the 1920 attempt to 
implement Sevres Treaty at least to guarantee international recognition of independence of 
Kurdistan. Almost all rebellions in Bakur, Bashur and Rojhilat Kurdistan faced deadly failure 
and Bakur Kurds were put under annihilation, assimilation and extermination. This policy 
caused a radical small group of university students successfully created with the purpose of 
  
	139	
establishing a totally independent, talented, dynamic and leftist political reading aimed at 
investigating and researching the history, politics, international relations and history of the 
world in relations to the Kurdish Question. The group, which started from one man, named 
itself Kurdistan Revolutionaries in Bakur Kurdistan. Abdullah Öcalan based the theoretical 
and political activity on his life’s experience. The theory was totally based on Marxist theory 
and approached the Kurdish Question through class-based politics; despite this, in Bakur 
Kurdistan there was a very little working class industrial proletariat. The Turkish state built 
all manufactories in Turkey not in Bakur Kurdistan. It was Amed’s cultural, social, political, 
lingual and ethnic composition that influenced Öcalan. He managed successfully to organise 
it, created its ideological framework, and set up its strategic and tactical programme writing a 
comprehensive manifesto. The nascent movement faced an obstacle by the Turkish state, 
Turkish leftists, Kurdish nationalists and some Kurdish tribes. Despite all those challenges, 
they were able to overcome and evolved into a party.  
The PKK’s formation happened in a very chaotic and complex socio-political environment 
and later moved to Rojava, Rojhilat and then to Bashur Kurdistan in a very critical moment 
of contemporary Kurdish history. It was formed as an ideological and political leadership that 
aimed to understand, analyse and find the way of solving the Kurdish Question and act for its 
solution in theoretical and practical ways. Understanding the official policy of Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria with international political system regarding Kurds and Kurdistan was the 
most important topic of the formation of the PKK. The formation of the PKK was 
representing a radical change in the KNLM, while challenging Kurdish tribal leadership as 
was still largely present in the KDP’s of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. 
 This chapter defined the PKK as a contemporary modernist-constructionist patriotic 
nationalist movement, which occurred when all forms of Kurdish traditional primordial 
nationalist movements failed in all parts of Kurdistan. The strength of the PKK came from its 
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modernist and patriotic and self-sacrifice nature of organisational discipline with its 
ideological and political philosophy of defending national liberation at the stage of its 
formation. 
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Chapter 5 
The PKK’s Dominance and Hegemony in Kurdistan-Reformation 
Introduction 
 
 
Chapter five focuses on the PKK’s radical strategy and its progression in Bakur 
Kurdistan with the positive impacts in the other three parts. The heroic resistance in Amed 
prison, the serious revolutionary ideological and political performance in the Middle East, 
while the PKK was accommodated by the Palestinian Democratic Front, the launch of 
guerrilla war against Turkish state and more importantly the continuity of the struggle makes 
the PKK ideologically, politically and virtually the dominant actor in all parts of Kurdistan. 
The spirit of resistance of the PKK leaders abroad and in the Amed prison was inspired in 
their ideological belief and political stand to make a successful Kurdistan national liberation 
movement and create an independent and democratic state of Kurdistan. The chapter will 
analyse the PKK’s impact in the Middle East and Europe among the Kurdish Diaspora. The 
12 September 1980 coup d’état carried out by Turkish armed Forces (TAF) obstructed all 
Turkish leftist democratic movements in Bakur Kurdistan preventing the PKK from 
launching a guerrilla war.  The raids of the army weakened not only the PKK, but also all 
democratic forces. Thousands of its supporters were imprisoned, hundreds of the active 
members were killed and few hundred managed to go out of the country. In order to 
understand the post 12 September coup’s PKK, one must look at the heroic resistance of its 
leaders and members in Amed prison as well as those members in Bakur Kurdistan and those 
who moved to the Middle East.  How was the PKK able, despite that huge damage, to 
organise in a short time a real political party consisting of full-time revolutionaries 
completely committed to the revolution? How did it manage to build a popular front? Most 
importantly, how could the PKK establish a parliament in exile in Brussels? Does a 
conceptual analysis of all these developments allow an understanding of whether the 
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movement was trying to adopt a more democratic stand?  At this regard, the chapter 
concludes that the PKK was partially successful in adopting a more democratic option by 
obtaining the election of Kurdish MPs representing Kurdish interests in the Great National 
Assembly of Turkey. The PKK transformed itself from a party devoted to the armed struggle 
to a party able to negotiate possible solutions to the Kurdish question democratically by 
becoming a national and international actor. At the heart of the PKK’s emergence, 
progression and becoming a hegemonic actor in all parts of Kurdistan, lies the spirit of 
Kurdish national question, national identity, and national liberation concept. Analysing the 
process of transformation and paradigm change from national liberation to democratic 
liberation of the PKK, it is necessary to look at its development at the first instance as a party, 
a guerrilla army, a popular front (moving towards a national/social movement), and then 
becoming an interlocutor to negotiate and establish a parliament in exile. All these mentioned 
organisations were preparations for Kurdistan national liberation and the independent state of 
Kurdistan.  
A Political Party the PKK 
 
As mentioned in chapter four, the PKK was born illegally in a strictly controlled 
political environment after the military coup d’état of 1971. This meant that whoever adhered 
to its views and politics ran the risk of being arrested. In this climate, the nucleus of a 
political reading group devoted to the research on the national-democratic revolution in 
Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey was founded under the name of Kurdistan Revolutionaries. The 
group read Marxist Leninist classics from a wide range of world revolutionaries of the time. 
The group focused on the Leninist party structure following the theory and in the practice 
adopted by the Vietnam Workers’ Party.   
The nucleus group’s leader Abdullah Öcalan, the senior member of the group, had 
experienced a different kind of political education. Born in Kurdistan, he witnessed and 
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observed the differences between Turkish and Kurdish people in particular in Turkey’s 
capital Ankara and in the de facto capital city of Kurdistan, Amed. He could listen to the 
speeches and observe the actions of Kurdish nationalists and Turkish political leaders; most 
importantly, he had the opportunity to participate in the university students’ political protest 
against the state, a political commitment for which he was imprisoned for seven months. 
Once in prison, he witnessed how the state punished its political enemies to death. After 
seven months in prison he was released, and he continued his education. His life at university 
not only provided him with a legal status, but it allowed him to organise a group according to 
his own political beliefs.  
As the natural leader of the group he used all his abilities, talents and energy to create a 
group of professional revolutionaries in order to fight for an independent, united and 
democratic Kurdistan. These professional revolutionaries devoted their life to work for the 
revolution. He prepared the theoretical and ideological base for the group. The group acted in 
clandestinely and for this reason it did not have any legal association, journal or newspaper. 
The members had willingly devoted their life to the cause and had to strongly believe in 
socialism, freedom, equality, justice and democracy. He worked among university students 
and recruited selected students with such credentials and qualities. Öcalan has had two 
attempts purely based on Kurdish nationalists although both attempts resulted in little 
success: the first attempt was during his membership of the DDKO. Because of his very 
radical views he was dismissed from the DDKO membership, and the second one was at the 
Çubuk Dam’s meeting. At the Çubuk Dam meeting all of his fellows were Kurds from 
different parts of Bakur Kurdistan, but from wealthy families apart from Öcalan himself and 
his first comrade Ali Haydar Kaytan.   
When Öcalan was in Istanbul at the Faculty of Law, he built up relations with the 
DDKO and became a member of the association. In addition, while at university he had the 
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opportunity to listen to Turkish leftists, mainly Revolutionists Youth, and in particular the 
DEV GENÇ, as Ocalan explained to both the DDKO –Kurdish nationalists – and the DEV-
GENÇ –, mainly Turkish radical leftists influenced him (Öcalan 2012: pp. 263). Although 
both the DDKO and DEV GENÇ influenced Öcalan, he was not convinced that they were the 
organisations he wanted to work for; he had a different organisation in his mind. Öcalan left 
the Faculty of Law in Istanbul, and moved to Ankara to study Political Science with a bursary 
granted to the best performing students in Turkey and Kurdistan.  
 After his release from Mamak prison he realised that what was needed was a new 
political party different from the Kurdish nationalists and the Turkish leftist ones. He worked 
hard among the higher education students and brought together the group he wanted. In the 
Mamak prison, one of Öcalan’s cellmates was Ibrahim Aydin who was a Kurd from Dersim. 
He met Fehmi Yilmaz who was a friend of Haki Karer and Kemal Pir, two Turkish leftists 
from the Black Sea region of Turkey. Öcalan moved there and in a very short time they 
became a research, investigative and political reading group. A qualitative group grew, 
reaching between 20 and 30 members, all of them university students (Jongerden & Akkaya: 
2012: pp. 8). In the first year, every evening the group met and did readings followed by 
discussions about the reason and causes of the failure of Turkish lefts, the coup d’état of 12 
March1971, the Kurdistan National liberation problem, and about a possible solution to the 
Kurdish question.  
  From 1973 to 1975 the group gained popularity and respect. Öcalan, as the chairman 
and Haki Karer were elected as the members of Ankara Revolutionary Higher Education 
Students’ Association called ADYÖD. Öcalan tried to bring Turkish and Kurdish leftist 
organisations together in one strongly united organisation. That attempt also failed. At the 
beginning, Öcalan tried without success to involve just Kurdish students in the Çubuk Dam 
meetings, later he tried also to involve the Turkish left, again without success. In his mind 
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Kurdistan was a colony with the right of national self-determination. According to Öcalan the 
revolutionaries from the oppressing nations should support the oppressed nations in their 
right to self-determination. It was the principle article and universally recognized right of 
oppressed nations in the United Nations Charter and the topic of their debates agenda.    
In Turkish history, even after the establishment of the Republic, many nations and 
ethnic minorities were massacred such as the Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks. However, in 
Turkey the most oppressed people were the Kurds, and Öcalan believed that as a colony 
divided between four states, Kurdistan should be liberated first. In his view Kurdistan’s 
liberation would have helped Turkey’s democratic revolution and revival of the other 
minorities too. 
When the group evolved from an ideological and theoretical reading group to a political 
power, the relations between the members of the group also evolved in a unified effort 
towards a common revolutionary goal. They have continuously researched, investigated and 
debated the topics of socialism, democracy, national question, national identity, and national 
liberation, national right to self-determination and consequently how to solve these problems 
in Kurdistan and Turkey from 1973 to mid 1975. In order to act towards a political change, a 
systematic programme, a revolution theory, and clear ideological guidance were needed. All 
these debates and meetings were held in secrecy since talking about these topics as well as 
talking about the Kurds and the Kurdish question could result in long imprisonments; this 
was due to the fact that their existence as a nation and a country was not recognised by the 
Turkish state.  
Cemil Bayik, one of Abdullah Öcalan’s first comrades since 1973, started a journey 
from Ankara to Urfa and Antep, two large Kurdish cities, in 1975. They participated in 
seminars and debates with Kurdish nationalists and Turkish leftists. The intentions of Öcalan 
and Bayik were to measure the political pulse in Kurdistan and analyse whether or not they 
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could open a window of hope for themselves. At that time the political environment was 
filled with Turkish left and Kurdish nationalists. The state was also in close surveillance, and 
talking about liberation of Kurdistan was very dangerous; if you hold fire you will burn. On 
the way back to Ankara both visited Öcalan’s home village, Amara. After having their meals, 
Öcalan’s father says: ‘you were a communist, now I heard that you are dealing with Kurdish 
question. Kurdish question is very dangerous, it is better to stay as a communist’. Abdullah 
Öcalan smiles and says: ‘my father knows the Kurdish question is more dangerous than the 
Turkish left’s Communism’ (Bayik 1998: pp. 124).  This journey was Öcalan’s first journey 
to Bakur Kurdistan after his preparation to build a party different than the traditional Kurdish 
and Turkish leftist ones.  
As soon as he returned to Ankara, Öcalan asked his comrades whether or not they could 
work professionally and devote their 24 hours to the Kurdistan Revolution. Some of the 
group cadres such as Haki Karer, Kemal Pir, Cemil Bayik, Mustafa Karasu, Ali Haydar 
Kaytan, Duran Kalkan, Mazlum Dogan and Mehmet Hayri Durmus moved to the cities of 
Bakur Kurdistan to carry out the ideological propaganda and organize the youth. They had 
named their group Kurdistan Revolutionaries, without exposing themselves not to attract the 
attention of the Turkish intelligence. However, the other groups called them with different 
names such as: Apocular as the supporters of Apo (Abdullah Ocalan), or UKOcular – Ulusal 
Kurtulus Ordusu – Kurdistan Liberation Army. But also Kurdish nationalists and Turkish 
Leftist organisations wanted to discredit the Kurdistan Revolutionaries as the followers of a 
person, Abdullah Ocalan/ Apo, rather than a political movement.  
On the 1st of January 1976 the Kurdistan Revolutionaries in Ankara held their first 
meeting. At that meeting Öcalan gave a detailed and systematic speech regarding the group’s 
ideological parameters of their understanding of historical materialism, dialectical 
materialism, history of Kurdistan, partition of Kurdistan and its colonization offering a 
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solution. The solution was that Kurdistan becomes a country and the Kurds a nation. A 
revolution must be organised in accordance with the principles of National right to self-
determination; to achieve that, an ideology and a political force must be created and 
organised.  Another topic of the meeting was the evaluation of their first ideological struggle 
in some Kurdistan cities, particularly in the cities of Antep, Maras, Malatya, Dersim and 
Adana. At the end of the meeting, the group reached the decision that a committee of three 
people would manage the activities. Abdullah Öcalan with two of his deputies: Haki Karer 
and Kamer Özkan. At the end of the first meeting the group members returned to their duties 
in different cities in Kurdistan (Ibid: 143-46). 
Haki Karer’s duty was in Antep, where he carried out a very successful ideological and 
political organisation in 1977. Kamer Özkan’s activity in Dersim caused some problems and 
he had to leave the group. According to Öcalan and Bayik Kamer Özkan he was working for 
the intelligence service when he left the organisation in Dersim. Apparently he had created a 
group called Tekosin, which stood against Kurdistan Revolutionists (Ibid: pp. 146). In the 
history of the Kurdistan Revolutionists in Ankara there were a lot of conspiracy stories. 
When Öcalan was the head of ADYÖD in Ankara, naturally he met all the members of the 
students association. The state enrolled its spies wherever it needed, and those enrolled 
students were members of the ADYÖD as well. Among those students Nejati Kaya (Pilot) 
and Kesire Yildirim approached Öcalan (Öcalan 1996: pp. 96), according to Öcalan and 
Bayik.  
 
The underground party that Öcalan dreamed of was finally established. Would they be 
able to continue their work as a party, while the party was in clandestinely? According to 
Öcalan at that time, Pilot was representing the Fascist tendency of the ‘special war branch’, 
on the other side Kesire Yildirim represented the Kemalist tendency of the ‘special war 
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branch’ (Öcalan 1996: pp. 112). Both of them were very close to Öcalan and they acted as 
members of the party. From 27th of November onwards the Kurdistan Revolutionists became 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party the PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan. A central committee was 
elected and between the committee members a three member executive committee elected 
Abdullah Öcalan as the General Secretary of the PKK. The programme of the PKK was 
aimed at organising the Kurdistan Liberation Revolution. This revolution should be led by a 
proletariat party, should organise a wide popular front, and organise a guerrilla army to 
continue the struggle through a prolonged popular war. The first stage was a party from the 
poorest stratum of Kurdish society, which had been established as well as the agenda to 
organise a guerrilla army. All those concepts were easy to express theoretically, the difficulty 
was implementation under a strict denial policy.  
The important question always asked by its foes and friends was why the PKK had 
achieved so much support and why the others had not. Objective circumstances of Bakur 
Kurdistan were ripe for revolutionary ideas. There were many Kurdish intellectuals and 
organisation prior to the PKK, but they did not have that much support from the people, as 
the PKK had. The answer was that the PKK was answering the objective demands of the time 
and acting towards the demands of the Kurdish society. The PKK had organisational 
independence; it did not belong to any branch of Kurdish or Turkish organisations. That 
organisational independence was observable in the personality of the PKK leadership 
activists. The ideological and political independence of the PKK and its ideological and 
political agendas were based on the objective circumstances of Bakur and other parts of 
Kurdistan. Therefore at the beginning the PKK was supported by the most oppressed as a 
party. 
The goal Öcalan had been dreaming of, the group of professional revolutionaries he had 
been searching for, and the party itself, were looking to build to lead the people from the 
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poorest stratum of Kurdish society; such a party was finally organised. Founding the party 
passed the first difficulty and impasse of Kurdistan revolution, but it was only the start. 
 
Establishing a Guerrilla Army the ARGK 
 
When the PKK was still in the mind of only one person in Istanbul and then in Ankara 
the political situation in Turkey, Bakur Kurdistan and the Middle East were in turmoil 
because of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in Lebanon 
–PLO, while Syria was the centre for the guerrilla organisation of Africa and Asia. In Bashur 
Kurdistan a prolonged uprising continued against the state of Iraq. Most of the Turkish 
revolutionists during the 12th March 1971 coup moved to Syria and Lebanon in order to 
receive guerrilla training offered by the PLO. Then they returned to Turkey to start a guerrilla 
war against the Turkish state. However, their warfare was short lived and they were killed in 
the clashes with Turkish Armed Forces. Some of Kurdish patriots from Bakur went to Bashur 
Kurdistan to receive for guerrilla training too. Those events, together with the training in 
Turkey, had left massive impacts on revolutionary youths in Turkey. The founding group of 
the PKK was ideologically supporting the prolonged popular warfare and armed struggle. 
Just before the formation of the PKK, Öcalan said that when he was in Dersim he visited 
Kutu Deresi in the Haydaran region and explained to his comrade Kamer Özkan his project 
for a guerrilla war (Öcalan 1996: pp. 101). However, Kamer Özkan decided not to create a 
first group of Armed Propaganda Units in Dersim.  
Between 1968 and 1971 the Turkish lefts organisations were discussing about how to 
start the urban guerrilla warfare and make Turkey an independent country. These discussions 
were opened and inserted in the legally established associations. The state was vigilantly but 
slowly monitoring what they were doing with the help of agents infiltrated among the 
students. It is known that some of the university’s academic members such as Professor 
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Mahir Kaynak and Professor Yalçin Kuçuk were among them. One the main reason why the 
THKP-C, THKO and TIKKO-TKP/ML’s guerrilla warfare failed and was defeated at the first 
instance was because of the state intelligent agents’ reports on them. Most of the universities 
of the time in Turkey were full of leftist, socialist, social-democratic and secular ideas. 
Kurdish students from Bakur who were studying in those universities in Turkey were 
naturally influenced with these ideas (Jongerden & Akkaya 2012. pp. 5).  
Turkish and Kurdish society at that time was not as literate as it is today; mostly of its 
members were uneducated and very religious and conservative. Some Kurdish students were 
conservative, however most of the university students had tendency towards leftist ideas. 
Similar to the Turkish leftist organisations, the Kurdish organisations of the time also had 
leftist tendencies and saw all national, political, social and cultural problems through the lens 
of materialism, socialism and secularism. The majority of Kurdish and Turkish leftist 
revolutionary groups in the 1970s decided that their base strategy was the guerrilla warfare. 
Turkish leftist were organizing the urban guerrilla warfare while the Kurdish ones were 
debating on the rural guerrilla warfare (Romano 2006: pp. 49). Because of the bipolar 
situation of the world, most of the leftist organisations were against the symbols of Western 
imperialism and capitalism. Although some of those organisations criticized the Soviet Union 
as revisionists, they hope that because of their anti-imperialist struggle the Soviet Union they 
would eventually support their guerrilla warfare, as it had happened in China, Vietnam, 
Mozambique and Cuba.       
The killing of Haki Karer constituted a turning point in the history of the PKK. The 
group knew who the rivals were and their relations and motivations, as well as their reason 
for the killing of Haki Karer; therefore, they decided to take revenge. Antep was one the most 
cosmopolitan Bakur Kurdistan cities and it were where the PKK started its first activities and 
where the party gained its stronger presence. On the first anniversary of Haki Karer’s deathon 
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18th May 1978, this time in one the most backward rural area of Urfa in Hilwan, a PKK 
activist got killed this time by a local tribe closely related to the ultra-Turkish nationalists. 
This time the PKK started to act against Kurdish collaborationist tribes supporting the 
Turkish state. The PKK successfully defeated the tribe called Suleymani tribe, and a 
candidate supported by the PKK won the mayoral municipality elections. The area of Hilwan 
was not suitable to launch guerrilla warfare because of the lack of popular support and its 
distance from Siverek, Amed, Urfa Adiyaman, Elazig and Dersim. However, the first Armed 
Propaganda Unit was established against Kurdish collaborationist tribe leaders.  
The Hilwan resistance and their success against the state supported tribe became the 
title of all state sponsored media. The attention of the state and all other organisations 
focused on the Apocular. In the same year, the PKK made its first congress while their first 
guerrilla commander Mehmet Karasungur was in Hilwan because their struggle in Hilwan 
Karasungur could not attend or wait for the 1st congress to be held on 27th November 1978.  
After the 1st congress the Maras Massacre took place and the martial law was declared. 
Öcalan immediately called a meeting and said that the martial law was the sign of a coup 
d’état. In May 1979, one the PKK’s three main executive committee members, Sahin 
Dönmez, got arrested in Elazig, and he confessed everything to the police. The members of 
the Elazig local branch of the PKK were all arrested. Öcalan left Amed to Mardin and then 
Urfa after some meetings, which had the purpose of reorganising the central and executive 
committee. He also prepared the PKK’s declaration document and the action against Mehmet 
Celal Bucak in Siverek, and then he left Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey on 1st July 1979 to 
reach Kobani in Rojava Kurdistan. 
In the Middle East, Öcalan faced a very cold greeting from the Palestinian 
organisations, because Kurdish and Turkish organisations had already had relations with the 
Palestinian Liberation Movements and made a negative propaganda against the PKK. In a 
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very short time, Öcalan reversed this negative opinion and worked on four important points: 
firstly Öcalan managed in a very short time to establish a warm relationship with the 
Palestinian Liberation movements as well as Kurdish community in Kobani, Aleppo, 
Damascus and Beirut. Ethem Akçam, the PKK sympathizer who helped Öcalan reach Kobani 
became the bridge between the central committee of the PKK in Bakur and Öcalan in 
Damascus.  
His immediate duty was to bring some cadres in order to educate and train them in the 
guerrilla warfare and then relocate them to Bakur Kurdistan. Secondly, Öcalan created the 
bases in the Bakaa Valley among the Palestinians for a long-term education and guerrilla 
training, telling them the truth about the PKK because the Palestinians were recognized and 
supported by the Soviet Union. Thirdly, he made connections with the Kurdish community in 
the Diaspora, which since the 1960’s existed both in Lebanon and in Europe. Fourthly, he 
used that opportunity positively in order to make sustainable relations with the socialist 
system, European communist and socialist parties and National Liberation Movements 
around the world; despite the socialist system, this was not the system in which the PKK 
believed in (Bayik 1998: pp. 306-12). After long discussions and debates with the Palestinian 
Democratic Front, it finally allowed Öcalan to bring a group of PKK members for guerrilla 
training. Öcalan urgently returned to Kobani and sent a message to the executive committee 
asking them to urgently relocate 50 good candidates for future guerrillas from all regions of 
Bakur Kurdistan. In a short time, they were relocated in Kobani then in the Bakaa Valley 
clandestinely. The unexpected incident led to the arrests of Mazlum Dogan and Mehmet 
Hayri Durmus, two of the PKK’s central committee members, on 1st October 1979 – the 
biggest threat to the organisation.  
The first trained guerrilla group of the PKK returned to Bakur and they made their 
bases in Kars, Agirî, Bingol, Dersim, and Siverek. The commanders of the guerrillas, Kemal 
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Pir, Mahsum Korkmaz and Mehmet Can Yuce, carried out an amateur action in Batman 
province at a Gendarmerie check point that would heavily damaged the PKK. Kemal Pir and 
Mehmet Can Yuce got injured and then arrested while they jumped from a moving pickup 
truck between Batman and Sason, while Mahsum Korkmaz managed to escape with some 
injuries.  
Three important events compromised PKK’s activities at the time: the first one was the 
arrest of Sahin Dönmez, a member of the executive committee of the PKK. Once in custody, 
Sahin Dönmez disclosed every detail about the PKK’s future activity and programme. The 
second one was Mazlum Dogan and Mehmet Hayri Durmus’s arrest while with another 
cadre, who was carrying a very important note from Öcalan to the PKK’s central committee, 
which was confiscated by the police at the time. The third one was the arrest of Kemal Pir 
and Mehmet Can Yuce between Batman and Sason while in possession of all the documents 
related to the guerrilla warfare and the training camps in the Bakaa Valley. The Turkish State 
had enough evidence in hand to show that the PKK had established as a party, that its leader 
was able to flee out of the country and, more importantly, that the PKK was preparing a very 
dangerous guerrilla war against the Turkish state.   The 12th September coup d’état took place 
and the army took over the government and arrested almost all the members of Kurdish and 
Turkish legal and illegal organisations and associations. The PKK immediately relocated its 
remaining cadres and supporters to the Bakaa Valley.    
On 20th September, just eight days after the Turkish army coup the Iraq and Iran war 
started and soon after, Israel attacked Palestinian positions in south Lebanon and in Bakaa 
Valley in Lebanon. The PKK held its first conference in 1981 and its 2nd Congress in 1982. In 
the PKK’s ten years struggle the 1st conference and 2nd congress were cornerstones, which 
paved the way to the future development and progress of the party in the following years and 
decades that followed. How could a party with a modern scientific knowledge focus on 
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leading a revolution in Kurdistan? How did the PKK educate its cadres for the continuity and 
survival of the party? How did it mobilize the masses for a general uprising? How would it 
sustain its relations and continue with multiple actors in Kurdistan, the region and the world? 
The challenge was how to achieve all these revolutionary goals without repeating the failures 
of the previous Kurdish uprisings of the last two hundred years, or the mistakes made by the 
Turkish radical left until their disappearance in 1972.    
The process of the reinvention of the PKK started in the post-coup period in Damascus 
and the Bakaa Valley in Lebanon. After, and even before, the coup thousands of the 
supporters of the PKK were arrested and most of them made political defences for the 
Kurdistan national liberation Movement (KNLM). Mazlum Dogan, Hayri Durmus and Kemal 
Pir, the three PKK Central Committee members and founders of the party were, arrested 
before the September 1980’s coup.  They were in Amed prison in conditions worse than the 
ones experienced by prisoners in Saigon, Vietnam, in the 1960s and 1970s. The resistance 
continued under inhumane conditions: tens of prisoners lost their lives in hunger strikes, 
while executions were also being carried out among the members of Turkish revolutionary 
leftist organisations.  
The expectation of the PKK members in the prison, and particularly from Kemal Pir 
and Mehmet Can Yuce was that the commanders who were trained in the Bakaa Valley knew 
how the PKK was organizing the guerrilla warfare. In addition, they expected that Mazlum 
Dogan and Mehmet Hayri Durmus were aware of the post-coup developments as well. The 
state’s policy was to defeat the PKK in Amed prison before it started a substantial guerrilla 
insurgency. The tortures and inhumane treatments of the political prisoners of the PKK 
reached an unbearable degree.      
The PKK was aware of its responsibility to launch the guerrilla activity inside Bakur 
and they thought that it would reduce the harsh treatments on the people as well as in the 
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prison of Amed. Some internal problems inside the PKK were causing and preventing 
launching the guerrilla activities. For example, Kesire Yildirim, Cetin Göngür and Baki Karer 
were not in favour of launching guerrilla activities. However, the majority of the leadership 
of the time worked hard to reinvent and to organise the cadres on the basis of an ideological 
and political manifestation of the long-lasted popular war as experienced in China and 
Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong’s guerrilla war theories were the mostly used 
sources.  
In order to prepare its members ideologically, the PKK went through a reassessment of 
Hilwan and Siverek practices in order to decide what kind of guerrilla warfare could be 
sustained. This included a study of the 19th and 20th century’s uprisings in Kurdistan, and of 
the failures of the Peshmerga practice between 1961 and 1975. In addition, they analysed the 
experiences from Palestinian the Al-Fattah, the Palestinian Peoples Liberation Front led by 
George Habbash, and the Palestinian Democratic Popular Front led by Naif Hawatme. 
The PKK had almost recruited three hundred cadres from Bakur Kurdistan. Most of 
them educated and who had left their university studies in order to undertake an ideological 
and guerrilla training offered by the PKK. The most important experience was that, according 
to the PKK’s military strategy, a guerrilla war would not be possible, if they did not learn 
from the consequences of the past Kurdish rebellions’ failures. For example how they 
became immigrant or sent to exile by the Ottoman and Persian Empires far away from 
Kurdistan. The case of the famous Badr Khans family was a very dramatic one. The Badr 
Khan rebellion was defeated and all the family was sent to exile in the Grit Island in the 
Mediterranean Sea and never caught the chance to return to Botan. The PKK taught to its 
cadres the process of returning back to Bakur Kurdistan must return as armed guerrilla in 
order to have public support and their mobilization a guerrilla insurgency must launched 
immediately. That was the only way out of the political conundrum of the time to organise a 
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guerrilla army, otherwise the PKK would have been an immigrant organisation and after a 
while would be self defeated, similarly to previous Kurdish and Turkish organisations. 
Human resources and the mobilisation of the masses in Bakur Kurdistan, logistics and 
hide out bases together with channels of communications and weapons constituted the 
technical sides of that struggle. The most important thing was to have the will power, the 
courage, the bravery and ideological belief of returning to their homeland even if it would 
entail death and sacrifice. Most of the Kurdish and Turkish political organisations agreed that 
the only way to confront the military coup and Turkish state was to launch guerrilla warfare, 
but none of them have had the courage and bravery to launch such an action, with the PKK as 
the only exception.  
Öcalan, in an education seminar, said: what is it for the sword and weapon? In order to 
live in our land we have to have these to defend ourselves, because there is not any other way 
of life left. Every avenue of life for ourselves has been blocked; however we have to use 
these weapons in the right way (Öcalan 1996: pp. 168). At the second congress, the decision 
of establishing the HRK –Hêzên Rizgarîya Kurdistan – Kurdistan Liberation Forces was 
confirmed and well-trained guerrillas groups were established from September 1982 
onwards: they crossed the borders of Rojava (Syria) towards Bakur (Turkey) then to Bashur 
(Iraq). Some of the PKK groups faced difficulties crossing from Bakur to Bashur.  
One of the experienced commanders from the Hilwan and Siverek resistances, Sahin 
Kilavuz, was killed along with eight of his comrades while crossing over to Bashur. 
According to the agreement between the PKK and the KDP, the PKK guerrillas had to be 
based both in Bashur Kurdistan and Bakur Kurdistan’s border area. The first group was 
called the Armed Propaganda Units. Botan is the most important area, where the assimilation 
policies of Turkish state had not been effective; the guerrillas aimed to set a base there. Botan 
is also the most strategic area between four parts of Kurdistan and one of the most forest and 
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mountainous terrain of Bakur Kurdistan. The guerrillas by mid 1983 made their bases in all 
areas they had aimed to. They reached Agirî, Kars, Dersim, Bingol, Amed, Botan, Adiyaman 
and Mardin.  
The first official attack on the Turkish armed forces was launched. On 15th August 
1984 the HRK (Hêzên Rizgarîya Kurdistan) the Kurdistan Liberation Forces planned to 
launch a guerrilla war against the three strategic towns of Bakur Kurdistan Eruh, Çatak and 
Shemdinli. The state announced that bandits who would be caught and killed by the security 
forces had caused the attack. The guerrilla warfare continued with heavy losses but it 
managed to win the support of the people and to mobilise the masses causing social, cultural 
and political changes not only in Bakur Kurdish communities but also in the other three parts 
of Kurdistan, as well as in Turkish society too.     
The HRK gained strength and in 1986 the ARGK- Artesa Rizgarîya Gelê Kurdistan – 
the birth of the Kurdistan Peoples’ Liberation Army was announced. The guerrilla war under 
the banner of the ARGK continued for fifteen years. The organisation structure was different 
then the HRK. The HRK was small guerrillas group aiming to become a guerrilla army. 
When the HRK evolved into the ARGK its structure was like a conventional army consisting 
of a single unit to the biggest component of the army, a division. 
After Öcalan’s imprisonment in Imrali Island in Turkey the concepts of the 
“Liberation” discourses in the PKK literature changed to “Freedom”. The PKK at its 7th 
congress in 2000 changed the name of the ARGK to the HPG – Hêzên Parastina Gel – the 
People’ Protection Forces. The HPG is still the PKK’s armed force. The HRK and the ARGK 
aimed at ejecting the Turkish army from Bakur Kurdistan and the strategic goal was creating 
an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan. The main goal of the HRK and the ARGK 
was the Liberation of Kurdistan no matter how long it would take. The HPG was aiming for a 
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legitimate self-defence, in other words not aiming to Liberate Kurdistan, but to defend the 
forces for a democratic solution with the Turkish state without secession from Turkey.  
 
Founding a Popular Front the ERNK 
 
The PKK’s ideological, political and theoretical paradigm was different from other 
Kurdish nationalists and from Turkish leftists. The Turkish left was under the influence of 
Kemalist ideology and Kurdish nationalists were asking for reforms. Although some of them 
in theory were asking for the same strategic aims as the PKK, in practice they did not choose 
to act to form a national front or launch a guerrilla struggle. Conversely, the PKK focused on 
Kurdistan National Liberation strategy as it had established a leading Party to lead the 
revolution, but also it was trying hard to include in its strategy the formation of a professional 
Guerrilla Army. To sustain and mobilize the masses it was necessary to establish a National 
Popular Front. In order to sustain the guerrilla army with their own resources and not to be a 
dependent movement, an immediate popular organisation was established in Newroz in 1985, 
almost six months after the announcement of the start of the guerrilla war against the Turkish 
state. 
The ERNK – Enîya Rizgarîya Netewîya Kurdistan – Kurdistan National Liberation 
Front aimed to achieve the best possible organisations in this area. The first step consisted of 
organising the people inside Bakur Kurdistan from all stratums of the society. Secondly, the 
ERNK aimed at working with the other parts of Kurdistan’s political parties and the people 
on the border sides of Bashur, Rojava and Rojhilat in a logistical effort to support the 
demands of the guerrilla units inside Bakur. Thirdly, it aimed to organise the millions of 
Kurds living in Turkey’s big cities especially Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Adana, Mersin and 
others. Fourthly, its purpose was to involve the struggle of the Kurdish communities in the 
Diaspora.  A great number of dynamic and young Kurdish populations from all parts of 
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Kurdistan were in Europe. That population in Europe became organised and mobilized very 
fast and provided an invaluable support to the Kurdistan National liberation Movement.  
The people of Bakur Kurdistan, after the September coup, were frightened because of 
the martial law and from widespread open public tortures in villages and towns. There were 
enormous difficulties to find supporters among the villages in rural areas. The army and 
police force strictly controlled the cities and towns in the east and west sides of Euphrates. 
The Turkish state had an official policy of depopulating Bakur Kurdistan’s provinces on the 
west of the Euphrates (Sivas, Malatya, Maraş, Adiyaman and Antep), mostly the Alevite 
Kurds. The process of depopulating Alevite Kurds from west Euphrates started when the 
state witnessed that a radical national and political development was in progress and that it 
was different from the other organisations. This time that organisation was bravely acting in 
the name of Kurdistan and was capable of recruiting Sunni and Alevite Kurds, Kurmanj and 
Zaza Kurds, andeven Turks. The PKK had organised into a united popular front from all 
communities in Bakur Kurdistan, the ERNK becoming the voice of all social classes in 
relation to Kurdistan national liberation. 
I have repeatedly pressed on this point that the PKK at its emergence insisted on acting 
together with Kurdish nationalists in Bakur and Turkish democrats in Turkey. The PKK from 
its early stage, between 1974 and 1975, tried to act collectively in collaboration with the 
radical revolutionary Turkish left and nationalist leftist and conservative Kurdish 
organisations in Ankara. During the ADYÖD with the supporters of THKP-C, THKO, 
TIKKO-TKP/ML and many other Turkish organisations did not follow Öcalan, Bayik, Pir, 
Karasu, Kaytan and Karer when they tried hard to convince them to form a united democratic 
front. The Kurdish organisations of DDKD, KDP-T and TKSP were active in Ankara. Öcalan 
and Bayik met them and offered to discuss their ideas in an attempt to unifying their beliefs 
and actions. However, Kurdish nationalists rejected their offer (Öcalan 1982: pp. 115-16), 
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(Bayik 1998: pp. 85), (Karayilan 2012: pp. 97). The PKK had tried to bring all democratic 
forces into one united front before and after the martial law declaration in 1978, and before 
and after the military coup.  
When the 12th September military coup took place, the PKK in Kurdistan and the DEV 
YOL organisation in Turkey were able to safeguard and relocate some members to Syria and 
Lebanon. This time the PKK fastened its activities in two spheres. The first one, to bring the 
Kurdish organisations that were from Bakur Kurdistan into a united anti-colonialist and anti-
fascist front and the second one was to bring Kurdish and Turkish organisations into a wider 
ant-fascist front against the military coup. Even Öcalan went further in order to bring Kurdish 
organisations into a united front, and in this way aiming to safeguard them in order to avoid 
those becoming immigrant and refugee organisations. The PKK offered the general secretary 
of the TKSP, Kemal Burkay, the opportunity to be the leader of this united front, but this 
offer was rejected (Öcalan 1982; pp. 115). All Kurdish organisations in 1980 and 1981 gave 
the PKK their final decisions; that they would not attempt to prepare for guerrilla warfare and 
they would definitely continue their struggle in the non-violent way in Europe until the 
government in Turkey’s political authority returned to the civilians. The PKK also offered all 
Kurdish organisations from all four parts of Kurdistan to get united in a National Congress 
and offered them the opportunity to work seriously and to concede them the role of secretary 
of the National Congress; unfortunately this offer also was rejected (Öcalan 1982: pp. 189).  
This time the PKK tried to attract Turkish radical leftist organisations. Finally, the 
FKBDC – Fasizme Karsi Birlesik Direnis Cephesi – Anti- Fascist United Resistance Front 
was declared on 1st of June 1982; a union between the PKK, DEV YOL and seven other 
radical leftist Turkish organisations (Serxwebun 1982: Issue: 6 pp.1 & 23). The FKBDC 
became a hope among the Turkish and Kurdish united front, however, it did not continue and 
at the end of 1983 DEV YOL chose to move to Europe, left Syria and stopped its 
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commitment to any kind of guerrilla war. In the end the PKK was left alone, none of the 
Kurdish or Turkish organisations supported PKK’s insistence on launching a guerrilla war 
against the Turkish state. In the prisons in Kurdistan and Turkey, those who resisted the most 
were the PKK’s members. The PKK speed up its national, political, cultural, social and 
diplomatic activities and the ERNK – Enîya Rizgarîya Netewîya Kurdistan – Kurdistan 
National Liberation Front was finally declared. The ERNK obtained the support from Kurds 
in the Diaspora. The Rojava Kurdistan’s people gained a special place among the ERNK 
organisation, because they did not only support materially but also became a physical support 
participating even in the guerrillas. The ERNK in Europe as a legal organisation played a 
very crucial role in terms of cultural, social and diplomatic activities, and also became a huge 
financial supporter of the guerrillas.  
The ERNK continued to exist until February1999, when the PKK’s leader was handed 
over to Turkish state from Nairobi, Kenya. In the winter of 2000, the PKK’s extraordinary 
7thcongress put an end to the activities of the ERNK. This caused a huge confusion among 
the members of the ERNK in Europe. The PKK made a huge mistake in suspending the 
activities of the ERNK (Karayilan 2012: pp. 355). It could have created an equivalent 
organisation to replace it. The ERNK not only compromised the activities in Europe but also 
in Rojava Kurdistan, too. The ERNK played a significant role in the history of Kurdistan and 
the PKK’s struggle for the mobilisation of Kurdish people in the Diaspora in Europe. The 
ERNK struggled hard against the forced assimilation of Kurds and revived Kurdish cultural 
and political development in big cities in Turkey and among the people in all the four parts of 
Kurdistan. The ERNK opened a new page in Kurdish history, and its influence still continues 
by different social, cultural and diplomatic Kurdish associations wherever Kurdish people 
have lived.  
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Opening the Gate of Legal Politics 
 
Kurdistan was partitioned and colonised between four nation-states: Turkey, Iran, Iraq 
and Syria. Under each of them Kurds were subject to strict policies of assimilation, 
annihilation and ethnic extinction. In order to make Kurdistan a liberated independent 
country, all possible legal political environments were prohibited. In any case, mentioning the 
words of Kurds and Kurdistan were enough to be accounted as the most dangerous terrorist 
against the ‘indivisible territorial integrity’ of the Turkish state. The existence of a nation 
called Kurds and a country called Kurdistan was strictly forbidden in the Turkish 
constitutions of 1971 and 1980. So the page of any legal political activity for Kurds and 
Kurdistan was completely sealed forever in the Turkish state’s system. The constitution of 
Turkey only recognized one nation in Turkey, the Turkish nation, Turkish language, Turkish 
flag, Turkish state and Turkish country. There was only one way left to exist, deny your 
Kurdish identity and live as a Turk and to do politics according to the Turkish state 
constitution to become an MP, Prime minister or even President. Any expression about Kurds 
and Kurdistan faced heavy sentences. Under those circumstances to do politics as a Kurd for 
the liberation of Kurdistan meant a very long imprisonment, if not worse. Those measures 
implemented by Turkish state’s constitution caused the birth of the PKK.   
The PKK managed to organise a small group of political activists into a party, and to 
create a guerrilla army and a wider popular front to mobilise tens, hundreds, thousands and 
millions. It saved its organisation and reinvented itself ideologically, politically, and by 
theoretically publishing its philosophical understanding and belief in a continued political 
monthly magazine. It influenced the creation of communities in the Diaspora, the creation of 
associations of youths, workers, women and peasants in Bakur and the mobilisation of the 
Kurds living in Turkish main cities and in European countries (Romano 2006: pp. 50-51).   
  
	163	
The PKK was able to launch and sustain a guerrilla war with mobilized masses and 
fought against the second largest army of the NATO. The PKK independently organised the 
people in different spheres politically, culturally and diplomatically in order not to depend 
economically from satellite organisations. Organizing masses was not just for a short time but 
also for a long-term impact.  
The Turkish state used whatever method was needed to stop these developments and 
advancement of the movement led by the PKK. The counter-actions of Turkish state included 
the use of Special Forces, the army, the police, the Kurdish village guards, the informers, 
JITEM – gendarmerie, the intelligence agency and the army intelligences’ secret service 
against Kurdish people’ and the creation of Extraordinary Region Governorate in Bakur 
Kurdistan. Turkish state’s internally continuous war had a strong impact on the all stratums 
of the society in Bakur Kurdistan and in Kurdish society outside of Kurdistan, because of 
their extraordinary support of the PKK.  
The Second Gulf War started when Iraqi Armed forces occupied Kuwait in 1990 and 
the American led International Coalition dismantled Iraqi army and the regime. It opened a 
new window and an extraordinary opportunity for the movement of the PKK. Thousands of 
the Iraqi army left their weapons in their bases after American attacks on Iraq. The PKK 
gained those weapons and widened their spheres of operation in a huge geographic area of 
Bakur and Bashur Kurdistan. Kurdish people in the north and Shiite Arabs in the south of 
Iraq upraised against the state of Iraq. The Iraqi state used unlimited military force against 
Shiite and Kurdish civilians; it caused millions of people to leave their homes dueto the fear 
of chemical bombings. It caused Humanitarian Intervention by the permission of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution of 688 to establish Save Havens for the civilians and 
No-Fly Zone for Shi’a Arabs and Kurdish people in Bashur Kurdistan. Humanitarian 
Intervention in Iraq caused the political parties of Bashur Kurdistan to become united in a 
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wider front, and then they held elections, set up National Parliament and established the KRG 
– Kurdistan Regional Government. 
Prior to the Second Gulf War the PKK announced that the developments in Bakur and 
Bashur Kurdistan caused the establishment of the Botan-Bahdinan War Cabinet.  However, 
because of the KRG establishment and the Humanitarian Protection by the UN, the PKK left 
the idea of Botan-Bahdinan War Cabinet. With the resistance led by the PKK, fought by the 
ARGK and sustained by the ERNK, over the years it became obvious to Turkey, regional 
states and the international powerful nations such as the US, UK, France, Germany and 
Russia that the PKK movement was not like any other previous movement seen before. It 
was not only a national liberation movement; it was a political, a guerrilla, and social 
movement attracting all stratums of communities’ attention and support in Kurdistan. That 
movement had deep roots among the society and it guaranteed its continuity and 
sustainability.   
Turkish state’s denial policy on Kurdish national identity was not able to assimilate and 
annihilate Kurdish Question by force. The PKK’s guerrilla war was supported by the Kurdish 
masses. A new entity in Bashur Kurdistan came to existence with the establishment of the 
KRG, which caused some anxiety among regional states especially the Turkish state. Those 
developments caused Turkish state to change the direction and to adopt some softer policies 
toward the acceptance of the existence of a Kurdish nation and opened the gate of legal 
politics in Turkey.  In this way, the Kurds gained some limited representation in the National 
Assembly of Turkey not representing as the representative of Kurdish people but 
accommodating in the left leaning Turkish political parties. The PKK up to this stage had 
always insisted that it was leading Kurdistan national liberation as the only revolutionary 
movement that has truly fought for the independence of Kurdistan.  The PKK also blamed the 
other Kurdish political parties and associations as opportunist and primitive nationalists who 
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had not truly fought for independence, but for autonomy. Therefore the PKK up to this stage 
has refused any parliamentary political activities, and even if such an activity opportunity 
occurs, it will only be in the interests of the state. Despite defending this idea ideologically, 
when the opportunity of legal political activities was available the PKK politically supported 
the idea in order to move towards political reconciliation and opening the gate of political 
dialogue and negotiations to have peaceful settlement of Kurdish question. The national 
liberation concept of the PKK, the progression and developments of its ARGK and ERNK 
put a huge social change inside of Kurdish society in Bakur Kurdistan and its coincidence 
with emergence of the KRG made millions were mobilised.  
A legal political party was established in Turkey by Kurdish leftists, patriot nationalists 
and some reformist elements, with some Turkish leftists. Later, the Turkish leftist members 
were not keen to participate and they left.  The Kurdish elements established the HEP – 
Halkin Emek Partisi – the Peoples’ Labour Party, legally, in 1990 to participate in general 
elections with the Social Democratic Popular Party. The state infiltrated it and tried to control 
the HEP because the Turkish state wanted to prevent Kurdish masses supporting the PKK 
through a legal party. However, by 1990 the PKK, as a political party that had organised a 
guerrilla army and created a national front, knew of the Turkish state’s indirect intervention 
and prevention of the HEP. The PKK, on the contrary, supported any legal activity such as 
the HEP to become a platform to be an indirect supporter and play role in the peace process, 
which it did (Watts 2010: pp. 52). 
Turkish state security court banned the HEP on 14th July 1993. The MPs of the HEP 
were transferred to the DEP- Demokrasi Partisi – Democracy Party. The DEP party was 
established on 7th May 1993. There was also another party established, the ÖZEP – Özgürlük 
ve Eşitlik Partisi – Freedom and Equality Party on 25th of June 1992, and the ÖZDEP 
Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi – Freedom and Democracy Party on 19th October 1992. Both 
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parties of ÖZEP and ÖZDEP were dissolved and joined the DEP, and the DEP was shutdown 
on 16th June 1994. All those parties followed the same path and were supporting the PKK 
struggle and in favour to solve Kurdish Question peacefully. Although all those pro-Kurdish 
legal political parties in Turkey aimed to solve the Kurdish question in a democratic 
parliamentarian way, the state continued to ban them, and did not allow them to participate in 
politics legally 
The HADEP – Halkin Demokrasi Partisi – Peoples Democracy Party was established 
on 11th May 1994 and was closed down on 13th March 2003 to be replaced by the DEHAP – 
Demokratik Halk Partisi – Democratic People’s Party, which was established on 24th October 
1997 and dissolved on 9th November 2005 to join the DTP – Demokratik Toplum Partisi – 
Democratic Society Party. From 2nd March 1994 to 22nd July 2007, because of the 10% 
national election threshold in Turkey, all those Kurdish supported political parties that could 
not pass the national elections threshold were not represented in the Turkey’s Grant National 
Assembly (Watts 2010: pp. 65-71). On 22nd July 2007 they participated as a block of 
independent candidates and they won 22 seats, and when the Parliament opened after election 
all the 22 elected MPs joined the DTP and they set up their own parliamentary group. The 
DTP also had the same destiny of all previous sister parties and eventually was blamed 
because for its support to the PKK and eventually closed down by the verdict of 
Constitutional Court on 11 December 2009. All these parties knew that they would be closed 
down and therefore they always established a spare party in the case of closure to replace it 
immediately. The BDP – Bariş ve Demokrasi Partisi – Peace and Democracy Party was 
already there and the MPs were transferred to the BDP, which was established on 2nd May 
2008. The BDP became very successful and continued the tradition that was established in 
the HEP in 1990s. The BDP participated until the 11th June 2011 general elections as a block 
of independent candidates and won 35 seats in the parliament.    
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The HDP – Halklarin Demokrasi Partisi – Peoples Democracy Party was established 
on 27th October 2013 and the DBP – Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi- Democratic Regions Party 
was emerged on 11th July 2014. These two parties were born from the BDP. The BDP was 
dissolved and all the MPs were transferred to the HDP except one MP who was transferred to 
the DBP as co-chair of the party was Emine Ayna.  
All the above-mentioned parties were established to create a dialogue and negotiation 
for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question with the Turkish state. On 3rd January 2013 
Turkish media announced that two MPs of the BDP Ahmet Türk and Ayla Akat Ata paid a 
visit to Öcalan in Imrali Prison. It was an extraordinary event, most of Kurdish people were 
happy for that dialogue. The reconciliation process continued and the HDP played a very 
important mediation role, however this so-called ‘peace process’ was failed when the HDP 
passed the 10% election threshold and won 80 MPs to the parliament of Turkey as the 
representatives of Kurds, Turks, Armenians, Assyrians, Laz, Arabs, Sunnis, Alevite, 
Christians, and Yezidis. 
At the birth of the PKK until 1988 it built its discourse on the National Liberation 
discourse and ejected the Turkish army from Kurdistan through guerrilla war. When the 
second Gulf War happened in 1991 and the collapse of Soviet Union and Turkish state’s 
removing ban on Kurdish language, the PKK softened its radical revolutionary policies that a 
legal political struggle could be considered if Turkey accepted Kurdish national and political 
rights through peaceful means. Therefore all those parties were established in order to push 
the Turkish state towards a peaceful solution to the Kurdish Question. This process of those 
legal political parties still continues without any success.  
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An interlocutor starting the Process of Dialogue and Ceasefires 
 
The region of the Middle East after WWI was divided into small nation-states. The 
Ottoman Empire was defeated; the Kurds lost their right of statehood because of internal and 
external factors of the time. The former Ottoman part of Kurdistan was divided into three 
between Britain, France and new republic of Turkey. Other than the Palestinian and Israel 
war there were no major issues between Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Syria. In 1979 the Iranian 
popular revolution was hijacked by theocratic Mollas, Iraq attacked Iran and occupied a large 
portion of Iran’s territory and the Iraq-Iran war as the First Gulf War continued for eight 
years. After the Iraq and Iran war, Iraq occupied Kuwait and the Second Gulf War started 
between of the US led international coalition against Iraq. Iraq was dismantled as a state. 
Millions of Kurds sought refuge in Turkey and Iran, and the world witnessed the scale of the 
Kurdish question in the Middle East. Humanitarian Intervention for the first time after the 
end of the Cold War was brought in defence of the Kurdish people at the United Nations 
Security Council. Forty per cent of Bashur Kurdistan’s territory became a de facto state with 
its own parliament and government. Interestingly, Turkey, a country that never accepted the 
existence of Kurdish people did support the UN Security Council Resolution in supporting of 
the Kurds (McDowall 1997: 375-6).    
 The president of Turkey at that time was Turgut Özal who was Kurdish from his 
mother’s side and among all the presidents to date he was the first one without a military 
past. President Özal invited Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani to Ankara, the capital city of 
Turkey, and met them at the Presidential Palace. President Özal opened the way for the 
parliament to remove the ban on the Kurdish language for the first time in the history of the 
Turkish republic, while Mesut Yilmaz declared that Kurdish language could be a second 
official language in Turkey. All these revolutionary changes were happening just after March 
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1991. President Özal declared he would support the autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq. 
Abdullah Öcalan declared that if Turkey wanted peace, a federal solution could be 
negotiated. Soon after that declaration, president Özal started talking about a federal solution 
for the Kurdish question in Turkey and even to put Bashur Kurdistan under the federal 
umbrella (Ibid: 428-29).    
The president and the Prime minister of Turkey for the first time declared their support 
to solve the Kurdish question. The opposition party in the parliament of Turkey was also in 
favour of solving the Kurdish question. The PKK with its national, political, diplomatic and 
guerrilla struggle has gained enormous strength and was also in favour of a peaceful 
settlement. The regional and international situation was not against such a solution. The 
European Union and the US wanted Turkey to solve the Kurdish question peacefully, even if 
it needed a federal solution. The liberalization of Turkish politics by president Özal was a 
sign of positive developments.  
The HEP participated in the general elections held in October 1991 in the list of the 
SHP – Sosyal Demokratik Halkçi Party – the Peoples Social Democrat Party, and won almost 
22 seats from Bakur Kurdistan. After the elections, the HEP MPs split from the SHP and 
became a parliamentary opposition group.   
President Özal invited Jalal Talabani and discussed the possibilities of a peace 
settlement between the PKK and the Turkish state. The HEP parliamentary group of Kurdish 
MPs built up a dialogue with president Özal and supported the initiatives to open the 
channels of dialogue. Eventually, Jalal Talabani went to Bakaa Valley and met Öcalan. On 
that occasion they agreed to publicly declare the 17th March 1993 Newroz Ceasefire (White 
2000: pp. 169). It was a great moment for the PKK: after twenty years, since 1973, it had 
gained an enormous reputation and its leader had become an internationally recognised one.  
Some forces inside the Turkish state were hostile to that process, because the process itself 
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was self-explanatory showing the defeat of the Turkish state, security, intelligence and army 
in defeating the PKK by force. They could not defeat the PKK, and finally they were 
negotiating a peaceful solution with it.  
On 17th April, exactly one month after the announcement of the ceasefire, Turgut Özal 
died. Many believed that president Özal was killed because he was the supporter of Bashur 
Kurdistan’s autonomy and went further beyond autonomy supporting a federal solution for 
the Kurdish question in Turkey. At a meeting of the Turkish-American businessmen, Stephen 
Kinzer in 2001 on the New York Times stated that he had suspicious of president Özal’s 
death (Uzun 2014: pp. 14). Almost everybody agreed that the ‘special branch’ of the state had 
killed president Özal. After the death of Özal a commander of the PKK killed 33 unarmed 
soldiers in May and the peace process collapsed. The HEP closed down, and another party 
was established: the DEP – Demokrasi Partisi – The Democracy party. The HEP MPs were 
transferred to the DEP but the DEP also closed down and eight MPs were imprisoned and the 
other fled from Turkey.  
Four MPs of the HEP, and then DEP, Leyla Zana, Orhan Dogan, Hatip Dicle and Selim 
Sadak, were sentenced for a fifteen year long imprisonment. Ten years they were kept in 
prison and in 2004 they were released again; they participated in legal politics. What 
observers saw was that the Turkish state only plays a political game with the Kurdish 
political movement and it would never come to terms of peace, in a peaceful manner? 
	
The Kurdistan Parliament in Exile the PKDW 
 
The republic of Turkey, since its establishment in 1923 to 1990 when Turgut Özal 
became the president of Turkey, the Kurdish language was prohibited. After Özal’s 
presidency, the ban on the Kurdish language was removed. Özal also opened the way that 
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somehow Kurdish politicians could participate in parliament and he was also the first ever 
official in Turkish republic’s history to mention a solution for Kurdish question; even 
mentioning that federalism could be discussed in order to make Turkey as a democratic 
member of European Community. This democratic approach of Özal caused his death and the 
destruction of 4000 villages and thousands of lives. One of the Kurdish MPs Mehmet Sincar 
was assassinated in Batman city on 4th of September 1993 and on the 2nd March 1994 the 
parliamentarian immunity of eight Kurdish the DEP MPs was removed, and they were 
arrested in the Turkish parliament. 
The Kurdish MP’s were mediators for peace between Özal and Öcalan, eight of them 
were imprisoned and some of them fled the country before their political immunity was 
removed. Legal political activities were banned by the Turkish state for the Kurds and those 
DEP MPs in Europe established the PKDW – Parlamentoya Kurdistan li Dervayî Welat - 
Kurdistan Parliament in Exile. On 12th of April 1995 Kurdistan Parliament in Exile was 
convened in the Netherlands. Although Öcalan was trying to establish Kurdistan National 
Parliament in 1990-91, however, it was not successful because of some internal party crisis at 
the 4th congress.  
The Kurdish national organisations in Europe were unique because they included 
Kurdish intellectuals from all parts and the Diaspora. They organised a symbolic election 
between the Kurds in the Diaspora and the member for the PKDW were elected. The PKDW 
was greeted in all European countries and was invited to talk in different European 
parliaments. It promoted relations between Kurdish political parties and became a national 
platform for national unity transforming itself in a very short time into a national institutional 
body. The PKDW wrote a constitution and built diplomatic relations, and brought 
international attention and support to Kurdish Question in the centre of the Middle East. 
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After the imprisonment of Öcalan, the PKDW dissolved itself and its majority members 
were transferred to the KNK – Kongra Netewîya Kurdistan – Kurdistan National Congress. 
The KNK is still continuing its activities under the same logo of the PKDW and at the same 
building in Brussels, Belgium.  
 
Conclusion 
 
After the 12 March 1971 military coup in Turkey the right to national self-
determination of the Kurds reverberated in students’ daily discussions together with their 
cultural rights. After the coup, the idea strictly defended by the Kurdistan revolutionaries was 
that the Kurds were a nation and their country, Kurdistan, had been colonised by four nation-
states. The Kurdish question became an international one with the need for a solution 
according to international law. Those students established a small radical revolutionary group 
evolved to a political party of the PKK. It established a guerrilla army and a popular front. 
When Turkish state found out that the Kurdish national problem and the PKK would not be 
eroded from the Turkish political agenda, it softened its policies. Alternatively, the PKK was 
willing to solve Kurdish Question by peaceful means. President Özal’s policies of removing 
the ban on Kurdish language and his determination to solve Kurdish Question, even if it 
required a federal solution, were revolutionary steps. Those steps caused the PKK to do some 
reforms in its ideological stands. The obvious example was slowly moving from an 
independent united and democratic Kurdistan to a federal solution inside the borders of 
Turkey. Although the PKK was at the beginning strictly defending the only solution that 
would be secession from Turkey, the developments showed that when an opportunity for 
peaceful were available, the PKK used it as one of the possible solutions for peaceful 
settlement of Kurdish national question 
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Evolution from a small radical group of Kurdistan Revolutionaries to a Political party, 
established a Guerrilla Army, a Popular Front, and led and mobilised the people to resist in 
urban, rural and in prisons against the Turkish state’s coercive force of assimilation, 
annihilation and extermination of Kurdish nation; this pushed the state to think about some 
dialogues with the PKK. That evolution happened because the Kurdish national question was 
the main question in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey. The ideological and political goals of the 
Kurdistan national liberation were supported by Bakur Kurdistan’s people as well as other 
three parts of Kurdistan. The chapter discussed that the PKK’s national liberation strategy 
was working well in practice, and the reformation process of negotiating a federal solution 
and moving to legal political parliamentary process became possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	174	
Chapter 6 
Why the PKK Needed Paradigm Change- Transformation 
Introduction 
 
Chapter six analyses the factors and dynamics that caused ideological, political and national 
strategically transformation as well as paradigm change of the PKK movement not only in 
Bakur, but also in the leadership of Kurdistan National Liberation Movement in the four parts 
of Kurdistan. As a leftist but national liberationist movement, the PKK showed the signs of 
reformation when it witnessed Perestroika and Glasnost in Soviet Union, the collapse of East 
European Soviet satellite states and Polish reformation process with the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall. The PKK started its ideological and political reformation when the PKK leaders 
accepted to meet Mehmet Ali Birand, Turkey’s famous half-Kurd internationally well-known 
journalist in the Bakaa Valley in June 1988. Öcalan, in that very long first-ever interview to 
Birand, gives first the signals to the Kurdish and Turkish public that the PKK is ready to 
agree on mutual interests at the first instance (Dündar 2012: pp. 281).  
Whether the new paradigm for a democratic republic and society are achievable or not 
in the socio-political situation in Turkey and in all parts of Kurdistan is an unanswered 
question and everybody is still questioning these new developments. The PKK insisted on 
building radical democracy through a bottom up process of municipalities able to guarantee a 
democratic autonomy. The chapter will focus on the reasons why the PKK started to change 
its ideological and political strategy and why it changed its national liberation strategy, which 
was getting support from the masses. Why the PKK had dramatically changed its national 
liberation discourse and withdraw its armed guerrilla forces from Bakur to Bashur Kurdistan 
in 1999, a move that caused the death of almost 500 hundred lives?  While the search for a 
peaceful solution which cost the lives of 500 guerrillas failed and why it started again in May 
2013 withdrawing guerrilla forces from Bakur to Bashur again repeating the same mistake? 
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Which were the reasons of moving from an armed revolution to a totally non-violent mode of 
struggle? Why the PKK reformed and transformed itself two times in a decade? How it 
managed to run the affair of KCK’s complicated organization? Would Democratic 
Confederalism constitute an alternative solution to the nation state system? The conclusion 
will be drawn from the above-mentioned parameters.  
 
Ideological and Political Transformation 
 
The PKK emerged as a Marxist Leninist proletariat party with the purpose to lead a 
Kurdistan National Liberation Movement during the Cold War. Its definition in that era was a 
Leninist definition, in tune with the collapse of imperialism and the victory of national 
liberation movements and socialism, Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe and Vietnam, 
Kampuchea, Laos, Mozambique and Cuba all adopted socialist political systems. The 
international workers unions as well as the national liberation movements fighting for 
independence were part of the world’s socialist system (Öcalan 1992: Chapter 3). The road to 
the liberation of Kurdistan from the yoke of Imperialism did not aimed only at an 
independent, united and democratic Kurdistan, but also Turkish people would be freed too. 
The Turkish leftist organisations due to their Kemalist and social-chauvinistic attitude, and 
Kurdish organizations with their nationalistic-reformist approach considered that Kurdistan 
has not been liberated by the parameters that the PKK built its ideology. In order to prove 
whether this ideology would work or not on the basis of the parameters in Kurdistan should 
go through political challenges. The acceptance of the official ideology of the state, based on 
the Kemalist ideology as well as the sharing of the same religion confused the Kurdish nation 
in state institutions such as army, police, courts, education, banks and prisons. Kurdistan 
ideologically and politically was under siege (Serxwebun 1979: pp. 88-89). The PKK build 
its ideology and politics on these parameters.               
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The PKK successfully propagated its ideology among the educated youth; public 
services workers, peasants and teachers strengthening itself as political actor in Bakur 
Kurdistan and then in Rojava Kurdistan then in all parts of Kurdistan as well as in Turkey, 
the Middle East and Europe. The PKK proved to the communities in Kurdistan and Diaspora 
that as reliable political party leading a guerrilla war has mobilised millions of people and 
was able to declare ceasefires, negotiate and make political alliances. It had organised a 
popular front and mobilised hundreds of thousand people; established its representatives in 
most of European countries; despite of the support of the NATO to some Kurdish parties, the 
PKK has become the only prominent actor in all parts of Kurdistan, without fear from 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Most importantly the PKK struggle over two decade broke the 
strict Turkish state’s assimilation policy on Kurdish nation and to some degree pushed the 
state to accept Kurdish reality to deal with it. From 1925 to 1990 within sixty years of 
Turkish Republics history the word of Kurds and Kurdistan was a taboo and who had talked 
about them would have had faced heavy imprisonment even capital punishment. That was the 
struggle led by the PKK broke that taboo and made the prime ministers and presidents of 
Turkish Republic from 1990 onwards talk about Kurdish Question and its solution. 
Why the PKK had to reform its successful ideological and political programme? Why 
this reformation became a transformation process?  There are different internal and external 
factors have caused the ideological and political reformation and transformation of the PKK, 
which started from 1988, then became official policy in 1995 at the party’s fifth congress. 
The total transformation starts when the leader of the PKK was abducted and transferred to 
Turkey from Nairobi the capital city of Kenya the Imrali prison in Turkey. 
The international plan of arrest and handover of the founder, leader and the organizer of 
the PKK to Turkish the state was the greatest tragedy Kurdish nation ever faced in its history, 
a fact that shocked around the world. The reaction to that plot was unimaginable among all 
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Kurds everywhere, except in the KDP-Iraq controlled areas. Kurdish people protested that 
dirty action of the US, Israel and Turkey all over the World. It was an enormous blow to the 
PKK, to the Kurdish nation and it was inhumane and degrading for the whole Kurdish nation. 
The arrest of the PKK’s leader in the plain among Turkish Special Forces and Öcalan’s 
blindfolded picture in between two Turkish flags broadcast on TV screens for days and 
weeks and months after his arrest was very humiliating. For a long time it was the main news 
title of al international newspapers and TVs around the world.  
As a consequence that plot and brutal show on TVs created a revolutionary reaction a 
great number of young educated secondary and university Kurdish students joined the 
guerrilla army from all parts of Kurdistan. Qandil Mountains become a magnetic centre for 
educating young guerrillas. When I was doing my fieldwork in September 2013 interviewed 
the KCK executive council members in Qandil and Maxmur Camp they said that more than a 
thousand men and women from Rojhilat and another thousand from Rojava Kurdistan joined 
the ARGK guerrillas (Tekin 2013: interview). More than a thousand were from Bakur, a little 
less were from Bashur were joined to the PKK’s guerrilla army the ARGK. 
The PKK was in the middle of its 6th congress when Öcalan was handed over to the 
Turkish authorities. Immediately they elected a leadership council in order to substitute 
Öcalan. They knew his arrest was an international plan and that the NATO had a role in it. 
What Öcalan did was to take an unexpected approach, which surprised everyone. As he later 
explained to his lawyers, in order to make the plot ineffective, Öcalan acted against what it 
was planned, instead of inviting the people to continue the demonstrations and continuing the 
fight, he ordered his comrades to act calmly and peacefully. Öcalan had shown his and his 
party’s intention to their search for a democratic and peaceful solution showing that the PKK 
has been to compromise on minimum demands for a democratic and peaceful solution of the 
Kurdish question since 1988. 
  
	178	
When Öcalan started giving interviews to Turkish journalists from June 1988 onwards, 
he already started reforming his party’s ideological set and intention for reforms. For 
example he talked about an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan; the borders of 
four states were drawn against the will of the peoples of Kurdistan; parliamentarian politics 
was seen as a reformist way and so on. However, the PKK leader explained to the journalists 
from Turkish media, ‘it is just the beginning of the PKK struggle for universal national and 
political rights of the oppressed in Kurdistan and there is still a way to compromise and to 
negotiate. Before thousands and hundred thousand death we can stop this war if the state 
continues on denial and colonization policies then there would be a bloody war’ (Birand 
1992; pp. 216-7).  
  After Öcalan’s arrest and imprisonment the process of reformation of the PKK started 
to change very fast. Although the first signs of the change from formation towards 
reformation started when the socialist system collapsed and, during its fifth congress, the 
PKK reformed its party programme distancing itself from the Marxist Leninist doctrine. A 
new doctrine was not introduced, but Apoism (The philosophy of Abdullah Öcalan mainly 
based on gender equality) was the most preferable among the party ranks. The ideological 
reformation was not completed with political reformation. The strategic and structural 
fundamental organizational structures remained as the ones shaped during the socialist 
system era. From February 1999 onwards Öcalan proposed a road map mainly based on a 
democratic solution, a democratic republic of Turkey and renaming the Kurdistan National 
Liberation Movement as a Kurdistan Freedom Movement.  
From that change it was visible that the idea of an Independent, United and Democratic 
Kurdistan as a solution to the Kurdish question was abandoned. National Freedom of 
Kurdistan replaced the concept of National Liberation. The meaning of that change was that 
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the Kurdish question would be a matter of democratization of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria 
and no more of a national liberation with the purpose of creating a state of Kurdistan.  
Most of Öcalan’s prison writings consist in the court trial’s defences focused on the 
issue of a democratic solution. From his court defence it was visible that ‘the libertarian 
social ecologist Murray Bookchin, feminist political theorists, leftist Foucauldians and 
critical Marxists’, influenced him (Gunes 2012: pp. 136). At that critical moment changing 
the ideological and political paradigm of the PKK was very risky a kind of ‘Salto Mortale’ as 
Jongerden and Akkaya called it.  Öcalan was arguing in his new ideological and political 
manifestation that a nation is defined not on the basis of ethnicity or language but on the basis 
of citizenship in a democratic republic (Jongerden & Akkaya: 2012 pp. 5). Although this 
transformation was again supported by the masses, the reality was and still is in the mind of 
majority of the masses there was still the idea of national liberation for the establishment of a 
democratic western style state for communities of Kurdistan. In Brussels at the KNK building 
when Zubeyr Aydar a member of  the KCK executive member and Remzi Kartal were 
interviewed while conducting the fieldwork they expressed that changes of the concepts of 
the PKK were seen others as we were “renegade”.     
Analysing that period of transformation of the PKK from imprisonment of its leader 
from 15thFebruary 1999 onwards three factors need to be considered: Turkish state, the PKK 
leadership council and Ocalan himself. Firstly, after the initiative of the federal solution in 
1993 and trying to solve Kurdish question through peaceful means, which caused the death of 
President Turgut Özal, it became evident that the only solution for the Turkish state was 
annihilation and assimilation of Kurdish nation. Secondly, the PKK was born as the result of 
national oppression of Kurdish people and denial policies of the Turkish state. As a national 
liberation movement organised, mobilised people and armed guerrillas fought for establishing 
and independent state of Kurdistan. After the imprisonment of Ocalan, the PKK leadership 
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council could have had a different approach to insist on its fundamental national and to some 
degree freedom and justice related ideological reasons of its existence. The leadership council 
of the PKK’s soft and liberal approach damaged its reputation as well organisational 
defection. Those shortcomings weakened the organisations political stance. Thirdly, Ocalan 
was fighting with the Turkish state, not the world. In the prison through his solicitors, 
expressing that the US, Israel and the NATO were responsible for the plot of his 
imprisonment was not making any positive impact. The solicitors visiting Ocalan and 
allowing those statements were not making any positive solution to Kurdish question. The 
process of transformation was the most difficult moment of the PKK history. Ideological and 
political transformation went too far not only ideologically but also politically too. 
 
 
 
Changing the National Liberation Strategy 
 
The PKK was founded during the cold War era’s ideological confrontation between the 
Left and the Right in Ankara, the capital city of Turkey. The era was defined as the era of 
national liberation movements and socialist revolutions. The liberation movement of Vietnam 
and its revolutionist literature had a massive impact on the discourse proposed by the PKK. 
The small group of University students took the example of the guerrilla war and the 
legendary leaders of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro at Sierra Maestro Mountains in Cuba.    
The Soviet Union, East European Countries, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Mozambique, 
Angola and etc., were seen as Socialist Block. The socialist system was supporting anti-
imperialist national liberation movements around the world. The PKK was hopeful that 
eventually it would get support from the Soviet Union. Bakur Kurdistan was a neighbouring 
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geography to Soviet Union and the future support and aid would not be difficult to get thanks 
to this vicinity. 
Kurdistan National Liberation Movement was founded as a proletariat led Marxist-
Leninist organisation to free an oppressed and colonized nations’ struggle for their Right to 
Self-Determination: the aim was to achieve an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan. 
Strategically the PKK aimed at an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan. In order to 
achieve this strategic goal its external allies were: the Soviet led Socialist Block, Labour 
movements in the developed countries; National Liberation Movements of oppressed nations 
in the world and Turkish, Persian and Arab proletariat led democratic and socialist labour 
movements; Kurdistan National liberation Movements in Bashur, Rojhilat and Rojava 
Kurdistan. Internal allies were also Bakur Kurdistan’s proletariat the peasants, petit 
bourgeois, and the army of jobless and stateless people. 
Soviet socialism collapsed in 1991 and consequently all the Eastern European socialist 
system collapsed too and the triumph of Liberalism over Socialism were declared. European 
Community countries evolved to European Union removed the national state borders, 
allowed free movement of the member states’ citizens to choose whichever member states 
wanted to live in. The power was distributed from the centre to the periphery, in other words 
to the municipal councils for independent internal decision making the process fairer and 
faster. The norm of state sovereignty was in a limbo after the Humanitarian Intervention in 
Iraq and Bashur Kurdistan. Israel and Palestine were in dialogue to solve their problems 
through peaceful negotiations. All these developments were signs that the world is moving 
towards a more peaceful environment and democratisation process is supported by 
international institutions such as the UN and the EU.       
The Iraq and Iran war (the First Gulf War) had ended. The KDP and PUK, which led 
Kurdistan liberation movement in Bashur Kurdistan, were defeated again in 1988, after the 
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Anfal campaign launched by Saddam Hussein's regime. The Second Gulf War (Saddam’s 
occupation of Kuwait and the Desert Storm Operation) started and the UN and the NATO 
together created a new entity with a Safe Haven for Bashur Kurdistan’s people. In 1992 
Bashur Kurdistani political parties after long negotiations with Saddam Hussein did not 
achieve any progress, they hold an election and a Kurdistan Regional Assembly was elected. 
The regional power balance changed in favour of the US led NATO alliance, the Cold 
War ended and the PKK was deeply affected by the collapse of Socialist camp on one hand, 
and to change its ideological principles and political alliances on the other. The leadership of 
the Kurdistan national liberation from the PUK and KDP has set a parliament and a 
government cabinet in Hewler, which has been supported by the NATO. Those developments 
in the Middle East and in Bashur Kurdistan were affecting the PKK that socialist system has 
been eroded from the world stage and Marxist-Leninist ideology has been failed. Therefore 
the PKK speeded up its reformation process. 
The signs of the change appeared when Mehmet Ali Birand met Abdullah Öcalan in 
Bakaa Valley in Lebanon in June 1988. However, their message was not convincing and did 
not answer the demands of the time. Birand for second time met Öcalan this time in 
Damascus on 18th of May 1992. The second time the interview took place, when Öcalan was 
arrested and detained for two days by the Syrian intelligence. Birand explained that the 
situation was very different domestically, regionally and internationally. When they first met 
in 1988 there was a bipolar world, a somehow a stable Middle East, and internationally 
nobody was talking about the Kurdish question (Dündar 2012: pp. 323-33). The second time 
Birand met Öcalan the bipolar world had come to an end, a multipolar world was on the way 
of evolution, the Middle East was in turmoil, Bashur Kurdistan was under international 
protection, the PKK had relocated to its main guerrilla forces to Bakur Kurdistan’s 
mountains, and more importantly the Kurdish question went beyond the borders of the 
  
	183	
Middle East to become an international question. President Özal already declared that he was 
ready to discuss the possibility of a federation (White 2000: pp. 166).   
The PKK held its 5th congress in 1995. On this occasion, the signs of slight ideological 
and political changes were clear, in particular the shift from the idea of independence to 
federalism. In addition, after a fierce resistance against the Turkish-KDP-PUK alliance in 
May and June 1992 huge demonstrations took place in Bakur Kurdistan with the interference 
of Jalal Talabani. As a consequence, thanks to the strong will of the Turkish President Turgut 
Özal and of the Gendarmerie forces Commander General Eshref Bitlis negotiations for a 
ceasefire started in order to offer a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey. 
Accepting the negotiations with the Turkish state constituted a self-explanatory act of the 
PKK and it was a real sign of paradigm change. It can be said that it constituted a passage 
from REVOLUTION to REFORMATION. At the end of the fifth congress of the PKK the 
hammer and sickle in the flag of the PKK was replaced with a flambeau.  
The PKK agreed on three ceasefires: the first one in March 1993; the second one in 
1995; and the third one was on 1st September 1998. The first one in March 1993 was the most 
important one for a future peace because of the leaders involved: Jalal Talabani from the 
Kurdish side, Kurdish MPs from Bakur, PKK leader Öcalan and more importantly a half-
Kurd Turkey’s president Turgut Özal, all of them had the real intention to solve the Kurdish 
question even if the solution can be a federal solution.  
As mentioned above the domestic, regional and international changes and 
developments required that the PKK had to make some political and ideological 
reformations. However, those changes could have been achieved bit by bit according to the 
developments. For example, the PKK insisted on the idea that the only way of solution was 
an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan. The universal national right to self-
determination can only be implemented with the separation from the colonial states of 
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Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria (although the PKK was not mentioning Syria’s name at that time 
because Syria was the sanctuary of the PKK). Since the solution proposed by the PKK was 
independent Kurdistan, when the president of Turkish state was talking about federation, it 
was thought that a solution could be achievable. The Turkish prime minister talked about the 
examples of Catalonia and the Bask in Spain. When the party at its fifth congress speaks out 
its demand from independence towards federalism and accepted the idea of a federation. 
Turkish state stopped talking about federation or any settlement with the PKK.   
One of the PKK guerrilla commanders fled and surrendered to the KDP-Iraq in Bashur 
Kurdistan and was called by his nickname Parmaksiz Zeki, his real name was Shemdin 
Sakik.  Shemdin was captured or handed over to Turkish Army Forces – TAF in Bashur 
Kurdistan. Shemdin gave valuable information to the TAF operation generals and there were 
rumours that he was also participating to TAF operations against ARGK guerrillas (Karayilan 
2012: pp. 333). 
According to Karayilan: ‘Shemdin gave very important information and confess to the 
TAF if you want politically defeat the PKK in Bakur Kurdistan, you should defeat the PKK 
in Amed (Diyarbakir) first, if you want militarily defeat the PKK you must defeat it in Botan 
and stop the PKK getting logistical support from Rojava and Bashur to the other Bakur 
provinces; then if you want to get wiped off the PKK and defeat it totally then you must push 
pressure on Syria and take Öcalan from Syria out” (Ibid; pp. 333).  
The TAF followed that strategy and successfully put pressure on Syria with the support 
of the US, UK, Israel, and Egypt. On 9th October 1998 PKK leader left Syria to Athens 
historical and capital city of Greece. Öcalan in a telephone interview to Medya TV said: “By 
leaving Ankara to Kurdistan we became a party, by moving to the Middle East we became an 
army; when we go out into the world, we shall achieve a state” (White 2000: pp. xii). That 
statement declared clearly the ideological and political stand of the PKK’s national liberation 
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strategy. Greece refused Öcalan’s entrance then Moscow, Rome, and Nairobi did the same. 
Finally he was handed over to the Turkish state on 15th February 1999. In the morning of 
16thof February Turkish prime minister with a shaky voice announced that Öcalan was in 
Turkey and he would pay the price for what he did to the Turkish justice. 
Kurdistani people from everywhere went through mourning and sorrow and fierce 
fighting took place in Turkey, Bakur Kurdistan and European metropolis cities particularly in 
Germany. The anger of every Kurdish person was at its pick. After two weeks Öcalan sent a 
message thorough his solicitors to his party and the people to be calm and react peacefully.  
Öcalan’s capture and imprisonment caused a physiological impact and disbelieving to the 
US, UK, Germany and Russia. Most of its followers expected that Öcalan would insist in his 
revolutionary stand against the state, instead he ordered the party to implement fundamental 
changes in the PKK’s paradigm. This meant, as we already mentioned, a shift from the idea 
of independence and united democratic Kurdistan to the democratisation of the Turkish 
republic through constitutional guarantees following the example of Switzerland as a 
Cantonal system (Öcalan 1999: pp. 10-1).  
This shift was very painful for the PKK activists and especially for the guerrillas on the 
mountains. The Kurdish nation was also in shock and the guerrillas who left their family, 
children, home, career and life to fight in the mountains suddenly found them without a 
purpose. This was a complex and chaotic chaos from the grassroots to the top leadership of 
the PKK. Thousands of people cut their relations with the PKK in Europe and chose to stay 
homes. Thousands of the guerrillas left the mountains some to Europe and joined the KDP 
and the PUK.  
The PKK’s leadership made a major mistake. Öcalan through his lawyers sent 
messages to the PKK. If the PKK was controlling its activities and step-by-step would have 
moved forwards according to its previous programme it would not have suffered the damaged 
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it suffered as it happened from 16th February 1999 to 1 July 2004. The PKDW was closed 
down followed shortly by the ERNK. And then the ARGK’s name and the strategy of its 
formation were changed to HPG.  The name of the PKK was changed to KADEK - Kongra 
Azadi û Demokrasiya Kurdistan – Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, then to 
KONGRA GEL – Kurdistan People’s Congress – Kurdistan Peoples’ Congress (Gunes 2012: 
pp. 135). Then in 2004 the PKK re-established again. The Kurdistan National Liberation 
Movement discourse in the PKK literature came to an end as well as the idea of Universal 
National right to self-determination included in the in the original discourse of the PKK. All 
these discourses were ended and repurposed again. Instead of aiming at a nation-state, the 
PKK changed the paradigm to democratizing Turkish republic and democratizing Kurdish 
society. The worst of that was that the PKK withdraw its guerrilla forces from Bakur, a move 
that coasted the lives of 500 guerrilla fighters. From those changes it was obvious that either 
the state had promised Öcalan something still not known, or Öcalan was deceived by the 
TAF intelligence, the Gendarmerie, the Police and National intelligences of the Turkish state.      
 Despite the domestic and international changes, the shift made by the PKK after 
Öcalan’s arrest was much too drastic. All the promises made to Öcalan by the state as well as 
Öcalan’s good will to reach a compromise without any human coast seemed to clash with the 
statement he made after leaving Syria without producing any significant positive result. The 
state did not concede any rights and did not even issue an amnesty for the ten thousand 
Kurdish political prisoners in Turkish jails. All those paradigm changes only benefitted the 
Turkish state, as in every National Liberation movement there were defections, but the 
defections in 2004 by Osman Öcalan the PKK leader’s brother was the most dangerous threat 
to the PKK’s existence (Ibid: pp. 144-5). That defection as it has been touched in the 
previous chapters cost a heavy price to the PKK as it lost almost half of its leadership council 
and more than two thousand guerrillas. 
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Finally, changing the national liberation strategy from independence to federalism 
could have offered a balance; however, it was not compatible with the launch of a guerrilla 
war again, either a non-violent totally civil disobedience to work for democratisation or a 
total guerrilla war for strategic goal of national liberation.  
 
Replacing the Democratic Liberation Strategy 
 
The term of ‘Democratic Solution’ was used widely in the PKK’s media after Abdullah 
Öcalan’s imprisonment. His first defence statement broadcast via his lawyers was entitled 
“Declaration of the Democratic Solution for Kurdish Question”. Öcalan precisely explains 
that Leslie Lipson’s book The Democratic Civilisation was ‘accidentally’ reached his hands 
and that has contributed to his understandings for a democratic solution for the Kurdish 
question (Öcalan 1999: pp. 11). He continued saying that in the 1970’s the idea of the right of 
self-determination in 1970s was interpreted as the route for the establishment of an 
independent state. In the case of Kurdistan, he continued, a separate state is a blind alley, 
which will obstruct solutions. Therefore, instead of looking for solutions on the basis of a 
separate state, autonomy, federalism or any other options, a rich democratic solution would 
the best option (Ibid: pp. 11).      
Just before his handover to Turkey, Öcalan had announced the third unilateral ceasefire 
to begin on 1st September 1998. According to PKK's sources the TAF through some channels 
had informed the PKK that if they announced the ceasefire the state might accept some 
political and cultural rights (Gunes: 2012: pp. 134). After his imprisonment and his trial and 
sentenced to death, on the 1th of August he made statement through his solicitors stating that 
the 1st September ceasefire in 1998 was valid. However, due to the sensitive situation and his 
role and charisma the death sentence turned into life imprisonment after negotiations with the 
EU members regarding Turkey’s EU membership. 
  
	188	
In this context he started the unilateral withdrawal of two groups of PKK’s cadres as a 
sign of good will to move towards a definitive peace. One group was the ARGK guerrillas 
who stationed across the border of Bashur and Bakur in Shemzinan, the other group was the 
ERNK, a group of civilian activists from Europe who surrendered to the Turkish state at 
Istanbul international Airport. He ordered his guerrillas to withdraw from Bakur to Bashur 
Kurdistan.  
Since then Abdullah Öcalan through his lawyers statements developed their main tactic 
of their struggle to gain their legitimate universal national, cultural, political and social right 
through democratic means and organizing the society through civil society organisations. 
Civil society organisations were set up in the most of Bakur Kurdistan’s cities as the new 
dynamic of democratic struggle and democratic liberation. The legal political party was 
DEHAP and they participate in the general elections and to debate the Kurdish question 
searching for a solution through democratic and political means rather than through violence. 
The participation in the local municipality elections with the gain of seats in the local 
mayoral elections would guarantee the presence of different ethnic and religious communities 
of Turkey. It would also allow them to get organised in order to express themselves in a 
democratic context.  
The PKK did whatever Öcalan asked those thorough letters and via his lawyers. The 
international and global changes were enormous. The European Union was accepting the 
membership application of East European countries and Turkey’s candidacy seemed going 
well at that point in time. However, there was not any single development on the part of 
Turkish state regarding the Kurdish question. At the end Turkey was accepted as a candidate 
state for membership of the EU.  
There were many questions for the PKK to answer. Why was the PKK established? 
Which were the reasons for the existence/emergence of the PKK? The purpose of asking 
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these questions were the reasons caused the existence of the PKK had not gone. Those 
policies of denial annihilation and assimilations were there, why the PKK was taking all 
those soft measures unilaterally? The state was continuing a destructive propaganda against 
the PKK and 24 hours on the TVs of Turkey the agenda was the arrest of the PKK leader and 
saying that he has been surrender and confessed everything to the state. In that political 
atmosphere the people of Kurdistan was asking why the PKK was giving too many 
concessions to the state. The PKK did whatever Öcalan asked for and that situation continued 
for five years without any progression. Neither of the people nor the PKK guerrillas were in 
favour of Democratic Liberation strategy. It caused the most destructive losses to the PKK.  
Öcalan was kept in Imrali prison, a prison only for the PKK leader with high security 
guarded with more than a thousand Special Forces and officers. Everything was under high 
security control. The book of Leslie Lipson The Democratic Civilisation nobody knows 
whether it was ordered with special intention of the state, which allowed it despite Öcalan’s 
solitary confinement or was given following Öcalan's orders. Nothing that was not in the 
interest of the state would have been allowed. Secondly, the letters written and sent by 
Öcalan from the prison were strictly read and could have been edited then sent to the PKK’s 
leadership council. While the reasons of the emergence of the PKK were still unsolved the 
PKK was dramatically transforming its national, ideological, political and diplomatic strategy 
and tactics. The state of Turkey did not pay any attention to those transformations.  
When the PKK defending national liberations strategy and aiming an independent 
united and democratic Kurdistan it had the opportunity to organise and mobilise the people 
for an armed revolution while diplomatically was holding meetings in the all-state institutions 
of the EU member countries. Whereas it changed its national liberation strategy to 
democratic liberation strategy it was put in the terrorist organisations list. That is an 
unanswered question, why. 
  
	190	
The PKK chose the strategy of a democratic solution to democratize the republic of 
Turkey. It tried to give theoretical bases for it ideological and political changes, distancing 
itself from the Marxist Leninist doctrine. Democratic Socialism became the post-
imprisonment doctrine of Öcalan and the PKK. They put democratic and democracy as the 
adjectives to whatever noun they wanted. For example: democratic solution, democratic 
socialism, democratic republic, democratic autonomy, democratic nation, democratic 
confederalism and now democratic federalism. Putting democracy or democratic in front of 
any words it would not make more convincing. Saying democracy in theory and acting in 
practice autocratically would not make any actions as an act of democracy.  
The Kurdish question is the question of a divided nation, the question of a colonised 
nation put under strict rules of assimilation, annihilation and extermination. It is firstly a 
national question and secondly a question of democracy. The reason of the emergence of the 
PKK was the question of Kurdish nation, not the question of democratization of Turkey. 
During the forty-four years of the PKK struggle more than fifty-thousand men and women 
have been killed and around four thousand villages been razed by the state security forces. 
Recently, ten cities and towns have been razed again. During these forty-four years Turkey 
has developed economically but Bakur Kurdistan has been destroyed socially, culturally, 
economically. More than three million people have forced to move to Turkey’s main cities. 
Hence reducing the question of Kurds and Kurdistan to the question of democratization of 
Turkey was not the right political direction. If the state accepted the democratic liberation 
process with the mediation of the international institutions such as the UN, EU and US it 
could have been considered. Negotiation was a positive step but not with an imprisoned 
leader under strict control of the state. The first condition of the PKK for any dialogue and 
negotiations with Turkish state should have been the freedom of their leaders. Except then his 
freedom nothing should have been accepted.  
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The PKK took examples of the Palestinians and Israel negotiations, Northern Ireland 
and British government, the Moro Islamic movement and the Philippines government and 
East Timor with Indonesia government. All those negotiations were mediated and monitored 
by the UN, EU and the US. The PKK should have had insisted on its founding principles. 
Palestinians insisting on two state solutions, East Timor gained its independence, Northern 
Ireland achieved power sharing and legally defending the unification of Northern and 
Southern Ireland and the Moro Islamic movement has reached regional autonomy. The 
democratic liberation strategy seemed a failed strategy. The Kurdish question is the question 
of a nation and needs to be solved according to the founding principles of universal national 
right to self-determination not a question of democratisation of Turkey. 
The new Turkish republic was built on denial of any different ethnic and religious 
communities. The Armenian genocide and massacre of the Kurds then forced settlement of 
the Kurds among Turkish communities in Anatolia to assimilate was presented as the result 
of homogenization policies. The existence of different communities was seen as a threat to 
the new republic. That policy still continues and it has a constitutional base (Turkish 
constitution 1982).  Leslie Lipson in The Democratic Civilisation gives the example of the 
uniqueness of the Swiss democratic confederations. Nearly three quarters (74%) speak 
German; one fifth (21%) of Swiss the mother tongue is French; 4% is Italian and 1% per cent 
speaks Romanche. Romanche language is one of the Swiss Cantonal Confederation’s official 
national languages and it is as equal as German language. Romanche language constitutes 1% 
and German language 74%. Despite this huge difference they are equal and both of them are 
official languages (Lipson 1964: pp. 143-4). The application of the Swiss example to Turkey 
could have been the best possible democratic solution not only for the Kurdish question but 
also for the question of Armenians, Assyrians, Arabs, Circassian, Laz and other ethnic and 
religious minorities. The monolithic understanding and attempt to assimilate all ethnic and 
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religious differences in order to create a unique Turkish nation did not succeed. That 
imposition is too far from democracy. The PKK’s new ideological and political changes 
could have been successful only in a democratic environment like Europe. In Turkey the state 
and the government saw those changes as weakness of the PKK.        
 
Searching a Peaceful Political Solution 
 
The evolution of a small group of young university students in Ankara in 1973s now in 
1993 has become a massive national, political, guerrilla and social movement. It is not only 
in the heart of Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin and Adana in Turkey’s big cities; and not only 
Bakur, Bashur, Rojhilat and Rojava; and not only in most of the European countries but also 
it was in the heart of Syria and Lebanon, in other words in the heart of the Middle East 
threatening a NATO member state. Up to 1993 when the PKK and Turkish state officially 
and publicly showed their desire to solve Kurdish question, Turkish state had never accepted 
the existence the Kurds as a different people then Turks, in its official ideology in Turkey 
only Turks existed and The PKK had created credible relations with Palestinian resistant 
organisations. Through Palestinians widened their relations to Socialist Camps countries too 
as Öcalan mentions while he was in Bulgaria in 1982 and later in 1987 (Öcalan 2012: 336). 
The PKK’s diplomatic relations with Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria were damaged when 
Soviet Union was collapsed. It was triumph of Capitalist Modernity, liberal capitalist 
economic-political system over Soviet Socialist system. The collapse of Soviet Union 
affected the PKK’s guerrilla warfare strategy and its national liberation strategy. Because the 
PKK’s struggle gained momentum and in 1990 and 1991-92 was moving towards a ‘Strategic 
Balance’ stage of national liberation’s guerrilla warfare. The PKK after the collapse of Soviet 
Union was in search for alternatives how to sustain it continuity through changes would be 
implemented.  
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The League of Nations up and in 1945 the United Nations had always played a role of 
keeping states' interests rather than the peoples’ ones. However, after the end of the bipolar 
world during the Second Gulf War that tradition of keeping states’ interest first, was broken 
by Humanitarian Intervention in Bashur Kurdistan with the protection of civilians from a 
sovereign states’ aggression. The paradox was that Turkey, being as a member of the NATO, 
was also an occupier of more than half of Kurdistan and the home of more than 25 million 
Kurds who had helped the Bashur Kurds with its NATO allies. In that case Bashur Kurdistan 
would have become a United Nation protected entity and in the future would have had a 
domino effect with Turkey negatively affected as the result. In Bakur Kurdistan the PKK 
struggle was at its pick. As mentioned above that strategic changes were on the way. 
Syrian and Islamic Republic of Iran affected negatively the PKK after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The reason was that both states were the only channels of the PKK between 
Bakur Kurdistan and the world especially the EU countries. The PKK had relocated its 
guerrilla training camps from Bakaa Valley in Lebanon to the mountainous area between 
Bakur and Bashur, Bashur and Rojhilat, such as the Haftanin, Gare, Metina, Zap, Xakurk 
Zele and Qandil as well as smaller camps inside Bakur Kurdistan’s Merdin, Garzan, Amed, 
Botan, Dersim, Bingol, Serhed. Therefore Iran and Syria were pressing and pushing the PKK 
to act against the KRG in Bashur. Turkey was also pressing and pushing the KRG to act 
against the PKK. In October 1992 the KRG under the united authority of the PUK and KDP-
Iraq and the TAF attacked the PKK from Bashur and Bakur (Ibid: 340-46). 
The Kurdistan National Liberation Movement after the Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad 
suffered ups and downs, however second half of twentieth century gave birth many leaders in 
four parts of Kurdistan.. Osman Sabri, Abdurrahman Qassimlu, Abdullah Öcalan, Jalal 
Talabani and Massoud Barzani played the main roles after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Talabani and Öcalan in spite of different ideological and political approaches were friends 
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since 1979 when Öcalan moved to Syria. Talabani, as the leader of the PUK, was one of the 
founder and leaders of KDP-Iraq during Mustafa Barzani’s leadership. Talabani as t one of 
the most experienced Kurdish leader in the 20th century played a very important role and had 
relations with most of the world leaders and especially with president of Turkey Turgut Özal. 
Talabani became the mediator between Turgut Özal and Abdullah Öcalan when for the first 
time a Turkish president intervened to solve the Kurdish question peacefully (Cemal 2003: 
pp. 43-50).  
Jalal Talabani, Kamran Karadagi and Cengiz Çandar negotiated mediating between 
Öcalan and Özal with success. The PKK leader’s consecutive interviews with Turkish 
journalists and the ERNK’s external popular activities in Europe, the Middle East and 
Turkey’s metropolis with the ARGK’s ripen situation that the PKK to announce ceasefire for 
a peaceful Newroz celebrations. It was announced they would give a chance for peace an 
important press conference will take place on 17th March 1993. Famous journalists from all 
over the world were gathered in Lebanon at Bakaa Valley in Bar Elias town prior to the 
mentioned date (Çandar 2012: pp.11). Öcalan made his first ever public press conference and 
said:  
“We are not demanding an immediate separation from Turkey. We are realists on this 
subject. Do not interpret this [ceasefire] as a simple tactic [serving a hidden agenda]. There 
are many reasons as to why [we are realists]. Those who understand the historic, political, 
and economic situation of the two peoples [the Kurds and Turks] know well that separation 
could not take place because they [the Kurds and Turks] are intertwined like flesh and bones” 
(Öcalan 1999: pp. 7). 
Öcalan in front of a crowd of world’s expert journalists triggered the bullets for peace 
and revealed their intention if Turkish state wanted to make a peace deal the PKK will 
compromise for the good of the peoples of Turkey mainly Kurds and Turks. President Özal’s 
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advisor Cengiz Çandar was present together with Hassan Cemal, two Turkish famous 
journalists, Kamran Karadagi the famous Kurdish origin of Al-Hayat newspapers’ 
correspondence, and Jalal Talabani the future Iraqi President. That ceasefire was going to last 
for a month. Three days before the end Öcalan again in front of even more journalists 
declared that the ceasefire has been extended for a longer time and two days later president 
Özal died. It was the end of the peace process too (Çandar 2012: pp. 19-20). President Özal 
was buried very quickly as well as the ceasefire. On May 1 the PKK’s Commander 
Parmaksiz Zeki ambushed a bus carrying unarmed soldiers killing thirty-three of them. It was 
the end of the ceasefire and a very important opportunity was lost. It was assumed by almost 
everybody that Turkish states’ Special War Branch or the ‘Deep State’ killed Özal and it had 
intervention or links in killings of 33 unarmed soldiers. According Cengiz Çandar that he was 
one president Özal’s advisors explains that the period, which was very close to solving 
Kurdish question (Ibid: pp.19).  
After the death of president Özal the Turkish state destroyed thousands of Kurdish 
villages, committed extra-judicial killings and an undeclared total war was on-going against 
Kurdish civilians. Totally more than forty thousand people lost their lives in the dirty war 
between the Turkish state and the PKK guerrillas. 
The PKK continued searching for peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. However, 
after Özal’s death none of the officials of the state dared to talk about the Kurdish question 
because who ever mentioned the Kurdish question would have had the same outcome as 
Özal's. The PKK was fighting against the TAF as well as with the KDP-Iraq in the border 
area between Bakur and Bashur. On 1st December the PKK declared a ceasefire with the 
KDP and Turkish state. The KDP-Iraq accepted the ceasefire but the Turkish state did not. In 
1996 the coalition government of Erbakan-Çiller government with the initiative of Erbakan 
with mediation a conservative writer Ismael Najar was another attempt to re-launch peace 
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negotiations; however, the army did not let the initiative to be successful. The second 
ceasefire did not last longer. With the mediation of some Turkish writers close to the Turkish 
army the third ceasefire was declared by Öcalan through Medya TV by a press conference on 
1st September 1998. The people mediated for the third ceasefire, they were the people 
working for the army and their offer was based on a plot, which was ended with the 
abduction of the PKK leader. Öcalan was transferred to Imrali prison and nobody knew what 
was going on in the prison between the TAF intelligence services, the National Intelligence 
Service (MIT) and PKK leader. The PKK leader was interrogated by a quadrant of the MIT, 
the TAF intelligence service, the Police and the Gendarmerie intelligences for consecutive 10 
days. Soon after Öcalan’s interrogation and imprisonment in Imrali, Öcalan started to give a 
theoretical base for why he wanted to concentrate on a ‘Democratic solution’. The first 
written text was as his first defence to the Court of Appeal in Ankara was interpreted in 
English in July 1999 called: Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the Kurdish 
Question.  
On 1st September 1999 the PKK announced that their announced ceasefire in 1998 was 
valid and declared its withdrawal from Bakur to Bashur Kurdistan. The strategic aim 
consisted in the withdrawal of the guerrilla forces from Bakur Kurdistan with the ending of 
violence. The participation in the general and local elections was the sign that the PKK was 
looking for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey. They studied the 
nonviolent struggles and found out how they have been successful how costly was insisting 
on continuing the armed guerrilla struggle. However, the state did not take any positive 
actions and all declarations of the PKK and Öcalan’s meeting with lawyers did not produce 
any result. If the Turkish state were acting through democratic means and opening a new 
window to discuss the Kurdish question, the guerrilla struggle would not have taken place 
from 1st June 2004 onwards. 
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The 1st June 2004 was not a strategy to overthrow the government and the state’s 
monopoly over Kurdistan, rather to encourage and support the masses for mobilization in 
democratic process and organizing the society to stand up for its rights. The purpose of re-
launching guerrilla warfare was to support the Kurdish political-legal civil society 
associations in Bakur Kurdistan and also to encourage Turkish democratic opposition to play 
their role in the democratic transformation of Turkish society. However, the PKK forgot that 
the Turkish state would not accept an illegal organisation to support directly or indirectly a 
legal organisations or civil society organisations. Keeping guerrillas and fighting the state’s 
armed forces and the police only had criminalised legal political activities of pro-Kurdish 
legal political parties. 
The PKK during its forty-four years struggle has declared ten ceasefires from 1993 to 
2013 with the intention to solve Kurdish question peacefully and democratically. The first 
one was genuine and there was the chance of success, though the PKK and the Kurdish 
society were not really prepared for it. The president Özal and Talabani played a genuine role 
but the state and deep state of Turkey was against the president and unfortunately the price of 
peace and democratization of Turkey was paid by Özal’s life. All the other eight ceasefires 
did produce nothing except than the last one on 23rd of March 2013 lasted for 28 month 
without the TAF’s operation against the PKK guerrillas or legal political parties of the BDP 
then HDP and DBP. The last one could have been saved if there was an intention from both 
sides. 
 
Debates about Ending the Armed Struggle 
 
It took exactly twenty years until the PKK established the guerrilla warfare and 
guerrilla army of the ARGK locating them in the heart of Bakur Kurdistan’s mountains and 
forests. They have created a social and cultural relation with the community and the ARGK 
  
	198	
had its own prestige among Kurdish communities. It was the most dramatic moment for both 
the people and the guerrillas to withdraw from Bakur. The intention was the peace and a 
democratic solution will take place and the guerrilla will return as political activists. 
However, they had forgotten that the state of Turkey had a past of seven hundred years of 
Ottoman rule and that in its seventy years of existence the republic never accepted freedom of 
any national entity except by force. The withdrawal guerrilla forces from Bakur Kurdistan 
was seen by the state as a proof of PKK’s weakness. Even the Supreme Court (Yargitay) 
confirmed the verdict of capital sentence to Öcalan.  
At its 7th congress the PKK publicly announced that they were fully behind the decision 
of their imprisoned leader to find a democratic framework for peaceful solution to the 
Kurdish question. They officially confirmed that they were no longer looking for 
independence but that the new thesis aimed at a “Democratic Republic, ‘Democratic Country 
(Turkey) and Free Part (Free Bakur Kurdistan)’”. The changes were not only these, they also 
stated that the ‘armed struggle, the guerrilla warfare’ had played a role in it. Therefore, it 
would be necessary to restructure and rename the PKK, the ARGK and the ERNK. Öcalan 
also recommended that to withdraw the guerrillas and that they should be prepared and 
educated for democratic political activities (Kapmaz 2011: pp. 128-9). They rearranged and 
reorganized their ideological, political and organizational structures in order to be compatible 
to the new era of a democratic peaceful solution. However, the state and the governments of 
the time did not take those actions as the opportunity to look for a solution to the Kurdish 
question. The state continued the traditional denial and solving Kurdish question in the 
framework of security problem. The PKK after its 7th congress published its statement and 
decisions. Everything was in line with whatever Öcalan said. However, there was a great 
unrest among the people, intellectuals and guerrillas. There was an assumption that whatever 
came out from Imrali prison if they were not Öcalan’s words, had to be taken with suspicious 
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(Gunter 2008: pp. 79). The PKK was ready to end the armed struggle, which lasted for five 
years obeying Öcalan, but the state did not guarantee cultural rights in its constitution.   
What the state was trying to do was to completely destroy the organizational structures 
of the PKK, disarm the guerrillas and assimilate the people then integrate pro-Kurdish legal 
political parties –such as HEP, DEP, HADEP, DEHAP, DTP and BDP – to the Turkish 
state’s discourse. If the Turkish state had an intention to accept only cultural rights of the 
Kurdish people it would have a public statement to declare it. The state’s intention and 
actions has always been against the existence of the Kurds and Kurdistan. Even Öcalan went 
further invited his comrades to send two groups of the PKK activists, one from the armed 
guerrillas of the ARGK from the field and the other from the ERNK in Europe, to surrender 
as a sign of good will for the sake of peace. However, the Turkish state did not consider those 
positive steps. The PKK leadership was ready to disarm the guerrilla forces and even if with 
little concessions of cultural right for Kurdish people. The ‘deep state or gladio’ caused 
collapse the 1993 ceasefire and cost the life of president Özal; in 1996 the deep state or 
gladio again dismantled the initiatives of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and in 2000 the 
initiatives of Bulent Ecevit were all signs of a strong hand in the heart of Turkish state 
showing that it did not want a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish question.  
The regional and international dimensions of the conflicts had changed in the Middle 
East. The United States of America and United Kingdom directly intervened in Iraq because 
they accuse Saddam’s regime to hold weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein’s 
regime was toppled and the process of the Middle East turmoil started. Turkey’s relations 
with the US gradually worsened because a NATO ally Turkey did not let US troop to cross 
from its territory. Turkey and Syria upgraded their relations and got closer to each other 
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rather than the US. In 2003 Iraq and Iran also become allies. A new constitution in Iraq was 
written and for the first time in Iraq’s constitution legal status of Kurdistan was guaranteed.  
The regional turmoil and the process of democratization started by Öcalan did not 
produce any legal guarantees for Kurdish people and Turkey refused any negotiations. There 
was any reason to continue the ceasefire and the PKK reconsidered to restart the guerrilla 
warfare struggle again, if Turkey was not in favour of a solution. Even the AKP declared in 
Stockholm ‘even if a Kurdistan get established in Argentina they will be opposed and in 
Moscow also said ‘if you do not think of some think it means it does not exist, in other words 
if you do not think Kurdistan and Kurdish question it does not exist’. The debates to end the 
armed struggle did not make any contribution of political positive changes in Turkey. The 
PKK necessarily returned to the original principle that in the Middle East ‘if you are not 
armed you will be harmed and buried’. In the last chapter and in the general conclusion it will 
be discussing more in depth this point. 
 
The KCK (Kurdistan communities Union or the Union of Communities in 
Kurdistan) 
 
As a successful organisation the PKK has recorded two achievements in its 45 years of 
history. The first one was which is the most significant one, was when Öcalan was set free in 
Syria following successful national, political and diplomatic activities, which forced the 
Turkish state to come to the table of dialogue in 1993. The second one was that the PKK was 
able to avoid defeat despite its many mistakes when its leader was handed over to Turkish 
state by the NATO. When Öcalan moved to Syria in 1979 he did the proper tactics, 
established diplomatic relations with Palestinians, thorough Damascus and Beirut sending the 
PKK cadres to Europe. Then, in 1998 almost twenty years after moving to Europe he had the
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enormous opportunity to transform the PKK into a democratic movement and to gain the 
international support for the Kurdistan National Liberation Movement. However, leaving 
Italy was an unforgivable mistake for which he will never forgive himself. When he was 
handed over by the NATO to Turkey, his video in the plane and his video between two 
Turkish flags was the most humiliating picture of a Kurdish leader and the Kurdish nation 
suffered greatly. In reaction to those pictures seventy-nine Kurds in different prisons in and 
outside of Kurdistan set them on fire (Judi 2011:  pp.815). Nevertheless, he saved the 
movement he had organised bit by bit for thirty years. From June 1988 he tried to speak to 
everyone in Turkey in order to convince the state of the possibility to compromise without 
more bloodshed. During his imprisonment to 1st June 2004 he tried whatever he could to 
convince the state to accept the minimum demands, but the state rejected his offer. He asked 
the PKK to change the programme, the strategy, the tactics, the name transforming all 
institutions and organisations for the sake of democratization, but none of those changes was 
fruitful.  
The PKK, as explained in the previous chapters, emerged to eject Turkish colonialism 
and establish an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan and establish a state, but a 
democratic state. When the KCK was announced on 21st March 2005 it insisted on that it was 
not an alternative to the state formation for the Kurds, or any other ethnic minority within the 
borders of Turkey against the Turkish state. However, it has been defined as an umbrella 
organisation consisting of hundreds of civil society organisations from all stratums of the 
society and many clandestine armed and non-armed organisations and parties from four parts 
of Kurdistan. In other words well-organised civil society associations around the country had 
the role to raise awareness in the society and to stand up for their legitimate, universal 
individual and collective rights. Obtaining individual and collective rights can be possible if 
democratic options are available, so the more the state implements democratic opening and 
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opportunity for individual and collective freedoms and rights, the more distance will be made 
by the Kurdistan National liberation movement with the use of violent means (Öcalan 2012: 
pp. 93). 
Öcalan insisted on self-government, which is a kind of administration that can be called 
a non-state political administration. Public administration/self-governance in Öcalan’s new 
paradigm is different than traditional state-governance. Democratic Autonomy is the direct 
democratic rule of the people by the people organised from the grass roots of the society. In 
other words it is a pyramid of direct and voluntary participation of the people and civil 
society organisations. States are founded on power; democracies are based on consensus. 
Office in the state is determined by decree, even though it may be in part legitimized by 
elections. Democracies use direct elections. The state uses coercion as a legitimate means. 
Democracies rest on voluntary participation (Öcalan, 2011: p 21).  
The PKK totally implemented what was coming out from the Imrali prison. The PKK 
was not curiously considering the messages were receiving by the lawyers from Imrali 
prison. There was huge anger not only among communities but also from all different 
political factions and even in the ranks of the PKK too. The confusion was at the pick, the 
question of a nation has been reduced to the question of democratization of Turkey, the paid 
price in Kurdistan was unaccountable and those changes were criticized at everywhere and 
thousands supporters of the PKK left the organisation from 2000 to 2004.  
Öcalan through his lawyers and the EHCR – European Court of Human Rights – 
defences sent his messages in the form of books to the PKK. The PKK adopted the thesis of 
‘Democratic Modernity’ based on a democratic, ecological and women-emancipatory system 
and switched from being a party to a congressional system (Uzun 2014: pp. 21). The PKK 
during its 8thcongress in April 2002 dissolved itself and a new Kurdistan Freedom and 
Democracy Congress – KADEK – took its place. Öcalan continued to reflect and analyse the 
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situation, and as the part of the on-going quest for change, KADEK dissolved itself at 
9thcongress and was replaced by Kurdistan People’s Congress – Kongra Gel – it is still 
continuing as a legislative assembly of the KCK system, which is continue to develop 
ideological, political and organizational tripartite. In 2004, the PKK was reconstructed with a 
new identity: it became the ideological centre of the new system. The Union of Communities 
of Kurdistan – Koma Komalên Kurdistan – the KKK – was established as the umbrella 
organisation of the new system at Newroz in 2005 in Amed. One year later the Kurdish name 
was sounding a name in Turkish army’s name therefore it changed to the KCK –Koma 
Civakên Kurdistan – reflecting a slight change in emphasis (Ibid: pp. 21).  
The KCK, as a system now an umbrella consisted of ten might be hundreds of 
organisations. The philosophy of Öcalan is the main theory of the KCK. Those member 
organisations are from four parts of Kurdistan and the Kurds in the Diaspora. The PKK and 
its guerrilla army the HPG are the main pillars of the KCK; the PKK as the ideological centre 
setting the parameters and the HPG as the armed forces leading all guerrilla activities. The 
KCK system as an alternative to its previous goal of an independent Kurdish nation state 
aims towards the ‘democratic nation’. The democratic nation concept is not based on one 
nation; rather it is defined as an umbrella including all ethnic, lingual, cultural and religious 
entities of the region. Instead of aiming a greater independent united Kurdistan, it aims 
towards a confederal Kurdistan, which will be free but not independent. The new paradigm of 
the PKK has been defined as a complicated paradigm and difficult process to implement 
(Gunter: 2014 pp.127). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Democratic Confederalism concept has been borrowed from Cantonal 
administration of Switzerland. The direct democratic rule of law has guaranteed individual 
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existence of twenty-six Cantons as equal partners in democratic confederative Swiss state in 
the centre of the European continent. The idea that this example can be implemented in the 
centre of the Middle East is highly controversial because of too the many ethnic, religious, 
lingual differences in conflict with the nation-states. The nation-states in the Middle East are 
ethnic states; they do not implement the rule of law as the principle to democracy. 
 The Turkish state was playing a political game with the PKK. As an outsider it was 
obvious that if the PKK did not choose that opportunistic way and had chosen a resistant way 
of struggle, their struggle would have had achieved to great successes. From 1977 to 1998 the 
PKK’s national liberation strategy gained support, mobilized people almost every year more 
than a thousand guerrilla. Despite all the odds the PKK’s recruits were coming from all over 
Kurdistan regardless of they were Sunni, Shi’a, Alevi, Yezidi or Kakayi Kurds. Öcalan as an 
experienced leader did play the main role of creating the PKK in Ankara and transferring it to 
Bakur Kurdistan and sustain and develop it in Syria and retransfer it to the heart of Kurdistan 
and did choose the most suitable way to Europe. Moving to Europe meant moving into the 
heart of the world. His arrest was a huge blow to the PKK. The greatest mistake the PKK did 
was too fast and too thirsty to move to a reformist and liberalist way of life. Nobody knows 
whether the Turkish state was enforcing or Öcalan was with his free will was committing to 
those dangerous changes and transformations. Even if the state did not – which is impossible 
from my point of view – and Öcalan was independently expressing his free views, it was 
totally in control of the PKK to act and keep the unity and do the best possible way. Öcalan 
was in prison. Prison means you are 100% under control of the state. You are not free and 
whatever you do is under control.  
The Turkish state gradually allowed the legal political party the DEHAP and its 
activists who were sympathetic to the fact that the PKK organised civil society organisations. 
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According to the experiences the Turkish state never allowed any Kurdish entity to do 
politics unless it is totally under control of the state. The activities of the DEHAP party was 
under control of the state. Any uncontrolled party activist was immediately arrested and in 
the courts state informants were giving evidence against the activists who were sentenced to 
long imprisonments. It was argued that the state intelligence was controlling the DEHAP 
activities. What is confusing is why the PKK any other Kurdish political party has not 
understood so far that any patriotic attempt from Kurdistan has always accounted as a 
national security danger to state and has been eliminated at the place. The Turkish state in 
two hundred years of history since the Ottoman Empire dealt very harshly with any Kurdish 
attempt to self-determination.   
Despite all negative steps were taken by the Turkish state against the will of Kurdish 
people, the international community to solve the Kurdish question according to universal 
national right to self-determination, after Öcalan’s imprisonment, the struggle continued and 
popular support doubled. When the negative denial policy of the state revealed to the masses 
the PKK got even stronger. The movement with the paradigm change evolved towards 
becoming a mass social movement. The participation to the PKK after Öcalan imprisonment 
made the PKK too crowded from all parts of Kurdistan. Its mass participation caused the 
birth of new PKK’s for the other parts of Kurdistan. The PÇDK – Partiya Çareseriya 
Democratic a Kurdistan – Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party was established from the 
Kurds from Bashur who were in the ranks. The PJAK – Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistan – 
Kurdistan Free Life Party from the Kurds of Rojhilat Kurdistan in the ranks of the PKK and 
the PYD – Partiya Yekitiya Demokratika – Democratic Union Party from Rojava Kurds were 
established. These three parties and the PKK plus KNK in Europe and many more 
organisations as autonomous organisations in the four parts of Kurdistan and in the Diaspora 
continue their activities under the umbrella of the KCK.  	
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Chapter 7 
The PKK’s Radical Democracy Paradigm: the KCK 
Introduction 
 
Chapter seven analyses how the PKK’s paradigm changed and how this transformation 
have been effective in mobilizing, organizing and politically involving the masses towards 
the establishment of a Radical Democracy in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey, although it had 
moved from one stage (national liberation), to another stage (democratic liberation), the 
responses (in positive way) from Turkish state so far had been very little or nothing. The 
understanding of the concept of Radical Democracy fell within the framework of Marxist 
thought on three pillars:  state, class and party. During the Cold War era National Liberation 
Movements were within the frame of Marxist thought aiming that a party must lead the 
liberation movements, the working class/proletariat must lead and the goal is establishing a 
state. In Imrali Island Öcalan criticised Marxism and talked about democratic socialism and 
radical democracy in hundreds of his meeting with his lawyers. The goal of change from 
national liberation towards democratic liberation was to move politics beyond the state, 
political organisation beyond the party, and political subjectivity beyond class (Badiou 2002: 
pp. 95-97). In implementing democratic liberation, the PKK changed its name to be a 
congressional organisation that included all social stratums of the society; to do politics for 
the people by the people and not aiming towards a state. In theory it was seen possible, but in 
practice the state denounced it as national security threat and banned it. 
The transformation of the PKK and the new paradigm of Radical Democracy consisted 
of the idea of a Democratic Confederalism based on Democratic Republic, Democratic 
Nation, Democratic Autonomy and a vivid Democratic Civil Society aiming at 
decentralization and devolution. Implementing such a political project was a paradox in a 
country like Turkey based on a unique Turkish-nation-state mentality with the exclusion of 
any other ethnic entities. In case of implementation the Radical Democracy elements it could 
be argued whether Democratic Confederalism could constitute an alternative to Turkish-
nation-state or at least work within that framework in parallel.  
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The appropriate way of decentralization and devolution needs to be developed is a 
democratic environment, as it has been in implementation in Switzerland as Cantonal system 
and in the UK as the devolving power from London to in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland Assemblies. While a vigilant civil society was strongly gaining the ground in Bakur 
Kurdistan more than ten thousands of Kurdish civil society activists were imprisoned. 
Despite the transformation process of the PKK the people were participated into the political 
process and participating to political activities peacefully moving away from violence. The 
launch of many ceasefires have shown that despite Turkish state’s coercive forces, a peace 
deal could have been achievable as the international example shown but even if the PKK 
declared of decommissioning itself Turkish state would give nothing because it has always 
seen the Kurds and Kurdistan as a national security threat. Transformation and paradigm 
change, dropping the goal of an independent Kurdish state and national liberation did not put 
any positive impact on the Turkish state’s behaviour towards Kurdish question. 
 A democratic society paradigm is achievable if a bottom up democratic culture and 
mentality is not prevented by the state. When the PKK from 1st September 1999 to 1st June 
2002 silenced the guns, which happened after the imprisonment of Öcalan there were a 
growing number of civil society organisations and Kurdish democratic legal organisations 
transformed to a massive social movement in Bakur Kurdistan and in Turkey. In Bakur 
Kurdistan thousands of civil society organisations from different stratums of the society were 
organised and Turkey’s big cities where millions of Kurds are living they organised civil 
society organisations too. They only allowed existing until the ruling party achieved to its 
targets then all of them were closed down and their activists imprisoned.   
The PKK leader leaving Syria in October said, “By moving from Ankara to Kurdistan, 
we become a party, by moving from Kurdistan to the Middle East we become an army and 
now while we are going to Europe we will become a state”. Could the PKK convince the 
Turkish state that if the PKK leader was not imprisoned in Turkey, would it had been 
possible to launch then new paradigm? How could it be possible to say while you are 
surrounded by nation-states, and multi-national states, that Kurdistan does not need a state? 
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Or how can one convince communities scientifically that the state is the source all 
exploitations, yes it is, but it can be a democratic institution too. The Soviet experience has 
proved that there is still a long way to go to reach a democratic socialism. The state is an 
apparatus of governing or coordinating different institutions and it needed but its power 
should be reduced and transformed to the local people’s self-governance. 
The KCK as a system of coordinating mostly PKK supported organisations in four 
parts of Kurdistan happened after the imprisonment of Öcalan with the massive participation 
of educated youths from all four parts of Kurdistan. In order to accept all of them the PKK 
divided itself into four branches one for each part of Kurdistan: northern, eastern, western 
and southern. In this way Rojhilat Kurdistan the PJAK (Kurdistan Free Life Party), for 
Rojava Kurdistan the PYD (Democratic Union Party) and for Bashur Kurdistan was PÇDK 
(Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party) all gathered under the umbrella organization of the 
KCK. 
With radical democracy or direct democracy the PKK meant that through non-violent 
mode of struggle and not clashing with the state, but parallel to the state, with the political 
education of people and their organization to give them the opportunity to decide their 
destiny. This was needed because the communities in Kurdistan are not homogeneous but 
heterogeneous: different dialects, sects, religions and ethnicities. The PKK’s goal was to give 
these communities the opportunity to represent themselves autonomously with the idea that a 
more democratic environment would facilitate their unity. The problem was the unilateral 
mentality of Turkish state had always considered ethnic, national, lingual and religious 
differences as an existential threat to their existence. Therefore, any reformation and 
transformation from the PKK side had only little effect on the state mentality. The reason is 
that Turkish the state since its foundation had always recurred to violence in order to achieve 
its aims. That is why the paradigm of Radical Democracy/direct democracy has not been 
productive so far.   
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Democratic Republic 
 
In the new paradigm of the PKK particularly since the imprisonment of Öcalan is 
democratic peaceful and legal political reformation and transformation of the state of Turkey. 
The PKK leadership council according the new paradigm of democratic liberation stated that 
if Republic is a system where democracy can function for the people by the people and then it 
needed to accommodate all the people in Turkey democratically and equally. Therefore the 
republic could be a democratic one where not only Turks and Kurds, but also all other ethnic 
and religious communities, such as Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, Roman, Pontus, Laz and 
Circassia’s Arabs ethnicities as well as religious communities etc., share the same equal 
rights and duties and be treated equally.    
The ideal state for a republic is not a nation-state but a democratic state (Öcalan 2012: 
p.29). The evidences on the ground have shown that in over 90 years of Turkey’s political 
history, there is not space opened to the acceptance of diversity. The only principle of 
foundation of Turkey is that the state is for the Turks with one Turkish nation, Turkish state, 
Turkish Flag and with only Turkish language. This meant that only those who belong to this 
nation can access to a social, political, and cultural position in the society and be promoted to 
the highest ranks. The state is the state of Turks only; there is not any possibility for other 
different ethnic or religious differences to achieve any position in the state and in the army. 
The only rare examples had the purpose of deceiving the people and the European democratic 
audience to show that Turkey has some democratic norms and it is adopting European 
democratic standards.    
According to the new path of the PKK, the republic could be transformed a republic of 
only one-nation-state into a democratic-republic representing democratically all the other 
peoples. How could a state such as the Turkish state be transformed into a democracy? This 
can be done through civil society organisations, which can organise the society from below 
and bring the people to a level of decision-making without making any differentiations 
between ethnic and religious realities. However, states only do things if they are in their 
interests, whereas people’s interests always clashes with states’ interests. Therefore, the states 
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do not allow the progression of the civil society in Middle Eastern societies, because the 
promotion of democratic civil values clashes with the interests of the hegemonic, totalitarian 
states such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, for example. It would be very difficult to find a 
way towards their democratization. If the Turkish republic can be reformed and transformed 
through legal political means, there would not be any need for revolution. The evidence on 
the ground shows that even if you take into consideration the foundation principles of the 
republic established between the 23 and 24 of April 1920, there is nothing that can legally 
secure national and democratic rights for national entities. Those principles, and with them 
Turkish constitution did not recognise Kurds as a nation. It was written at a very critical 
moment, in order to convince Kurdish tribal leader and other nationalist leaders to support 
Mustafa Kemal and to dismantle the Sevres treaty. When the war finished the brotherhood 
also ended.  
The examples of Spain, United Kingdom and Switzerland are the examples of countries 
where democracy had evolved. Spain is not a federal state but highly a decentralized republic 
and has seventeen autonomous communities. The United Kingdom has also adopted a 
decentralized system with England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Switzerland is a 
unique example of liberal democracy in the heart of Europe and, and even it is not a member 
of the EU, is one the most prosperous multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious 
democracies. 
The idea of a democratic republic for Turkey intensified during the meetings between 
Öcalan and his solicitors in the Imrali prison. Every week, sometimes twice a week solicitors 
were visiting Öcalan in Imrali. Cengiz Kapmaz who was the editor of the pro- Kurdish and 
indirectly PKK supported newspapers and magazines in Istanbul. For ten years as the author 
and editor of more than two thousands news articles and analyses about Öcalan’s lawyer 
meetings mentions in his book Öcalan’s Imrali Days, ‘Ocalan was convinced that the state 
will have reforms regarding to Kurdish question, because Turkey was accepted as a candidate 
member for negotiations by the EU. Even Prime minister Ecevit’s representative visited 
Ocalan and Ocalan was telling to his solicitors about moving to house arrest’ (Kapmaz 2011: 
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pp. 46-47). Each time his solicitors declared that Öcalan mentioned the idea of a democratic 
solution and transformation. Those transformations were only taking place from the PKK 
side not from the state’s side. On the one hand, a democratic solution required the 
undertaking of political activities according to the constitution of Turkey; a constitution 
written after the 1980 coup d’état and that required the PKK to lay down arms and surrender. 
The state knew that by giving easy access of the solicitors would have a positive impact on 
the PKK as well as on Kurdish people and the international community projecting the idea 
that Turkey is a democratic country moving towards the EU. However, the main target was to 
disarm the PKK and bring the guerrillas down from the mountains and defeat the PKK 
without giving any rights and status to the Kurds in Bakur Kurdistan. In this way the Turkish 
fear was, any re-launching of the guerrilla warfare would take a long time and with Öcalan in 
prison the PKK would not be defeated. The reason was because Turkish state strictly rejected 
any deal, any constitutional change and even any international mediation. 
In his first defence Öcalan in Imrali high security prison under cross interrogation of 
Turkish National Intelligence Agency –MIT, Turkish National Police Intelligence, The TAF 
Intelligence and the Gendarmerie Intelligences established the foundation for his democratic 
unity thesis. He showed that the denial policies of the republic started from 1924 onwards. He 
explained Kurdish and Turkish relations since 1071 when Kurds and Turks together defeated 
the Byzantium Empire. He provided a thousand years brotherhood story. He admired Kemal 
Ataturk and approved the 1921 constitution. Then he went on talking about the emergence of 
the Kurdish uprisings and took a different approach as if those uprisings were plots against 
the republic. Then he blamed the foreign plotters that surrounded Mustafa Kemal, without 
whom Kemal would have given the Kurds some autonomy (Öcalan 1999: pp. 22-35).  
Öcalan states repeatedly via his lawyers that an independent state would not be a 
solution; however, autonomy could be considered if the Turkish state would come to a 
compromise.  Up to that time the KDP-Iraq and other Rojhilat, Bakur, Rojava and Bashur’s 
political parties aimed at obtaining autonomy they were labelled as reformists and even 
traitors by the PKK since 1973 to 1999. But this sudden change was too difficult to explain to 
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the people. How the PKK could explain his followers why Öcalan has made a 360-degree 
turn? Up to the imprisonment it was a taboo to say Turkish or Iraqi Kurdistan, but after 
imprisonment you witnessed no Bakur no Bashur but Iraqi Kurdistan in the Öcalan’s meeting 
statements. The idea of a democratic solution proposed by Öcalan had damaged the national 
awareness of the PKK. Up to his imprisonment Turkish republic had destroyed more than 
4000 Kurdish villages and forced more than three million Kurds from their native land who 
were displaced to Anatolia and Europe.  
According to Öcalan’s thousands of statements via his solicitors and his defences to the 
European Court of Human Rights, he believed that he would be able to convince the state to 
reform itself and open a space in it its constitution to guarantee the rights of minorities and 
bring equality between Kurds and Turks. Hence, he tried hard to transform the PKK and all 
related civil society organisations to be prepared for a democratic solution. However Turkish 
state was built on some fundamental pillars of denial Kurdish nation and secured that denial 
by international guarantees at the Lausanne Treaty. It was not an easy process for the Turkish 
republic to solve the Kurdish question especially because it was responsible for the Armenian 
genocide, the Greek Pontus genocide, the Assyrian genocide and Kurdish genocides, all of 
them committed just at the beginning of the century, most of which have been officially 
recognised by European countries. Today the geography is called Bakur Kurdistan or the 
republic of Turkey calls it, as Turkey it was a considerable portion of Southern Armenia. 
Reformation and democratization of Turkish republic means all those files would be coming 
down from the dusted shelves of the archives to the tables of negotiations.  
There was the assumption from rival parties against the PKK, such as Kemal Burkay 
the former leader of the TKSP, that Öcalan had surrendered to the Turkish state in order to 
safe his personal life from the execution while he was trying to introduce the idea of 
democracy at the basis of any change in order to show the public and the PKK that the state 
will be democratized and there was no need to continue with the through violent means. As a 
close observer of the PKK’s formation and evolution since 1976, most of the PKK members 
and ordinary people of Kurdistan were shocked by the fact that between 1988 and 1993 when 
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Öcalan in some interviews to Turkish journalists and to his arch enemy Dogu Perinçek said 
‘if Turkey open a window of dialogue there would be a possibility to compromise on basic 
principles of equality between two peoples – the Kurds and Turks – and the armed struggle 
will be stopped’. Öcalan wanted to reform the state while the state was exactly acting in the 
opposite direction to annihilate the PKK, the process of the PKK and the Turkish state’s 
dialogue are the proof and evidence of this. 
The Turkish republic cannot be simply be democratized because according to its 
foundation principle ‘the state is the father’ of Turks only. According to the evidence of the 
past one thousand years, the history of Turkish presence in the region has made the rulers to 
be too self-centred. The power of a giant empire was deployed in Anatolia and it was used 
against very weak tribal led Kurdish uprisings. Turkish state with the financial support and 
Fighting Jets from Great Britain after WWI the Turkish republic won a decisive victory 
against Kurdish uprisings. The republic fundamentally invented the motto ‘who ever in 
Turkey do not accept Turkish identity either has to leave Turkey or be slave of Turks. Turkey 
is only for Turks and will remain eternally for Turks’. A republic with that motto as its 
foundation principle can only be reformed transformed through a revolution or a general 
uprising to be over thrown. Turkish state since its establishment after WWI has continuously 
officially implemented the policies of annihilation, assimilation and extermination of Kurdish 
nation and other religious and ethnic minorities. Ninety years of denial state policies followed 
as the rule of existence of Turkish state against all non-Turkish entities and they all have been 
seen as national security threat. This kind of republic cannot be a democratic one or in a short 
time with its constitution to be transformed to a democratic republic.     
 
Democratic Nation 
 
The PKK in its paradigm change and transformation made a new definition of the 
concept of the nation as democratic nation. In different definitions of a nation there is a 
significant common ground that no scholar can reject: a shared language, culture, social and 
economic life, history and territory as it has been mentioned in chapter two. By this definition 
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it can be said that without a language a nation cannot be called a nation, so the language is 
the most important criteria of what mainly makes a people as a nation. The charter of the 
United Nations offers a clear definition of the right of the different nations on earth at first 
chapter in the article one, clause two and three. However, over time the interest of the states 
and the interests of the rivalry between them have prevented the charter to be implemented. 
In fact the United Nation could have been the organisation of the nations not the 
organisations of the states. The Kurdish question is the question of a nation, in comparison to 
hundreds of nations on earth who are members of the UN just because they have their own 
state. The Kurds, numbering more than forty to fifty million, are not at the list of the UN 
because they do not have a state. Öcalan in the Imrali prison transformed his thought 
regarding to the definition of Kurdish national question in Turkey. In order to compromise 
with the Turkish state instead of Kurdish nation in Turkey, he defines all nations in the 
concept of democratic nation. 
Most of the experts of the field of nation and nationalism are agree that what makes the 
source of conflicts is the unequal representation and inequality between ethnic, religious, 
social and cultural communities. The prevention of even more dangerous wars between 
different communities in Turkey seems to be the reason why Öcalan has given so many 
concessions to the state of Turkey in order to find a way of coexistence and equal 
representation in the form of a unitary state using the universal legitimate National Right to 
Self-Determination in the form of a Democratic Nation. This meant to give up the idea of 
independence in favour of an Autonomous Democratic Kurdistan within the ‘artificial’ 
borders of Turkish state. However, even if this idea was thought in order to bring permanent 
solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey it had a very temporary effect. The historical 
experience has shown that the very complex and difficult issues and questions need deep 
permanent solutions if they want to be successful.        
One of the main pillars of the new paradigm of the PKK was the idea of a Democratic 
Nation. From its emergence to the arrest of Öcalan the main principle and founding reason 
and cause of the creation of the PKK were the right of national self-determination and the 
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establishment of the independent state of Kurdistan transformed to federalism in 1995 and 
then to autonomy following the argument that Kurds are a separate nation. Different 
language, different culture, different history, different spiritual and psychological upbringing 
and different norms and values embedded in the geography for thousands of years called 
Kurdish in Kurdistan. There are thousands of legendary heroes of Kurdish men and women 
who have sacrificed their lives for that purpose over the years. So the Kurds are a different 
nation from Turks, Arabs and Persians. They do not share the criteria mentioned above.  
The Kurdish question is a national question and the question of a separate state and 
secession from Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Kurdistan has been divided by force and 
colonised against the will of its nation. Turkey has deceived the Kurds during its war of 
independence and colonised Kurdistan. There is not a unity based on the shared will and 
consent. Turkish state accepts those Kurds who denies their existence and obeys to Turkish 
nation. As a researcher I observed during my fieldwork in Bakur Kurdistan found the above-
mentioned ideas among ordinary people who have paid the price for National Self-
Determination of Kurdistan. Although the people publicly do not oppose the ideas of Öcalan, 
however in private conversations they open up. Most people interpret the Democratic Nation 
proposed by Öcalan as if there is only one way available for the Kurdish nation than to accept 
self-assimilation and self-melting in Turkish nationality. Öcalan's idea was also rejected by 
the state as a secessionist one.  
Putting an adjective of Democracy in front of every noun would not make the process a 
democratic one. Democracy is a political system of governance and it is a culture, it is an 
understanding of life in the form of coexistence with your human fellow and it needs a long 
time to develop and give fruits. Those countries in the world, which moved or are moving 
towards democracy, have already left behind a very dramatic past of crimes, wars of ethnic 
and religious conflicts. The conflict in the Middle East and with it the conflict between 
Turkish, Iranian, Iraq and Syria and Kurds will come to an end after a dramatic event would 
have come to an end. This is because the states have created a nation from different ethnic 
and religious groups by force melting them into one indoctrinated one. Ordinary original 
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Turks, Persian, Arab or any other have no problems with Kurds. The problems and ethnic 
conflicts have been created by the states. The peaceful coexistence of Kurds, Armenians and 
Assyrians over centuries tells the true story. 
The ultimate aim of a nation is to create a state apparatus in order to cooperate between 
institutions. The state’s responsibility is to distribute justice, equality, freedom, rule of law 
and democracy. In a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religion country, the state is to 
provider those different entities a democratic and equal representation. As it has been 
mentioned earlier that one of the best examples of a democracy is the Swiss Cantonal system. 
A 74% of German speakers are equal with 1% of Romanche speakers in front of the rule of 
law in all spheres of life. The citizens of Swiss would be proud to say that they were Swiss 
nationals. Though in Turkey the state has aimed to create a nation, which a Turkish nation. 
Definition of a democratic nation in Turkey would be similar to the one in Swiss political 
system. However in the foundation of Kemalist’s early republican ideology and theory based 
on the Sun Language Theory – Güneş Dil Teorisi –, which states that, all languages are 
branches of the Turkish language. The difficulty is to implement a Swiss-like political system 
of Democratic Nation in Turkey is almost impossible, because the state does not accept any 
other nations except the Turkish nation. The Swiss political system is based on pluralist and 
democratic cantonal system. Turkish political system is exactly opposite of all European 
democracies and in particular exactly opposite to the Swiss democratic system. Having 
elections in Turkey does not mean that it is a democracy. In Iraq, during Saddam Hussein’s 
rule there were elections and he was winning by 99 % of the votes. Therefore implementation 
in such system in Turkey needs a total change in Turkish political system to be compatible 
with civilised and democratic norms of the EU. 
 
Democratic Autonomy 
 
Democratic autonomy is one of the new ideas expressed by Öcalan at Imrali as one of 
the component of democratic solution and democratization of republic of Turkey. According 
to the paradigm of Öcalan in a democratic republic a democratic nation would be consisted of 
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multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religions similar to the Swiss nation. Öcalan by offering 
this paradigm simplified the Kurdish Question from National liberation to the question of 
democratic autonomy and political democratic solution. Democratic Autonomy thesis of 
Öcalan does not contain geographical or ethnic-national components’ territorial division but 
compromise them equally in a wider democratic Turkey. However the traditional concept of 
autonomy is based on lingual, ethnic and geographical differences in the other parts of the 
world. For example autonomous regions of Spain Catalonia and Bask regions are best 
examples for autonomy with the KRG in Bashur Kurdistan. Öcalan tried hard to simplify as 
much as he could in order to withdraw from the original national liberation strategy and start 
a democratic liberation path removing the ethnic and territorial dimensions of autonomy in 
order to make it generally acceptable by the bureaucracy of the state and public opinion in 
Turkey.    
Öcalan through his lawyers was working on his Democratic solution thesis in order to 
implement the Democratic Autonomy thesis it needed to empower the weakened legal 
political party the DEHAP. But also in addition to this the four MP’s in prison since 1994 – 
Hatip Dicle, Selim Sadak, Orhan Dogan and Leyla Zana – were released to create a new civil 
society organisation and progressing the activities to a higher stage. It was the Democratic 
Society Movement – the DTH – Demokratik Toplum Hareketi – that had to purpose to lead 
the society and the civil society organisations. The DTH in a short period of the time gained a 
huge support from the people and had actively organised civil society organisations. The 
DTH, in combination with the DEHAP party and its elected municipalities, created two new 
organisations: the DTP – Demokratik Toplum Partisi – Democratic Society Party and the 
DTK Demokratik Toplum Kongresi – Democratic Society Congress. This process of 
democratic solution was implemented in parallel with the state’s hidden dialogue with the 
PKK through the KRG from 2005 onwards. The DTP participated to the general election as 
independent candidates and gained twenty-two seats. The DTP continued actively in general 
politics; the DTK actively organized civil society organisations in Bakur building diplomatic 
relations closely with the KRG. The process evolved further and developed into the PKK and 
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Turkish state hidden negotiations called the ‘Oslo Negotiations’. The Oslo negotiations were 
the second important negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish state. These negotiations 
lasted three years and eventually failed. The DTP was closed down and another party called 
BDP – Bariş ve Demokrasi Partisi – the Peace and Democracy Party continued its legal 
activities in the Parliament and all over Turkey. The BDP as a party and the DTK as an 
unofficial regional parliament leading more than a thousand civil society organisations put in 
their programme that they would work to implement the Democratic Autonomy goal in 
Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey. 
Professor Norman Paech in the Draft Submission for a Democratic Autonomous 
Kurdistan pamphlet prepared by DTK defines “‘Democratic Autonomy’ concept as a 
proposal to democratize Turkey. Its core element is to be a new constitution that gives the 
Kurdish people the same rights of life, the political status and the same economic, social and 
cultural opportunities as available to Turkish people” (DTK Pamphlet 2011: pp. 3). The aim 
and purpose of Öcalan’s democratic solution thesis was for the first time implemented on the 
legal platforms organised by DTK and BDP in Bakur operating as civil society actors in 
Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey. However, as soon as the pamphlet was published at the DTK’s 
first workshop in Amed the state and related media started the anti-propaganda and labelled it 
as secessionist and as an attempt to organise a parallel state within the Turkish state. The 
Kurdish nationalist organisations also blamed the project as a Turkish intelligence services’ 
programme. The Democratic Autonomy project was under attacked from both the state and 
Kurdish opposition parties in Bakur Kurdistan. Despite the all objections and obstacles the 
DTK and BDP progressed, developed and gained social and political support. It doubled the 
MPs and also doubled the municipals in the following elections in June 2011.  Municipalities 
won by the BDP were doubled from 57 to 100 and the MPs were from 22 to 37.  
 Turkish state tried to bring all democratic political organisations under its control. The 
DTK as well as the BDP in Bakur Kurdistan as well as in the big cities of Turkey were 
strengthened, when the state witnessed it was impossible to take them under its control then 
tried to cripple the process and imprisoned more than ten thousand activists and supporters. 
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That crackdown of political activists of civil society organisation, elected mayors and elected 
council members should have been the lessons to the PKK and Kurdish legal political party 
and civil society organisations that Turkish state neither want to give any constitutional rights 
and recognition nor want to solve Kurdish Question even if it has been reduced as am 
question of democratisation of Turkey. The PKK and Turkish state, have always tried to have 
their control on the democratic political process as well as civil society organisations in 
Bakur Kurdistan and in Turkey. Any party wins the majority in the general elections they 
would not be able to change the policies on Kurdish Question because Turkish state has 
based its fundamental existence on exterminate all other ethnic entities particularly the Kurds. 
It becomes obvious that the PKK or any other legal political party would not be able to have 
impact on official Turkish state policies. 
The DTK has been established since 2005 as a civil society organisation (in fact it 
supposed to be a regional assembly for Bakur Kurdistan) to lead all civil society organisation 
including trade unions as a wider democratic confederation. By 14 July 2011 it had more than 
eight hundred civil society organisations as the members. It had proposed a Democratic 
Autonomous Kurdistan, which has been organised on eight dimensions. Those dimensions 
are: Political, Legal, Self-Defence, Cultural, Social, Economic, Ecological and Diplomatic 
dimensions. The Draft mentioned that ‘despite all the adversities and obstacles that exist, the 
international and regional political situation has become more conducive to a solution of the 
Kurdish question. A solution to the Kurdish question is an emerging trend in Turkish society 
and this opens the necessary pre-conditions and opportunities for a solution. The Turkish 
state has arrived to a point where it cannot continue with old policies and Kurdish people 
refuse to live under old conditions’ (Ibid: pp.12). The DTK points out that there were the 
situation was already ripe for a change if Turkish society wanted a change. In theory these 
words were logical and as if they were demands of Kurdish and Turkish society. If both 
societies of Kurds and Turks were in clash with the state then the state would have not had 
the power to continue the old policies. Turkish people support Turkish state’s policies and 
whatever Kurdish politicians’ demands for Kurds and other ethnic minorities they get 
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labelled with the terrorist mark and get abandoned. Turkish state’s coercive policies have 
frightened the Kurds and all other ethnic minorities to participate in legal and peaceful protest 
to ask for their rights. 
While the theory of the DTP and the DTK was defending the interests of the people, 
why in practice that people did not help the defenders of their rights. So there is a paradox 
between the people and the DTK as a regional assembly and the DTP as a political party were 
preparing political and social awareness between Kurdish and Turkish people in order to 
achieve a peaceful settlement. After the first attempt of the negotiations and bringing 34 
people from Qandil and Maxmur camps as the beginning of a peaceful settlement the DTP, 
which later closed down by the court and the members, and the MPs were transferred to the 
BDP. The BDP politicians should have explained if the theory was right and they were 
moving in the right direction and the masses were supporting them why they do not achieve a 
peaceful settlement? Kurdish politicians from the legal political sides the DTK, DTP and then 
BDP and the PKK were sincere for peaceful settlement but the Turkish state was not. In order 
to understand the idea of a democratic autonomy and what it contains it is better to have a 
look at its principles as they were explained in the draft submission.  
Political Dimension: ‘The Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan’s political command 
will get its power from the organised democratic society and the community will get its 
power from the use of individual rights by free citizens together with the use of collective-
group rights. It continues and explains that it will use the power of democratic politics and 
opposes the nation-state’s strict centralist policies and its bureaucratic organisational 
understandings. Furthermore it goes on via democratic politics all segments of society will 
participate to political process and function in an open, transparent political environment. 
Political Administration in Democratic Autonomy starting from the grassroots, village 
communes, town, district, neighbourhood councils and city councils will organise themselves 
in the form of confederal organisation and will have its democratic representation at the 
Congress of Society. The Democratic Congress of Autonomous Kurdistan Community will 
send its representatives to the parliament of Democratic Republic of Turkey and take part in 
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the politics of common homeland. Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan will have its own 
original flags and symbols that representing them. In addition different communities in the 
democratic autonomy region will use its own symbols’ (DTK 2011: pp. 18-20).  
Democratic Autonomy project is not based on geography, ethnic and religious 
community; instead it is based on democracy and coexistence. It is based on criteria of 
democracy and it means ethnic, religious, social and cultural rights. This model is not only 
applicable to for Kurdistan but also to the other regions of Turkey too. The decision-making 
authority will primarily belong to delegates of village, neighbourhood, district, town and city 
councils. Democratic Autonomy will work in the formulation of state plus democracy. All 
other ethnic and religious communities will be able to organise autonomously and 
authentically such as Assyrian-Chaldean, Armenians, Arabs, Azeris plus Yezidi and Alevite. 
In the case of acceptance with legal constitutional guarantees by Turkish state it could 
guarantee political status of Kurdish people and all other minorities’ rights in a democratic 
Turkey, while Turkey strictly opposed to that idea and rejected it. The state at Imrali prison 
says something to Öcalan but outside something else to Turkish public.  
This approach fundamentally builds a democratic environment implementing the rule 
of democracy and providing equal representation while distributing justice among 
communities to some degree. However, an entity such as the Turkish state was far away from 
accepting such reformation draft that has been proposed in the DTK programme.  
Legal Dimension: ‘Despite the denial of its existence and its rights by the international 
community and regional states, the freedom struggle of Kurdish people today will be decisive 
for the status of the Democratic Autonomy. The status of Democratic Autonomy should be 
anticipated in order to end unlawful, inhuman attitudes, the policy of denial and the war of 
destruction against the Kurds and to secure a peaceful, free, democratic union within the 
borders of republic of Turkey by constitutional change and legal means. We see turkey and 
Kurdistan as a common homeland. The Democratic Autonomy law should be recognized as 
part of the new constitution of the Republic of Turkey and the EU Law and secured through 
mutual agreements’ (Ibid: pp. 22). Democratic Autonomy proposal invites international 
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organisation such as the UN and the EU and Turkish state to reconsider legal constitutional 
guarantees for Kurdish people inside the borders of Turkey. It explicitly explains that they 
have benefited from Abdullah Öcalan’s gender free-libertarian, democratic-ecological 
paradigm. They gave examples of the similar cases such as Northern Ireland, Scotland in the 
UK and the Catalonia and Bask regions in Spain and demanded similar solutions with 
national and international guarantees. 
The DTK at the same time remind to Turkish state that the Constitution of 1921and the 
Kurdish Autonomy Act ratified on 10th February 1922 by the Grand National Assembly. The 
legal System of Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan also states that it does not believe that 
the management of society solely by law, communality should be protected by using both 
ethics and politics together without falling into the dilemma of “either ethics or law”. A just 
social system can be build based on the gender-libertarian-democratic-ecological community 
paradigm (Ibid: pp. 24). 
Self-Defence Dimension: To preserve the existences of different ethnic, religious and 
cultural differences the self-defence is the sine quo non-condition of protecting the identity, 
politicization, and democratization of the societies. Although it does explain that self-defence 
does not mean militarily defending the society, however, the state never convinced that such 
an idea would not end up with clashing the security apparatus. In the Self-Defence dimension 
there is not the intention of building a huge military power against foreign invasions, 
however as in the nature all creatures need to protect themselves. In order to continue the 
existence of Kurdish reality they need to protect themselves by their own security forces. 
That means a democratic society should have its self-defences and protect itself in the 
villages, neighbourhoods, towns and cities against fascist and genocide attacks. Although 
throughout 19th and 20th centuries uprisings in all parts of Kurdistan were a kind of self-
defences against foreign occupations but the states of Turkey, Iran and Iraq did respond their 
self-defences very harshly with many times massacred them, because of self-defence 
dimension Turkish state so far have not agreed to let a Kurdish security police to operate in 
Bakur Kurdistan.  
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Cultural Dimension: In order to prevent cultural genocide as it happened in the history 
of Ottoman Empire and the republic of Turkey, according to the charters of the UN and EU 
cultural rights also must be guaranteed and full education in mother tongue needs to be 
secured in the constitution. Not only Kurdish but also the ban on all other languages than 
Turkish should be lifted and constitutional guarantees to be provided. In front of eye of the 
world Turkish state has committed to ‘cultural genocide’ because of not allowing native 
languages and cultures of Assyrians, Armenians and especially Kurds to be practiced. 
Assyrian and Armenian culture and language to some degree have been allowed because of 
their religious differences of being Christians. However, Turkish state has never allowed 
Kurds to exercise and practice their mother tongue though it was publicly prohibited. 
Democratic autonomous Kurdistan will guarantee all cultural differences equal treatment no 
matter their numbers are large or small. These guarantees in the Democratic Autonomous 
Kurdistan region have to be guaranteed by law in Ankara and international organisations.   
Social Dimension: As the outcome of long war between the state and the PKK 
thousands of villages have been evacuated and the people of these villages have been forced 
to migrate Turkey’s large cities and then to European countries. The social texture of society 
has been deformed and physical and cultural genocide has been implemented. Kurdish and 
other ethnic minorities’ women were under sexist mentality of the state. The family as the 
social unit of the communities has been in ruin. A democratic gender free and woman 
emancipatory system is to guarantee children, youth the family and women need to be 
implemented. The state intentionally has put the assimilationist and social genocide policies 
in Kurdistan through education, sport art, drugs and especially among women prostitution. 
The family unit became an example of the state to run and exploit the family and make 
woman as slaves. Social dimension of Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan is contemporary 
modern democratic form moral and political society a society that allows differences to live 
in it. The leading forces of the democratic confederal organisations of Democratic 
Autonomous Kurdistan are women and youth, therefore the role of women would be essential 
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in communal life in all areas or organisations. The youth would play a leading role and take 
part in reestablishment defence of the society with its energy and dynamism (Ibid: pp.30).      
Economic Dimension: Kurdistan as one of the first places in human history has created 
farming whereas now has become the land of people who are dispersed all around the world 
as the results of poverty and hunger. This is because who has established political hegemony 
has destroyed economic life and has exploited all underground and aboveground recourses. 
The proposed economic policy of Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan is democratic 
socialism that can provide equal opportunities to everyone priority is given to women. The 
aim of the Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan will be to empower the strong will of the 
people to go back to the basics to work on the land to cooperate with production from the 
land to contribute to economic independence.  
Ecological Dimension: The natural resources of Kurdistan have been put under control 
of state owned and private companies. These companies for more profit has destroyed the 
eco-system especially extracting the mines, making dams and building new sites have 
resulted burning forests and putting huge mountains of waste underground. The continuation 
of the policies will end up destruction of the nature and ecological system in Kurdistan.  
Diplomatic Dimension: Diplomacy is and activity between peoples groups and states, 
nation-state mentality is only securing its power through diplomacy with other nation-states. 
In a Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan, diplomacy will base on mutual interests people, 
different groups and societies. It will take into consideration that historical and social 
character issue of Kurdistan and its division into four parts will do diplomatic relations 
between these parts and the societies of other countries. Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan 
will play a role to improve peace and brotherhood in the region (Ibid: pp.37).  
These mentioned eight dimensions of Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan were 
introduced to the Turkish people, the parliament and the media. The response was very 
negative and officially was rejected. Despite all hard criticisms the PKK took the burden and 
supported the legal political movement in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey and declared 
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countless ceasefires in order to give opportunity for a peaceful democratic solution. What the 
PKK did miss, showing some degree of arrogance, was not taking the wider burden of 
including the representatives all political, social, cultural, ethnic and religious entities in any 
so-called ‘peace’ talks. The PKK and legal activists and the politicians in Bakur and Turkey 
did not convince the communities in Bakur as well as in Turkey that the national and political 
denial of Turkish state has caused the emergence of the PKK and the armed struggle was the 
reason of colonialist and destructive policies. The peace would only be achieved if these 
policies came to an end and automatically the PKK insurgency and guerrilla war would be 
ended. I personally observed the situation and did field work in Bakur Kurdistan in Agirî, 
Wan, Bitlis, Amed, and Merdin and Adiyaman provinces.  The situation was in line with the 
theoretical and ideological propaganda. There were to some degree the opportunity to do 
good services in order to convince the masses and mobilize them. The practical 
implementation was in crisis and the people on duty such as elected mayors and HDP with 
DBP party representatives were not doing their job properly at all. The opportunities were 
available on the ground were not given by the state, the state itself was in crisis and the 
situation was out of their control and also the so-called ‘solution process’ was on the agenda. 
The PKK, the HDP and DBP did not implement their policies and became bureaucrats and 
the gap between them and people especially after the 7th June 2015 became wider and wider 
as demonstrated in the example of Self-Administration declarations the people did not 
support them stating from 12th August 2015. The DTK two times declared that they will 
implement their democratic autonomy project independent of the Turkish state, however the 
results were null. The PKK and its imprisoned leader and all pro-Kurdish political parties in 
the legal political sphere must have understood that the Turkish state does not recognise any 
entity called Kurdish question. 
Since 2005 to 2016Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan project in theory has been 
demanded by the pro-Kurdish legal political actors, however this project strictly had been 
rejected by the Turkish state and the AKP government. On 14th July 2011 the DTK declared a 
Self-Administration in Amed and on 12th August 2015 again Self-Administrations in more 
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than ten town and cities of Bakur Kurdistan declared by people’s assemblies related to the 
DTK. In both occasions the government of the AKP ordered the army, the police and the 
gendarmerie’s Special Forces attacked harshly and destroyed the towns and cities by tanks 
and warplanes bombardments. In theory Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan project is more 
compromised one but in practice the Turkish state and government has rejected by 
destructive measures. The PKK and Kurdish political legal movement must understand there 
is no possibility of implementation of that project. 
 
Democratic Civil Society, Decentralization and Devolution 
 
 
Abdullah Öcalan in his democratic liberation project convinced the PKK and pro-
Kurdish political parties and civil society organisations in Bakur Kurdistan that Turkey will 
be a member of the EU. An EU member Turkey would be implementing the EU project in 
Turkey. Therefore the EU rules and regulations will be in practice and they will apply to 
Turkish and Kurdish daily life in Turkey. European democracy has been evolved produced 
civil society organisations and moved to wider institution of the union of more than twenty-
seven countries, the European Union. The EU has the principles and conditions for those 
countries that want to join. Turkey was one of those countries wanted to join to the EU and 
accepted as a candidate state. The PKK and Kurdish legal political movement believed that 
Turkey has the intention to join to the EU and implement European Democratic principles in 
Turkey where Bakur Kurdistan is a part of it. Most of the Kurds and Kurdish movement were 
so happy that Turkey will become a member of the EU and Kurdish question will be seen 
similar to Scotland, Catalonia or Northern Ireland and the process of decentralization and 
devolution of power will solve the Kurdish question. 
Decentralization of the EU countries generally means that the power from the centre 
has been transferred to the local councils. In the United Kingdom a city like London has 
thirty-two councils and they are based on population density rather than geographical, 
national and ethnic criteria. Devolution is different from decentralization. For example, 
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Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have devolved powers from London since the Labour 
government came to power in 1997. The labour government under the Prime Minister Tony 
Blair devolved the power from London to Scotland the election of a local parliament, which 
took the executive power in education, taxation, judiciary and transport. Scotland went so far 
to held a referendum for independence in 2015. 
Öcalan and the PKK wanted to follow the same example of England and Scotland in 
the context of Turkey and Bakur Kurdistan. Turkey, at the beginning of Öcalan’s 
imprisonment, should have negotiated an independent and federal Kurdistan’s UK style 
devolution. What happened was that the strategy for an independent or federal Kurdistan was 
withdrawn and within five years the state tried to convince Turkish people that it has defeated 
the struggle of Kurdish independence. When the PKK started the self-defence strategy in 
June 2004 the state again started to negotiate with Öcalan as if they wanted a peaceful 
solution. This approach of the state also failed in 2010, when the PKK started a revolutionary 
popular war strategy.  
The state showed as if it accepted the Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan strategy and 
started a dialogue with Öcalan again at the end 2012. From 2013 until 24th July 2015 neither 
the PKK nor Öcalan ever talked about a Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan. This time the 
PKK or the HDP following Öcalan’s directives changed from the idea of a Democratic 
Autonomous Kurdistan to the idea of a local democracy. If we look at the Turkish state’s 
strategy it is clear how it worked to gradually reduce the PKK’s demands without conceding 
anything and bringing the demand of the PKK to something irrelevant such as the National 
Self-Determination of Kurdistan. Simply the state after death of president Özal has always 
played a game with the PKK and it also took more initiatives especially after imprisonment 
of Öcalan.  
If the PKK had not downgraded its demands from independence to federalism then 
from federalism to Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan, those goals could have been at least 
negotiated. For example when the aim of the PKK was the demands of a nation of at least 
thirty millions in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey have been reduced to a local democracy the 
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outcome is null. At this stage the PKK must have learnt that they downgraded their demands 
too fast, which made them very weak in the negotiations. Negotiating the demands of a 
nation needs political skill the PKK has to learn from conflict resolutions.  
 
Democraticising the state by ‘non-violent means’ 
 
 
When the PKK started its journey at the beginning of 1970s there was only a solution 
between the radical left and some Kurdish nationalist organisations in Bakur Kurdistan and 
Turkey: destroying the state occupation in Kurdistan through prolonged popular war. It was 
because the political environment did not allow any entity to act or name itself as a Kurdish 
organisation and talk about Kurdistan in legal spheres. This barrier of the states denial and 
assimilationist policy was broken after a long struggle and heavy price of more than 4000 
destroyed villages and more than 45 thousands lives lost. To some degree that heavy price 
affected the state to come to a compromise with the opposition from both the Turkish 
democratic and Bakur Kurdistan’s national-democratic opposition. However, the old trend of 
ultra-nationalists and extreme-Islamists has prevented the state to come to a peaceful 
solution. Especially the Kurdish name ‘Peace Process’ in Turkish side ‘Solution Process’ was 
started from the beginning of 2013 until 24th July 2015 was close to a final resolution. It was 
prevented at the last minute, because the democratic and national-democratic opposition were 
gaining the ground and the overwhelming majority of Bakur Kurdistan population and 
majority of Turkish people supported it. 
The Turkish state was and it still is in a very important historical juncture since 2000s. 
Either will be evolved to a democratic republic and become a member of the EU and accept 
the rules and regulations of the EU and European Democratic Civilisation or will turn its face 
back and repeat the history of the Ottomans if the hegemonic powers of the world allowed it. 
Currently, the tendency of the state and the government shows that it is playing as if nobody 
were observing it, however, its trick has been known to everyone and it will not be able to 
continue in this situation.   
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Democracy and democratization are the best possible, preferable and less costly 
options. Öcalan and the PKK know better than anyone that the Turkish state is different from 
any other state on earth and so far has never accepted any other national or ethnic identity 
within the borders of the geography of Turkey. But until recently that geography was 
Anatolia, Lazistan, Armenia and Kurdistan.  All those entities are prohibited by Turkish 
constitution because the Turkish state by force has implemented its rules. In order to support 
the process of democratization the PKK from March 1993 to October 2015 announced ten 
ceasefires. The ten times announced ceasefires have not so far solved the Kurdish question; 
nonetheless have shown to the Kurdish and Turkish society, to the people of the Middle 
Eastern region and the world that until a solution to the Kurdish question has been reached 
Turkey will not have a prosperous and peaceful future. 
The Turkish state still does not accept the Kurds as nation and still thinks according to 
its military and security apparatus that it will be able by force to solve it and assimilate it as it 
happen in the Armenian case in the 1915 Genocide. It could be argued that it has removed 
some restrictions on Kurdish language and culture, however, it has more than three hundred 
TV and Radio stations and all educational institutions are Turkish. Today’s assimilationist 
policies of the state are harsher than any time. Therefore the PKK have made a major mistake 
in reducing the demands of Kurdistan National Self-Determination to a matter of 
democratisation of Turkey. It can support legal political activities and in getting involved 
directly in legal politics through supporting legal political parties to speed up the solution of 
Kurdish question.  
 
Democratic Confederalism as an Alternative Solution 
 
 
Öcalan in his The Road Map for a democratic solution to Kurdish question talks 
about three alternatives. The first one is ‘the National Annihilation Solution of Capitalist 
Modernity’ which has been implemented by Turkish and Iranian states since 1514s (Öcalan 
2012: pp. 84-6). This solution is the most extreme and violent way of extermination of Kurds 
  
	230	
and Kurdistan and other ethnic entities and issues in the Turkish and Iranian capitalist system. 
Öcalan gives reasons why capitalist system is the main source, while Ottomans and Safavids 
divided Kurdistan much earlier and Turkey and Iran are the earlier colonizers of Kurdistan. 
The second one is ‘Kurdish Federalist Nation-State Solution’ which is based on Bashur 
Kurdistan and reflects the federal solution considered by Western hegemonic powers such us 
France, the UK and US. Öcalan states that the hegemonic powers are not anymore sure 
whether the regional nation-states would really be suitable for their long-term agreements. 
Therefore a federalist nation-state solution, which based on Bashur Kurdistan, is suitable for 
their long-term interests (Ibid: pp. 87). The Kurdish Federalist Nation-State Solution is can be 
similar to Armenian solution during the WWI when all southern Armenian people and land 
was separated from today’s Armenia, just a small portion of Armenia became Independent 
Armenia. Kurds and Kurdistan question cannot be framed just in Bashur’s and only one third 
of Bashur’s geography and cannot be solved without Bakur, Rojhilat and Rojava. The third 
one is ‘Democratic Nation Solution’ which is a solution seeks outside the nation-state system. 
This alternative solution is opposed to both earlier mentioned solutions; neither seeks to 
establish an independent nor a federal state. This alternative will not be an extension of the 
state; it will empower the people to administer its daily life without the need of recurring to 
the state.  It will basically organise the society and society’s will by electing its 
representatives in the forms of councils in villages then in neighbourhoods, town, cities, 
provinces and regional assemblies then in a joint assembly in four parts of Kurdistan which 
would constitute the regional assembly for Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan inside the 
borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.  
Öcalan and the PKK proposed Democratic Nation Solution as a compromise and the 
most suitable way of finding a peaceful settlement to accommodate in their thesis of 
democratic confederalism. In this solution Turkey would be instead of 81 counties be divided 
into 25 regions but all would be defined as democratic nation of Turkey. A democratised 
republic and a democratic nation would accommodate a democratic autonomous Kurdistan. 
Turkey would become a member of the EU, and in a democratic republic of Turkey, a 
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democratic autonomous Kurdistan would be a democratic nation solution to other three parts 
of Kurdistan and without questioning the current nation-state system’s borders, a democratic 
confederal system would possible. In theory this proposal from PKK’s point of view was 
possible but the Turkish state labelled it as a project of parallel state and secessionist and 
terrorist project against indivisible unity and integrity of Turkish state. 
The nation-state system was created especially in the Middle East, Asia and Africa 
after the WWI according to the interests of victorious powers. The Kurds lost totally while 
Arabs gained twenty-two states, the Ottoman Empire squeezed into Anatolia but gained an 
internationally recognized state and Persians kept Iran eventually until the end of WWII. 
During the emergence of the United Nations at the end of the WWII the remnants of Xoybun 
attempted to provide some demands with a map of Greater Kurdistan came to naught. The 
borders drawn for the new states in the Middle East were divided and partitioned Kurdistan 
from the heart. The Kurds tried hard and struggled to gain a state or at least a legal status. 
Kurdish leaders of the time were consisted of some Kurds from the Ottoman army officers, 
educated intellectuals related to tribal nobles in origin left their uprising stay as local rather to 
be national uprisings and they lost their dreams. The international system also ignored the 
Kurdish request for independence even a legal guarantee for cultural rights was ignored. 
From the beginning of the 19th to the mid 20th century the Kurds were under physical and 
cultural genocide.  
From the last quarter of the 20th century onward gradually Kurdish political parties 
with their struggle have gained ground and nowadays are providing different kinds of 
solutions to their oppressors to have power sharing and coexist equally, for example by going 
for referendum of independence in Bashur Kurdistan and democratic federation of Northern 
Syria. Interestingly, those Kurdish political parties at the beginning of their struggle aimed at 
the autonomy and reforms such as the KDP-Iraq while nowadays they aim at independence 
and those asked only independence such as the PKK today even does not ask autonomy. 
At its first official party declaration statement the PKK described itself as the 
proletariat party of Kurdistan who brought Marxism-Leninism to Kurdistan. It stated that 
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only a proletariat party could solve the national question of Kurdistan in Turkey and other 
parts of Kurdistan. The time changed and the proletariat revolution did not happen in the 
most developed countries. In the meantime the socialist system collapsed and the era of 
national liberation and socialist revolutions came to an end. For this reason the PKK had to 
reform its ideological path and gradually left behind the Marxist-Leninist discourse. The 
PKK successfully implemented the changes and prepared for the new era of ‘the triumph of 
liberal democracy’. The PKK successfully focused global attention on the Kurds under 
colonial rules of Turkey. The PKK also distanced itself from the discourses of Marxism-
Leninism and left behind the national liberation strategy and tried to negotiate a democratic 
solution with the state declaring they were fighting for freedom for all lingual, ethnic and 
cultural different entities not only in Kurdistan and Turkey but also in the whole of the 
Middle East.  
Paul White mentions in his recent book The PKK, Coming From the Mountain, ‘since 
Öcalan’s capture it has become a commonplace to read that he turned from violence only 
under pressure from his Turkish captors. This is not true; the move away from ‘armed 
struggle’ began earlier, with the first PKK’s unilateral ceasefire in March 1993. Indeed, the 
PKK contemplated bringing an end to its armed activities before Öcalan’s capture curtailed 
this political evolution’ (White 2015: pp. 127). Öcalan was sending obvious messages 
through Turkish journalists for a peaceful, democratic solution. The PKK leader even went 
further asking if Turkey guarantees they would prefer to do political activities in the name of 
the PKK at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. As an experienced Kurdish politician 
who created the PKK from zero and spent twenty years in Imrali high security prison, he 
transformed his basic principles and goal of an independent Kurdish nation state and to 
Democratic Confederalism project. He had led the PKK for more than three decades aimed, 
an Independent United and Democratic Kurdistan up to 2000s. In the Imrali prison after 
2000s, Öcalan as a leader, researcher and theoretician influenced from libertarian American 
Anarchist Murray Bookchin’s Libertarian Socialism, Libertarian Municipalism and 
Democratic Confederalism. 
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The difficulty of implementing the project of Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan was 
the fear of Turkish state from any kind of democracy and liberty-aimed organisations in 
Kurdistan. Because those civil society organisations were seeding the discourses of equality, 
justice, freedom and more importantly gender emancipation promoting the status of women 
in the society. An organised society can stand for its rights and freedoms. Therefore the state 
blocked this process for the reason that in the future in the fear that the final goal of a 
democratic autonomous Kurdistan would be an independent Kurdistan. All concepts and 
discourses were proposed by Öcalan such as Democratic Republic, Democratic Nation, 
Democratic Confederalism, Radical Democracy, and Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan. 
Since 2013 to 2015 Local Democracy and Radical Democracy/Direct Democracy have been 
supported by the Kurdish people and legal Kurdish supported political parties, but the state 
and the ruling AKP have rejected. The PKK in its critical historical juncture will either 
continue on these goals or turn to retransformation process recent developments will produce 
the answer.  
 
Conclusion 
  
Chapter seven analysed whether the project of Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan via 
Democratic Republic and Democratic Nation was viable for the implementation of a Radical 
Democracy or Direct Democracy in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey. What the PKK understood 
from the process of transformation was that downgrading its original strategic aim from an 
Independent United and Democratic Kurdistan and searching National-Self-Determination to 
establish state of Kurdistan to a Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan in the borders of the 
existent nation-state of Turkey and be a proper example to Rojhilat and Rojava Kurdistan too. 
Therefore, the PKK thought it would force the Turkish state to get grant concessions by 
keeping guerrilla forces on the base of self-defence. Turkish state also approached to the 
PKK and Öcalan in away as if they want to solve Kurdish question through the EU’s 
reformation and democratisation policies would accept and recognise the legitimate rights of 
the Kurds through civil society organisation in a non-violent way. However, the final game 
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proved the vice versa. While Turkish state has rejected all form of non-violent peaceful 
settlements, how can it be argued whether the Turkish state was ready or would be ready to 
negotiate in a civil way in the same peaceful way Czechs and Slovaks did? Or the evidences 
on the ground will tell a different story.   
The PKK this time convinced a great majority of Kurds to withdraw their quest for 
independence and accepting ‘illegitimate borders’ as legitimate and to solve Kurdish question 
within the borders of Turkey as the question of democracy. But this request for Democratic 
Autonomous Kurdistan was also labelled as a secessionist was rejected because it could 
inflame ethnic, religious hatred and divide Turkey into two different states. The confusing 
paradox in the reaction of the PKK to such explicit actions by Turkish state cannot be 
understood, why the PKK has been so passive. The state has pushed back the PKK through 
Öcalan to the position where Kurdish nationalists and reformists stand in 1970s. As Ali 
Kemal Özcan states the PKK’s nationalism is a ‘nationalismless’ nationalism (Özcan 2006: 
pp. 227) seems to be true. At the start it began Kurdistan Revolutionaries, Kurdistan Workers 
Party, Kurdistan Peoples Liberation Army, Kurdistan National Liberation Front, and 
Kurdistan Parliament in Exile all these entities were come into existence for the liberation of 
Kurdistan from the yoke of Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian colonialism. Who ever asked 
for cultural rights or autonomy were declared by the PKK as national traitors and for the 
failure of 1975 was blamed the lack of will toward independence.  
 The mass mobilization of people and their participation to the PKK’s struggle was 
gaining respect and support from everywhere. Whenever the PKK started to negotiate with 
the Turkish state and downgraded its national strategic goal of independence and it turned out 
its basics from nationalism in Kurdistan, Germany put the PKK in the terrorist organisations 
list. At the beginning the organizational activities of the PKK, it was justifying and giving 
reasons for nationalism in an oppressed nation as patriotism as it happened in all colonised 
nations’ national liberation struggles. The justification for PKK’s activities was that any 
oppressed nation has the right to National Self-Determination. Nowadays the PKK never 
talks about nationalism, never about patriotism and never about liberation. That is a huge 
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paradox in the PKK’s historiography. Transformation towards democracy does not mean to 
ignore or deny the past. The future would be based on today and today have been built on the 
base of yesterday in other words the past. The PKK should be proud of its past. Its past was 
not based on some dogmatic words. In fact as I remember we were looking at and reading all 
available classics available from history to philosophy and from sociology to anthropology. 
As it was mentioned Kurdistan Revolutionaries had a list of the classics and everyday 
minimum four hours they were having reading and discussions groups’ ideological 
educations. All those educations were mainly aiming an Independent United and Democratic 
Kurdistan 
 How the PKK’s past relay on standing for justice, equality and freedom of all 
oppressed in Kurdistan, its ideology was also the ideology of defending those rights. It could 
be criticized for too much emphasis on Marxism-Leninism and class struggle in Kurdistan. 
The national strategy of Independent United and Democratic Kurdistan was the right strategy 
that is why it had gained that support from the most oppressed people of Kurdistan. The PKK 
can still defend this national strategy of independent Kurdistan as well as if the state would 
be ready to come to terms of democracy, justice, equality and freedom for National Self-
Determination could negotiate. In Kurdistan, nationalism does not end up with racism. If the 
state of Kurdistan was recognised as a sovereign state and the people of Kurdistan was 
having the same national and political right as Turks, nationalism would not be on the 
agenda. Kurdistan is divided, partitioned into pieces and in the process of extinction. 
Nationalism in Kurdistan would be a democratic nationalism could save Kurdish culture and 
language from extinction and from death and revive it into the international community.  
 The PKK had thought to its cadres and still is relying on those knowledge and the 
historical process of evolution of human history The first lessons of the PKK’s secret group 
education was from the first book the Principles of Philosophy, the history of social evolution 
of communities from the Primitive, Slavery, Feudal, Capitalist and Socialist stages of 
economic and social evolution. That historical evolution would have had produced another 
PKK if the current PKK we are talking about was not born between 1973 and 1978. 
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Ideologies can change as the evolution takes steps forward, but basic and foundation 
principles are not. 
 Transformation of the PKK and its new paradigm of Radical Democracy and 
Democratic Confederalism build on the pillars of Democratic Republic, Democratic Nation 
and Democratic Autonomy in theory seems very logical and acceptable. However, Turkish 
state so far has rejected it with the harshest method of military methods. Kurdish legal 
political activists who defended that project have been imprisoned for the charges of 
terrorism by Turkish justice system. Iraq up to the recent Referendum has also taken similar 
methods to Turkish state. Iran is not talking about it at all, while in Syria the Rojava 
experience is expecting very difficult days ahead.  
The nation-state system was established in the Middle East at the end of the WWI 
does not accept any changes. Therefore Kurdish Question seems will be the question of 21st 
century again similar to 20th century but with a very strong presence, the success would totally 
would depend on the PKK’s retransformation towards justice, equality, freedom liberation, 
democracy and an egalitarian society.  
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Chapter 8 
From National Liberation to Democratic Liberation: What is next? 
 
 
How far has the PKK distanced itself from the National Liberation discourse? Would it 
be possible for the new ideological and political paradigm of the PKK to be implemented in 
the Middle East? From the beginning of this thesis to this final chapter, this study has 
attempted to establish what the PKK stands for at its emergence up to its leader’s 
imprisonment in Imrali; that it was based on a concept of National liberation and the solution 
was projected as the universal right to self-determination as it applied to all stateless peoples 
struggle for their own independent national statehood. The PKK and all its associations for 
the sake of a peaceful settlement of Kurdish question were ready to compromise with Turkish 
state, however the state rejected all the offers. The paradigm change and transformation 
offered by the PKK and its struggle in favour of radical democratic politics and Democratic 
Confederalism starting from Bakur Kurdistan could bring peace and stability for a long 
period of time if the states accept not to intervene. In theoretical terms the concept was to 
offer the Turkish state to accept minimal rights of self-governance. In return the state was not 
giving any minimum rights, but totally denied that there was not such a question called 
Kurdish question. From the point of Turkish state in the past there could have been a 
problem, but anew republic defined that all people in Turkey are Turkish and first class 
citizens of Turkish nationality. Turkish state does not even recognise the question, how will it 
address a solution? 
However, there are many challenges, which jeopardize the message of the PKK. When 
Kurdish political parties at the domestic micro (in one part of Kurdistan) and macro (in wider 
spectrum in four parts of Kurdistan) level sacrificed their party interests to Kurdistan’s 
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national interests and internationally acted under an umbrella of Kurdistan National 
Congress, then Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria can accept or at least negotiate for a solution.  
At the micro and macro level, the most important problem is the impossibility for 
Kurdish organization to find a common ground for collective action. For example if most of 
Kurdish political organisations in Bakur, Bashur, Rojhilat or Rojava act together the 
approach of Turkey will definitely be different. Until there are not a unified national front 
between prominent Kurdish political parties in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria would never 
accept the idea of an independent Kurdistan.  In particular, Turkey and Iran, the two powers 
in the region are the ones who act against any form of self-determination for the Kurds. These 
two states are openly standing against legal constitutional status for Kurds and Kurdistan and 
they see Kurdistan as an indivisible part of their countries and nation-building processes. 
These two states have historically been in control of Kurdistan, Iran since 550 BC and 
Turkey since the 16th century. Since WWI the two new states of Iraq and Syria have been 
added to the list of Kurdistan’s occupiers. In this situation a withdrawal from National 
Liberation strategy would not help any Kurdistan National liberation Movements’ 
progression towards peace, justice and democracy. It does not matter how many times the 
PKK transforms and retransform, the Turkish state only seeks assimilation and annihilation 
of Kurds and Kurdistan. 
How are the problems of more than twenty-five millions of Kurds subjected to policies 
of annihilation in Bakur Kurdistan can be solved with the establishment of democracy in 
Turkey? The democratization of Turkey would mean the end of the current state’s mentality. 
The owners and rulers of the Turkish state have been Kemalist’s for seventy-five years, but 
now, since November 2002 they are Islamists and their mentality and economical interests 
are interlinked. They do not accept any a democratic process that could give an openness and 
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acceptance of different ethnic and religious differences in Turkey. This chronic mentality can 
be found in the Turkish state’s tradition since 1923 and only a revolution could overcome it. 
In this context, due to Turkish peoples’ conservative, nationalist and religious mentality any 
proposal coming from the KNLM would not be accepted with the exception of an 
unconditional surrender of the PKK guerrillas. 
Bakur Kurdistan has being directly and indirectly affected by the regional 
developments in Iraq and Syria as well as by conflicts between the Bashur and Rojava 
Kurdistan’s political party leaderships. The so-called peace process started in January 2013 
because of the developments in Rojava and collapsed mainly for threat on Rojava in July 
2015. The Turkish state’s strategic aim in launching the peace process was to bring the 
Muslim Brotherhood to the government in Syria, prevent any legal and constitutional 
democratic status to Rojava and distance the PKK guerrillas from Bakur Kurdistan. The PKK 
was strategically aiming from the peace process to save Rojava Kurdistan by direct strategic 
help and declare ceasefire for the sake of democratic developments in Bakur and Turkey. 
This point also need to be mentioned that, for the sake of a peaceful settlement and positive 
impact of ceasefire, the PKK was ready to disarm and transform to a legal political party if 
the Turkish state had accepted a monitoring and truth finding commission from impartial 
Kurdish and Turkish commission, or an international one. 
Another complexity of the strategy of Democratic Liberation of the PKK was to keep 
the guerrilla forces active in order to press and push the state to come to the table of 
negotiations. While the Turkish state was not accepting any kinds of Kurdish question, how 
could it accept negotiations from the pressure of the guerrillas? The concept of democratic 
liberation was on the one hand saying non-violent way of struggle to democratise republic of 
Turkey, and on the other hand keeping guerrillas as an illegal pressure to bring the state and 
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ruling party to table of negotiations. What the Turkish state and the AKP government were 
doing in the “Arab Spring” or the wake of the peoples of the Middle East and Northern 
Africa in order to disarm the PKK. Disarming the PKK would have been another failure of 
the KNLM in the 21st century.  What happened was the PKK took the opportunity to declare 
a ceasefire with Turkish Army in order to give a chance for the political process and 
democratic politics to be flourished in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey, but also to have a chance 
to help Rojava to establish its institutions in order to achieve self-administration. The Turkish 
state’s aim was to prevent any kind of democratic status for the Kurds in Rojava and to 
prevent a similar situation from repeating in Rojava as well as stopping the fight with the 
PKK in Bakur in order to cause a proxy war in Rojava. 
More importantly, transformation towards democratic liberation would create a more 
democratic environment where different political parties can flourish and act, if the state has 
accepted the project. The facts on the ground have shown that neither all-political parties of 
Bakur Kurdistan nor all political parties in other three parts of Kurdistan are in line with the 
PKK’s Democratic Liberation concept. The opposition of Bakur Kurdistani political parties 
believes that the democratic liberation strategy of the PKK had the only effect to put 
Northern Kurdistan people’s struggle under the influence of the Turkish leftists and Turkish 
state apparatus. Whereas the PKK insists on that the only solution of the Kurdish question 
would be through the democratization of Turkey carried out with in alliance with all ethnic 
and national democratic oppositions in Turkey. The reality on the ground is that the 
overwhelming majority of the communities in all parts of Kurdistan still have not been 
mobilised to help and defend the liberation/freedom movements despite of heavy human and 
material sacrifices. 
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From Newroz 2013 to the 24th of July 2015 at least almost half of the population of 
Northern Kurdistan believed that the process called ‘solution process/ peace process between 
the PKK and AKP government intended to solve the Kurdish Question through democratic 
means, in other words the democratization of Turkey would totally change the traditional 
political landscape in Kurdistan and open the gate to a democratic change among the peoples 
of the Middle East. The ordinary people of Bakur Kurdistan were regarding to democratic 
process and peaceful settlement and about the above-mentioned paradigm whole heartedly 
believed that there would be a settlement.  
However, the answer was and is that the AKP government and the Turkish were only 
seeking to disarm the PKK, and bring to power a Muslim Brotherhood government to power 
in Damascus. In that critical situation of the so called dialogue process between the PKK and 
the AKP government national, regional and international issues were mixed. This was 
because the state witnessed that not only that the AKP was losing support in Bakur 
Kurdistan, but also when there was a little window of democratic environment, that the 
state’s institutions became empty and thus the people preferred to support their elected 
municipal co-mayors and councillors from Kurdish supported political parties. In Bakur 
Kurdistan the BDP won more than one hundred municipalities. Its agenda was to solve 
social, political, cultural and social issues among the society and to raise politically 
awareness so citizens could stand rights and understand their duties. The Turkish state and 
the AKP government witnessed closely that this peaceful, democratic political environment 
did not benefit them. 
Would the PKK be able to move to abstain from violence and give up its original 
ideological stand? The answer of these questions is hidden in the PKK’s evolution thorough 
different stages of its reformation and transformation. From my observations from long time 
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the PKK members had committed so many horrible violent activities against its members as 
well as civilians not only in Bakur Kurdistan but also even in Europe. However, I have 
observed these positive points as well the PKK supporters have always believed in a free, just 
and democratic environment, but the problem is that the Turkish state’s ideological mentality 
does not allow such an environment to exist.  
Probably, if the Soviet Union and its Socialist system based on Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine had not collapsed, the PKK would not have changed its paradigm to this extent; for 
example, the PKK from its formal emergence on 27th November 1978 until 1995 had the 
hummer and sickle in the middle of the red star as the official emblem of the party. The PKK 
insisted on its proletarian nature and on the belief that this would lead to a liberation war 
similar to the one in Vietnam won by the Vietnam Workers Party. When the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine failed it was obvious that the PKK did not insist on supporting it. Even if it 
continued on proclaiming its Marxist-Leninist doctrine and National liberation strategy, there 
was not any socialist system to support them. However, the PKK could have kept its national 
liberation and to struggle for it with peaceful means, even if the Turkish state did not accept 
the Kurdish question. When Internationalised the Kurdish question and international pressure 
would have inevitably brought them to the table of negotiations. Defending national 
liberation in the post-Cold War era with peaceful means of struggle needed liberal 
democracies aid and support. While there was not a socialist system to support the PKK led 
national liberation concept in the post Cold War era, the PKK had to seek for alternative 
ways of getting aid and support.  
The National Liberation discourse for the time being has been abandoned in the PKK’s 
political terminology, particularly since 1999 when Öcalan was imprisoned. Instead of 
National Liberation, the words Democratic Liberation were preferred. Democratic Liberation 
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aims at continuing the struggle through democratic political organisations awaking the 
society and contributing to local and national elections. In this sense, it can be said that to a 
considerable degree, the PKK has distanced itself from the idea of National Liberation. The 
difficulty of the Democratic Liberation struggle is the Turkish state’s monistic ideology of 
not accepting any other ethnic, religious or cultural entity on one hand and the PKK led 
guerrilla movements armed activities on the other hand The PKK to a considerable degree 
has also convinced the masses to support democratic political ways of struggle and even to 
accept the illegitimate borders of the four states as legitimate. Since the overwhelming 
majority of Kurdistan is under Turkish control, Turkey constitutes the biggest obstacle to any 
democratic solution.     
The sectarian civil war in Iraq, which broke out in Iraq after the US and the UK 
intervention in 2003 and later in Syria after March 2011 with the general uprisings of the 
population, had huge impact on both Turkey and Iran. As a result Bashur Kurdistan and 
Rojava Kurdistan have been hugely relevant, because of these two parts of Kurdistan used to 
be under the realm of Iraq and Syria. Despite of the Kurdistan Regional Government of 
Bashur Kurdistan is internationally accepted, with the exception of Israel none of the UN 
member states has so far made any comment whether they would support or not a referendum 
for independence. Bashur Kurdistan came to existence as the result of international 
Humanitarian Intervention in 1991 with Resolution of 688 of the United Nations Security 
Council which aimed at protecting the Kurds from Genocide acts perpetrated by Saddam 
Hussein’s Baath Regime, after 26 years, when 93% of the population of the KRG voted for 
independence the UNSC rejected it. The political and diplomatic activities of the KRG show 
that in 26 years the KRG in Bashur has achieved little. If the KRG had not been able to 
convince the UN, EU and US how it could convince the Iraqi government? The problem is 
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not only the weakness of the KRG, but also of the strategic position of the Kurds and 
Kurdistan in the Middle East and their impact on the future of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.  
While the Kurds of Bashur Kurdistan aimed at independence, Rojava Kurdistan finds 
itself in a very critical historical junction since its national-democratic and political-military 
forces are fighting against ISIS in alliance with the US led 73 countries coalition. The 
difficult question is if when the fight against ISIS is over Rojava actors who sacrificed the 
most will be included in the peace process? Among this national, regional and international 
complex situation of the Middle East, the PKK tried hard to negotiate with Turkish state, and 
distance itself from national liberation discourse as it projected in its paradigm change and 
transformation process. Turkish state’s denial and assimilationist policies will force the 
Kurds to put pressure on the PKK to retransform it democratic liberation strategy. 
How far has the PKK distanced itself from the National Liberation 
Discourse? 
 
 
As it has been repeatedly mentioned in this thesis the PKK was founded as an ideological and 
political organisation aiming liberating Kurdistan from the yoke of imperialism and its 
colonialist collaborators namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In order to be liberated from 
those four states a revolutionary organisation had to be organised against in order to lead and 
liberate all four part of Kurdistan. The political and national goal was not only an utopia, but 
bit by bit was progressed and getting popular support and putting pressure on a NATO 
member state of Turkey to talk about a federal solution to the  Kurdish question. 
  The new party called itself the PKK and organised a guerrilla army, with the support of 
all strata of Kurdish society. Due to the policies of oppression imposed in Turkey, the PKK 
managed to recruit especially young people who wanted to eliminate the politics of 
assimilation and annihilation carried out by the Turkish state. The PKK chose a very different 
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path from the organisations that preceded it. The members of the PKK chose to devote their 
entire lives to the revolution. They had to give up any material property to own. They 
believed that life had to be lived in freedom in Kurdistan; otherwise the life for Kurds would 
be meaningless. Many people believe that it was this attitude towards the revolution, which 
gain the PKK so many adepts.  
The PKK over the time made the masses politically aware and transformed them into a 
strong social movement with ideas of equality and democracy. One of the reasons that have 
made the PKK a consistent movement is that the society had come to the point of believing 
that the PKK was offering them a viable opportunity in the struggle for national liberation. 
Therefore in this respect the role of nationalism in an oppressed and colonised nation like the 
Kurds and its primordial, ethno-symbolic and modernist definition and explanation cannot be 
undermined that national liberation discourse developed from. The concepts of nation, 
nationalism, and national liberation will continue in Kurdistan until a fair and just solution 
will be achieved. Although the PKK has changed its ideological and political discourse quite 
considerably, its armed guerrilla forces are still effective since the start of the guerrilla 
warfare in 1984, with its guerrilla warfare techniques and tactic becoming even more 
developed. So in this quagmire how will it be possible to move away from national liberation 
discourse while the Turkish state does not accept any national and political rights to Kurdish 
nation? 
 From March 1999 to June 2004, the PKK under the directives of its leader Öcalan at 
that time in prison did not carried out offensive attacks against Turkish state’s institutions. 
For five years it respected the ceasefire. It was then that it started transforming its ideological 
and political paradigm in order to prepare mobilise the masses into a democratic political 
struggle. The PKK officially distanced itself from the national liberation discourse and 
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entered the democratic political discourse. Turkish state did not welcome this change because 
it meant that the PKK was abandoning the idea of an independent Kurdistan and it will 
disappear as the previous 28 rebellions in Bakur Kurdistan’s history. However the reality on 
the ground proved differently, neither the PKK disappear such as the Turkish state planned, 
even the PKK become much stronger than before, nor the PKK’s democratic liberation 
produced any positive outcomes. 
 According to the new paradigm of democratic liberation of the PKK, a democratic 
confederal Middle East would begin in Turkey. While Turkey is still a monist state and 
strictly centralised and run by ultra-nationalist ideology, Iran is governed by a strictly 
theocratic sectarian political system. Turkey and Iran are both the main powers, which 
prevent any democratic change in the region. In this conundrum of the Middle East, while 
any demand for national and political, even cultural, rights for Kurdish people in any parts of 
Kurdistan have been labelled as secessionist and as an act of terrorism, dropping the national 
liberation strategy has been perceived as a political and national mistake. Distancing from 
national liberation of Kurdistan will only happen when Turkey democratically accepts 
national, political, cultural rights of self-governance of Kurdish people, and allow a 
Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan with its parliament function as Scotland and Wales.  
 
According to the evidences on the ground, to what extent has PKK been 
successful in implementing a Radical Democracy in order to achieve 
Democratic Liberation Discourse? 
 
 
Following the PKK’s new paradigm of democratic liberation a wide range of civil 
society organisations started a process of socially and politically organising the people from 
the grass root level, in order to organise all stratums of Kurdish society and other ethnic 
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minorities in Bakur Kurdistan and prepare them for civil disobedience and non-violent 
political actions. In the wider ideological concept it was defined as an implementation of 
Radical Democracy concept that was borrowed from Murray Bookchin (1921-2006), an 
American libertarian socialist author, orator, philosopher and pioneer in ecology movement 
as well as various feminists, leftist Foucauldians and critical Marxists. The dichotomy is to 
bring this concept into practise is the very strictly centralized ethnically and racially monist 
Turkish state’s constitution. 
Turkish state has always had the fear that the PKK led Kurdistan national liberation 
discourse will be recognised by regional and international powers and that it will create 
national, regional and international problems of Turkey’s division. Hence Turkey was 
supposedly trying to make dialogue with the leader of the PKK when he was in Damascus 
through Turkish leftist intellectuals such as Yalçin Kuçuk and journalists of the Sabah, 
Milliyet and Hurriyet daily newspapers. But also internationally the failure of Soviet 
socialism had opened the way that the PKK moving towards supporting parliamentary 
elections as a possible way of mobilizing the masses through non-violent democratic political 
actions. In this way the PKK leader and the PKK itself thought democratic liberation would 
be possible. 
The PKK indirectly supporting those Pro-Kurdish political parties, which aiming to 
democratically solve Kurdish question participation to the general elections in Turkey was 
the beginning of a new era. Soviet System had collapsed Liberal democracy in the West won 
and Turkish president Turgut Özal opened the gate of political democratic activities. The 
PKK with Kurdish political organisations in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey had supported 
Kurdish patriot and progressive political activists when they organised a legal political party 
in 1990, the HEP. The national election threshold was too high and the HEP participated to 
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elections in the list of Peoples Social Democratic Party winning 22 candidates. A continued 
guerrilla war had strengthened popular support and mobilised a considerable portion of 
Kurdish society. So it became obvious that if there were any possibility of doing politics 
legally and democratically the human costs would be much less. Both the Kurdish political 
parties in Diasporas with the PKK and the legal Kurdish supported political parties with 
ordinary people were supporting any kinds of democratic political activities. 
After his imprisonment and his dialogue with the TAF and the MIT in the Imrali prison 
Öcalan transformed the paradigm from national liberation to democratic liberation through 
his defence writings to the European Human Rights Court. The first benefit of the democratic 
liberation discourse was participation in the local mayoral local elections in April 1999, when 
the DEHAP won 37 municipalities. The most important one was AMED the unofficial capital 
with Wan and Bingol. The municipalities were won by the democratic legal political party, 
which was supported by the PKK were moving forward to do best services to the people and 
to be ready to double their municipalities in the coming elections.  
The process continued as if Öcalan was told by the Turkish state that if the PKK 
withdrew its guerrilla forces from Bakur Kurdistan and some strategic points in Turkey the 
Turkish state would grant some educational, cultural and political rights to the ethnic, cultural 
and religious differences in Turkey. However, nobody was or is aware of any deal between 
Öcalan and Turkish state representatives, which consisted of the TAF and MIT officials. The 
new paradigm was criticised within the PKK on the ground that the Kurdistan National 
Liberation discourse couldn’t be reduced Turkey’s democratisation. And still among the PKK 
members, especially those more than twenty years have been commanders of the guerrillas, 
are in favour of national liberation and an independent Kurdistan. However they support 
democratic liberation to support Öcalan’s stand for peaceful settlement. 
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Local self-efficiency in governance and local democratic administration will be the 
fundamental element of the democratic liberation process. For this purpose the PKK 
continued to hold the ceasefire for five years. During these five years it totally transformed its 
cultural, political and armed organisations in the all spheres of its activities. The DEHAP 
continued its activities in building and organising civil society organisations in all towns and 
cities of Bakur Kurdistan as well as in the metropolis of Turkey such as Istanbul, Izmir, 
Adana, Mersin, Bursa and so on. The civil society organisations flourished and deepened the 
roots in the society. In March 2004 local elections the DEHAP won 20 more municipalities 
and the number increased to 57 towns and cities of Bakur Kurdistan. Those developments 
were positively affecting the society. The municipalities of the HADEP sped up their 
activities towards building Village commons, Town councils, and Provincial councils in 
order to build Regional assemblies then moving towards an umbrella organisation called 
Peoples Democracy Congress as the future Parliament of Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan. 
The Turkish state was closely controlling the pro-Kurdish democratic political activities and 
allowing them to exist because of its negotiations with the European Union regarding its 
membership in one hand and to disarm the PKK without giving any legal status on the other.  
After the AKP came to power in 2002, the PKK declared that they would give them the 
opportunity of negotiating in order to solve the Kurdish question in a non-violent and 
democratic way. When the AKP got into power it promised that it would democratize 
Turkey. When the EU started the negotiations with the AKP government for Turkey’s 
membership, the AKP was playing a very pragmatic policy as if it really wanted to be a 
member of the EU. In fact the AKP was pressing the EU to accept the terms of Turkey not 
enter to EU and accept the terms of the EU. When the AKP government did not fulfil the 
demands the PKK asked for in the period of 1999 to 2004 for democratisation and a peaceful 
settlement of Kurdish question, the PKK restarted its guerrilla activities in Bakur Kurdistan 
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starting from June 2004. In 2005 the AKP tried through the KRG with the mediation of the 
MIT intelligence service to convince the PKK to declare a ceasefire. From 2005 to 2015 
almost six times the PKK had silenced the guns in order to give a chance for democratisation 
and to open a way to solve Kurdish question. During these six times of declaring ceasefires, 
the AKP government had time to modernise its army and police force, renew bases in Bakur 
Kurdistan, and put a strict control on pro-Kurdish democratic political parties and related 
associations. Although pro-Kurdish civil society and political democratic associations 
flourished, the state control dismantled most of them towards the end.  
The PKK’s radical democratic discourse in Bakur Kurdistan speeded up from 2005 and 
reached its zenith passing threshold national elections on 7th June 2015 and then failed totally 
on 24th July 2015 to be destroyed by 4th of November 2016. On 21st of March 2005 at 
Newroz celebration in Amed the KCK declared its formation and, following Öcalan’s 
message, started to work officially for democratic liberation. Pro-Kurdish legal Democratic 
political movement reached its success when it passed the 10% national election threshold on 
7th June 2015 winning 80 MPs putting an end to the AKP’s 13 years one party rule. The AKP 
lost the majority in the parliament since coalition negotiations with CHP party failed. At this 
point it was clear that neither the Turkish state nor the AKP wanted peace or a solution to 
Kurdish question with the democratisation of Turkey. What the AKP and Turkish state 
wanted was to disarm the PKK and nothing more. On 24th of July 2015 the AKP gave order 
to the TAF to start attacking the guerrilla positions inside and outside Bakur Kurdistan.  
Because of the hang parliament another election was hold on 1st of November 2015 where the 
AKP made an undeclared coalition with the deep state and ultra-nationalist the MHP party 
winning the elections with an overwhelming majority? On 4th of November 2016 Selahattin 
Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag the co-chairs of the HDP with ten HDP MPs were detained. 
All elected the DBP municipalities co-chairs were replaced by the government appointees.  
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Although the PKK leader and founder pushed his movement through his lawyers from 
Imrali prison to implement a Radical Democratic Discourse in Bakur Kurdistan, neither the 
Turkish state through the TAF and MIT nor the AKP government intended to allow a 
democratic solution to the Kurdish question. Their only solution was to assimilate all Kurds 
into Turkish ethnicity and nationality and disarm the guerrilla army. Therefore, whatever the 
PKK and pro-Kurdish democratic and legal political movement have achieved through civil 
society organisations, municipalities, teachers’ unions and students’ organisations have been 
destroyed and closed down by the Turkish state security forces and thousands of the activists 
were imprisoned. Without a total reformation or revolutionary democratic changes no 
solution can be achieved to the Kurdish question under the current Turkish political system 
and constitution.  
The PKK distanced from national liberation discourse quite considerably, and 
wholeheartedly was in favour of implementing radical democracy discourse via pro-Kurdish 
municipalities and thousands of pro-Kurdish civil society organisations in Northern 
Kurdistan, as well as in the Metropolises such as Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Mersin, Adana, and 
etc. where millions of Kurds were forced to move and live. As a result of supporting 
democratisation and decentralisation, the PKK oriented pro-Kurdish legal civil society 
organisations and gained an overwhelming majority electoral support in Bakur Kurdistan. 
This support of grass root level and empowering the people in the possible democratic 
environment caused fear at the highest decision making level of Turkish state, and therefore 
this process was stopped by the Turkish state. 
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The Process of PKK’s historical evolution from Formation to Reformation, 
Transformation and Re-Transformation 
 
 
The PKK in its four and half decade history went through three important stages: 
formation, reformation and transformation, and according to the evidence on the ground, 
(most probably it could be retransformed again) the fourth stage might be on the way. 
However, retransformation will hugely be depended on the regional transformation of the 
nation-states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. If somehow the Turkish state negotiates a 
peaceful settlement to the Kurdish issue and gives legal constitutional guarantee and 
acceptance of the Democratic Autonomy, and negotiates with the pro-Kurdish legal political 
parties in Bakur Kurdistan to accept Democratic Confederalism as no threat to Turkish state 
security, then the retransformation process will be stopped. The rejection of this project will 
radically affect the PKK in search for an alternative solution and with most probability will 
be re-transformed towards a national liberation discourse again. This is mostly due to the fact 
that the grass root support of Kurdish population, intellectuals, political activists and the 
leading cadres of the pro-Kurdish legal political parties have unwillingly supported the new 
paradigm of Democratic Nation, Democratic Republic and Democratic Confederalism, for 
the sake of reaching to a peaceful negotiated settlement between the PKK and the Turkish 
state. Democratic Confederalism and Democratic Autonomy projects have already been 
rejected by Turkish state. So regional nation-states especially Turkey and Iran then Syria and 
Iraq would only insist on assimilating and annihilating the Kurdish nation for forever in their 
agendas. This already has caused different voices in the grass roots level to the leading ranks 
of the PKK, for example the PKK executive committee member and the general commander 
of the HPG have stated many times that the PKK is not without an alternative. The alternative 
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that the HPG commander mentions is a national liberation discourse, one towards an 
independent Kurdistan. 
It is important to mention that the reformation process of the PKK was not only related 
and based on internal factors, but the regional and international changes and developments 
had considerable impacts to these changes. The reformation process of the PKK started due 
to internal developments of Turkish state’s President Özal’s removal of the ban on Kurdish 
language and open dialogue about a federal solution to Kurdish question, as well as regional 
developments of the Palestinian and Israeli peace process, and the negotiations with the 
Humanitarian Intervention in Bashur Kurdistan and the establishment of the KRG. The 
International factors were the collapse of Soviet Union led socialist system and the failure of 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the consequent triumph of liberal democracy in the West and 
the removal of nation-states borders between the members of the EU states. The EU becomes 
a model of 21st century’s democratic governance.  
The transformation of the PKK was based on the international factors mainly connected 
to the West. Turkey was fully supported by the NATO members and Israel. Turkey put 
pressure on Syrian Baath regime to deport the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria with 
the strategic support of the US and Israel and the EU countries. When Öcalan arrived in 
Greece he was not allowed to enter and he redirected to Russia and then to Rome, Italy. All 
EU member states agreed with the US not to accept the PKK leader and founder as a political 
refugee. At the end by direct intervention of the US the PKK leader was handed over to the 
Turkish authorities. Öcalan did have opportunity to go to the Mountains of Kurdistan. He 
chose a way to solve the Kurdish question peacefully and democratically with the help of 
European Western countries.  
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For the first time on 16th of February according to Öcalan’s prison writings and his 
conversations at the meeting with the HDP MPs the first official greeted him in Imrali prison 
was a representative of the CPT (Committee for Protection of Torture) from the EU. Öcalan 
explained that his handover was an international conspiracy against the will of Kurdistan 
National liberation led by the PKK and the people of Kurdistan; therefore, he intended to 
dismantle that conspiracy and transforming the PKK and formulating a new paradigm in 
order to keep the continuity of the struggle in the best possible way playing against the two 
main powers acting in the Middle East, the US and Russia. The formulation of the new 
paradigm of Democratic Liberation cost the movement a very heavy price, almost half of the 
leadership council of the PKK separated from the movement with around two thousand active 
guerrilla forces. When the PKK changed its name and its national liberation strategy, while 
declared no more fighting for an independent Kurdish nation-state but democratising Turkish 
states, an overwhelming majority of its supporter did not believe it could happen, because 
they had heard from their elders and also they lived and witnessed the civil and security 
apparatus of the Turkish state. 
The events started in 2010 in North Africa countries in Tunis, Libya, Egypt and Yemen 
had their influence in Syria too. When the wind of change blew from North Africa to the 
Middle East and reached Syria, Rojava Kurdistan’s political actors  acted fast to build 
political institutions and armed forces and power on the basis of their grass root in Rojava 
Kurdistan.   Regime changes took place in those countries –Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen 
except than Syria. The government and the state of Syria resisted against the uprisings, which 
was mostly done by Sunni Arab population supported by the AKP government. The AKP at 
the early 2011 provided the Muslim Brotherhoods Movement logistic support transforming 
the Syrian people’s uprising into an armed clash. Iran and Russia supported Syrian regime 
economically and politically, while the US and EU with Turkey supported the opposition and 
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financed them and allowing them to build their bases in Turkey. When the Syrian Regime 
was nearly to be toppled it invited Russia to help militarily. Syrian uprising in the Centre of 
the Middle East became a quagmire, which gave birth to too many jihadists belonging to Al-
Qaida and dependent armed groups supported by effectively by the NATO member Turkey. 
Turkey became the main transport route of all jihadist factions around the world and from 
there easily moved into Syria joined to Al-Qaida’s Syria branch Al-Nusra, or ISIS. All 
Jihadists declared Kurdish people, Assyrians and Armenians as non-believers who must be 
wiped off from the earth. Russia published satellite pictures of trucks that belonged to ISIS 
and Al-Nusra entering Turkey and Turkish officials were buying oil from them. Turkish 
journalist the daily Cumhuriyet production director Can Dündar for revealing those pictures 
how Turkish state was giving logistic help to ISIS and Al-Nusra by trucks accused as national 
traitor and left Turkey. So the Turkish state and the AKP government tried hard to show that 
it was in dialogue with the PKK, without changing constitution and officially recognising and 
defining Kurdish question, while on the other hand it was supporting all the jihadists and 
Muslim Brotherhood groups in Syria to overthrow the regime and stop any legal and 
constitutional guarantees to the Kurds in Rojava Kurdistan. 
In that critical moment the PKK’s sister party the PYD and the KRG supported factions 
under the umbrella of the ENKS acted fast promoting their underground national-democratic 
activities and established people’s assemblies in all Rojava with the purpose to organise its 
self-defence force to protect the organisations against the attacks and threats of the Syrian 
regime as well as Al-Qaida related Jihadist groups. Rojava Kurdistan became the laboratory 
testimony for Öcalan’s new paradigm for the implementation of democratic autonomy and 
the module of the KRG in Bashur. The PKK and the KRG to some degree came closer to 
each other and they established a committee of ten people, five from the KRG supported and 
five from the PKK supported politicians from Rojava Kurdistan as the Supreme Kurdish 
  
	256	
Committee. As soon as the Kurdish Supreme Committee declared in Hewler, among the 
KRG President Mesut Barzani, the Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Hewler 
and met the KRG President and the ENKS group. This visit by the Turkish foreign minister 
dismantled the Supreme Kurdish Committee, discontinuing its ability to function in Rojava 
Kurdistan. 
When Öcalan entered Kobani city in Rojava Kurdistan between 1979 and 1998, within 
20 years all the PKK leadership carried comprehensive work among communities in Rojava 
Kurdistan as a result almost ten thousand young men and women participated in the PKK’s 
guerrilla war against the Turkish state in Bakur and around five thousands of them lost their 
life. Although the KDP-Iraq supported traditional Kurdish political parties’ history goes back 
to 1950s, over time those parties divided into tens of different factions and lost their political 
and national impacts. But the PYD and its other associations were using the same ideology 
and philosophy of Öcalan in Rojava Kurdistan that the PKK was using in Bakur Kurdistan. In 
Bakur, the Turkish state was in control while in Rojava Kurdistan the Syrian state was too 
weak. The PYD, with considerable aid from the PKK counted on a considerable grass root to 
establish a democratic autonomous Kurdistan. The time changed not only those guerrillas 
from Rojava returned to Rojava but also this time young men and women from Bakur 
participated in Rojava Kurdistan’s self-defence, and practised an autonomous Rojava 
Kurdistan in the forms of Cantonal system. 
As mentioned above, the PKK supported a democratic political solution in Bakur 
Kurdistan and tried to push the state and government to grant democratic and constitutional 
guarantees. The ninth ceasefire was declared on 23rd March 2013 and continued for two and 
half years in order to reach a peaceful solution in Bakur and Turkey, but also to secure legal 
and political rights for the Kurds in Bakur and save ethnic and cultural entities in Rojava and 
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progression of Cantonal system. During two and half years the intention of the AKP 
government was to win the local, presidential and parliamentary elections and use the 
opportunity of the ceasefire stop fighting in Bakur and transferring the fight to Rojava 
Kurdistan and in the north Syria against the will of Rojava people through proxies of jihadist 
groups.  
The Transformation of the PKK in implementing Democratic Liberation/Radical 
Democracy experiment in Bakur Kurdistan, for the time being, has failed. The AKP has, 
since 1st November 2015, entered an anti-democratic, ultra-nationalist and anti-Kurdish 
coalition and has removed almost all pro-Kurdish democratic legal political gains in Bakur 
Kurdistan. Even if the Turkish state and the AKP government for the time being started a 
peace process with the PKK at the end this is doomed to fail because the AKP and the 
Turkish state has lost its legitimate credibility is because the state and government in Turkey 
is not functioning through the rule of law but only by executive orders. A failed process in 
Bakur and Turkey cannot be repeated as an example. This process of democratic autonomy 
and radical democratic process is totally dead in Bakur Kurdistan and the transformation of 
national liberation to democratic liberation is also dead. 
The process of formation of the PKK was successful in organising a party, mobilising a 
popular front and establishing a guerrilla army. The process of reformation was also 
successful by becoming an interlocutor to enter the dialogue to find a peaceful settlement for 
the Kurdish question and declaring that a federal solution could possibly negotiate. The 
transformation process was problematic, because the leader of the PKK was a prisoner under 
the control of Turkish state. During the transformation process, the PKK focused on 
indirectly supporting pro-Kurdish democratic political activities and supporting their 
participation in local elections, general national elections in Turkey. The transformation 
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process so far has failed and has not gained any significant changes in political spheres in 
Bakur Kurdistan. The Rojava experiment is the only possible exception to this, with the 
implementation of a radical democracy. Even though the process became successful in 
Rojava Kurdistan; it is not going to be similar to the draft of Democratic Autonomous 
Kurdistan demanded in Bakur Kurdistan by the DTK but it is preparing for a federal solution. 
The Turkish state and the AKP government with ultra-nationalist coalition not only destroyed 
legitimate democratic political gains, but also the centre of two cities and ten towns of Bakur 
Kurdistan, affecting the lives of 1.5 million Kurds. The recent domestic, regional and 
international developments have and will have effective impacts on the PKK to move from 
transformation to retransformation.  
 
 
Is it possible for the effects and impacts of Nationalism in Kurdistan to be 
wiped away in a short time, while being surrounded by nationalist nation-
statesfrom four sides?	
 
The answer is simply not according to the evidences on the ground that the impacts of 
nationalism are even stronger than before. At its emergence the PKK was blaming all the 
existent Kurdish political parties and organisations as not being patriot nationalists enough to 
defend Kurdistan national liberation aiming an independent united and democratic Kurdistan 
state. Even it went further blaming them as collaborationists and reformists for defending an 
autonomous Kurdistan inside the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Therefore the PKK 
built its ideological, political and philosophical approach on the theory of nation, national 
identity, national liberation and nationalism. These concepts as in the example of all other 
nations are embedded deeply in the culture, language, history and geography of Kurdistan. 
PKK emerged on the base of these concepts and ideas to liberate Kurdistan and the people 
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living in it. Therefore nationalism in the case of Kurdistan played as an ideology for freedom 
and independence and aiming national right to self-determination. The young energetic 
Ocalan from 1973 to 1983 in Turkey, then in Bakur Kurdistan and finally in Syria and 
Lebanon witnessed national and political developments as a result of this Ocalan made an 
agreement with the KDP-Iraq and they declared their alliance in July 1983. While the PKK 
blaming the KDP-Iraq as a primitive nationalist and reformist but because of close distance 
of Bakur and Bashur Kurdistan and the KDP-Iraq’s presence all along those borders the PKK 
made an alliance. That alliance was welcomed by ordinary people of Kurdistan but it did not 
last longer and failed to an end in 1987.  
Even the most developed capitalist liberal economies in the age globalization in the 
European Union the impact of nationalism is still evident, despite of customs union, single 
currency and removal of national borders’ check. For Example in Scotland, Northern Ireland 
in the UK, and Catalonia, the Bask region in Spain, Northern Italy and Southern Italy etc. 
national questions still exist in the centre of Europe. The Brexit case is one of the most 
important cases related to the question nations and nationalism. If the EU with its all 
institutions was functioning well, why the United Kingdom asked for a referendum for the 
purpose of leaving or staying in the EU? Those parties and individuals who were working for 
leaving were nationalists who were against the supremacy of the EU institutions over the UK 
institutions ones. Therefore the question of nation, national identity and nationalism will 
continue until freedom, justice and equality overcome and practised worldwide.  
The Soviet Union for seventy years claimed that the question of nations, national 
identity and nationalism were solved, however when the socialist system collapsed all the 
national questions surfaced and fifteen new states came into existence. The Soviet Union 
became a federation of federal ethnic, cultural and religious entities. The Middle East region 
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is a very complex region of ethnic and religious conflicts. At the heart of the Middle East is 
the Kurdish question with more than fifty million populations affecting four nation-states of 
Turks, Persian and Arabs. Kurdish nationalism will be developed and evolved despite the 
treatment from Turkish, Persian and Arab ethnic-nationalist states. 
Kurdistan as geo-strategic and geo-political important place constitutes a bridge 
located at the centre of the Middle East, divided into four parts between Turkey, Iran, Iraq 
and Syria. The communities in Kurdistan find themselves under cultural, social, economic, 
political and national oppression. In Iraq to some degree the national, cultural, political, 
economic and social rights of ethnic, cultural and religious entities have been guaranteed in 
the new constitution, in Syria and Iran is still to be seen, but in Turkey definitely these rights 
are not guaranteed.    
Despite the PKK has lowered its threshold from National Liberation to Democratic 
Liberation and has shown its good will in this regard, the region’s nation-states did not accept 
its good will. Whatever is related to the Kurdish question is interpreted in Turkey as a threat 
to its national integrity and unity. The Turkish state has created a Kurd phobia and through 
that phobia has indoctrinated most of Turkish society against any national, social, cultural 
and political rights to the Kurds. Until this phobia exists nationalism will have its deep effects 
on the Kurdish nation, for this reason and the Kurdish question is the question of a nation and 
it needs to be solved internationally and according to national right to self-determination.   
All the discourse and concepts developed during the transformation of the PKK, such 
as Democratic Republic, Democratic Nation, Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan and 
Democratic Confederal Kurdistan, has already been rejected by the nation states of the region 
mainly by Turkey. Turkey has not only rejected it, but has destroyed all related pro-Kurdish 
civil and political organisations. The Turkish state not only rejected democratic autonomy 
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and democratic confederalism in Turkey, but also it is preventing other regional states such as 
Iran, Iraq and Syria to negotiate such an agreement with the Kurdistan National Liberation 
Movement. So far this project has not produced any positive outcomes in Bakur Kurdistan 
and Turkey. The PKK needs to re-transform its paradigm in Bakur Kurdistan. For Rojava it 
can be said that democratic autonomy has been upgraded to Democratic Federation of 
Northern Syria, which accommodates Rojava Cantons as territorial entities inside the 
federation. Therefore, the PKK in the process of retransformation needs to clearly define 
National Self-Determination and make clear-cut definitions of autonomy, federalism, 
confederalism and independence.  
Even if the PKK at this stage does not aim to establish a state of Kurdistan with its 
current paradigm, eventually the practice of the regional states’ actions against the will of 
peoples of Kurdistan necessarily push the PKK to choose the option of a state of Kurdistan. 
Considering all the process of formation, reformation and transformation the PKK has gone 
through, a state apparatus needed to organise and govern and this state can be called ‘A 
Democratic State or a Democratic Confederal State of Kurdistan’. 
‘The concept of democratic autonomy refers to forms of non-sovereign self-
government within the territorial framework of a sovereign state. The autonomous rule may 
or may not be territorial, but it always eschews modern political sovereignty and its 
characteristic institutional form for strategic or political-moral considerations. In the context 
of Kurdistan, too the concept of democratic autonomy, elaborated in writings of Abdullah 
Öcalan, essentially signifies a quest for self-government within the legal-political framework 
of sovereign states ruling parts of a divided territory. The institutional structure and socio-
economic processes and practices of the autonomous government, it is contended, are 
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grounded in a democratic culture characterized by communal participation in the process of 
policy and decision-making, gender equality and care for community and environment’  
(Abbas Vali: 
https://www.academia.edu/35165330/The_Crisis_of_Sovereignty_and_the_Kurdish_Quest_f
or_Democratic_Autonomy_in_Syria_A_Theoretical_Outline_1) 
The sovereign state of the Turkish republic bases its existence on the denial of all 
other ethnic, cultural and national entities. It has committed genocides against Armenians, 
Assyrians and Kurds in the past and today it is committing cultural and physical genocide 
against what is the last impasse against its ethnic nationalist ideology, the Kurdistan National 
Liberation Movement. Although the PKK has been reformed and transformed on the base of 
good will and coexistence of different national, ethnic, cultural and religious pluralism with 
the intent of democratizing Turkish political system, the realities on the ground have shown 
that Turkish political system continues its ethnic nationalist ideology and does not accept any 
national and political rights.  
If Syria does not constitutionally accepts the Democratic Federation of Northern 
Syria, whose funding pillars are the Rojava Cantons, then the PKK would definitely and 
inevitably have to search for a new paradigm of Re-transformation for A Democratic 
Confederal State of Kurdistan. 
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General Conclusion 
This study concludes that the PKK, with all its organisational and political 
shortcomings during its formation, reformation and transformation processes was able to 
resist the Turkish states assimilationist denial policies and begin a dialogue and negotiations 
with the Turkish state. The Turkish state continues to deny and reject the existence of 
Kurdistan, and the Kurdish issue within the borders of Turkey. It was the PKK led struggle 
that put pressure on the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan within the Turkish 
Parliament to acknowledge the existence of the Kurdish question within Turkey, as well as its 
east and south-eastern regions known as Kurdistan at the establishment of the Turkish 
republic.  
National liberation discourse was one the most important topics of the political 
debates of 1970s in Turkey and Bakur Kurdistan, which attracted those young, energetic, 
educated Kurdish students at the universities of Ankara and Istanbul, evaluate and analyse the 
political and national situation of the Kurds. Previous to the emergence of the radical 
Kurdistan revolutionist group, most of the Kurdish nationalist organisations were also 
debating National Liberation discourse with Turkish leftist organisations. However, they 
failed to implement the plans and practicalities necessary. Debates continued and 
concentrated on a National liberation Movement for Kurdistan, and in particular, in Bakur 
Kurdistan the need became a practical demand. The questions arose among those young, 
energetic, talented and radical university students who sacrifice all of their private and 
personal belongings for the betterment of all. The PKK was established by those students, 
and from the debates of that time, became a national-political-military movement mobilizing 
millions to stand and defend their national, political and cultural rights in Bakur Kurdistan, 
which later came to influence the other three parts of Kurdistan too.  
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The PKK encountered a very harsh response from its birth by the Turkish state as well 
as Turkish left, Turkish ultra-nationalists, Turkish Islamists, Kurdish nationalist organisations 
and Kurdish tribal leaders. The reasons were too many, the most obvious ones were as 
follows: the PKK was arguing its ideological and theoretical paradigm that Kurdistan is a 
country and that the people of Kurdistan are a nation. Kurdistan and the Kurdish nation have 
been divided into four parts between four colonialist states. While these four states are not 
allowing any legal and constitutional rights, and they do not recognise the Kurds and 
Kurdistan as a nation and as a country the only way left is to organise Kurdistan national 
liberation movement for national right to self-determination. This strategic aim will only be 
possible to organise a party, a popular front and a guerrilla army through the Prolonged 
Popular War strategy to separate Kurdistan from colonialists. For this purpose those who 
admit to Kurdistan National Liberation should not think any private and personal life, only 
become professional full-time revolutionary militants. This was a bold line that separated the 
PKK from all other Turkish and Kurdish leftist and nationalist organisations and parties at its 
formation.  
The PKK in its interpretation of the world, the region and the history of Kurdistan 
boldly pressed on the centrality of the Kurdish question in the equation of the power balance 
and peaceful coexistence in the Middle East. Iran with a consistent historical long tradition of 
the statehood, Turkey with the same experience of the Seljuk’s, Ottomans and the new 
republic of Turkey both have used extensive use of force against the will of Kurdish peoples’ 
statehood. New states of Iraq and Syria, since their independence from the mandate regimes, 
followed exactly what the Turkish and Iran states were implementing. The PKK in its 
funding Manifesto boldly pressed on the importance and demand for a state of independent, 
united and democratic Kurdistan. To achieve that demand was a very hard and costly struggle 
in its organisation. 
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As it emerged in the highly controversial politically fragile moment in International, 
regional and domestic situations, the PKK defined itself as a part of national liberation 
movements of the anti-colonialism, which would be supported by international labour 
movements in the developed countries and the Socialist System led by Soviet Union in the 
world. The factors and conditions that the PKK (during its transformation period) had based 
its new paradigm for a Kurdistan revolution on were suddenly faced with dramatic changes: 
Soviet Union and the world socialist system collapsed, Marxist-Leninist doctrine failed to 
secure socialism, and the Western Liberal democracies became the winners. In the region of 
the Middle East, Israel and the Palestinians entered into negotiating the peace, and Bashur 
Kurdistan became a protected place by the UN and the US, where a new Kurdish entity of the 
KRG was born. The KRG’s two main leaders of the PUK and KDP were invited to 
presidential palace of Turkey. President of Turkey Turgut Özal talked about negotiating even 
a federal solution to Kurdish question, and most importantly as if in Bakur Kurdistan and 
Turkey a little window of legal-democratic-political activities occurred. These domestic, 
regional and international changes put impacts on the PKK to make reformations in its 
ideological, political and national programme. 
These international, regional and domestic changes had impacts on the PKK to adapt 
its ideological and political demands with the spirit of the time. Indirectly with the mediation 
of late Jalal Talabani, the PKK began negotiating peace with the Turkish state and announced 
its first ceasefire exactly twenty years after the existence of those indirect negotiations cost 
the life of Turgut Özal. The second and third ceasefires resulted in the imprisonment of 
Abdullah Öcalan. In prison, Öcalan concentrated on radical democratic politics, taking 
examples of the UK, Switzerland, Spain and the EU, even the US. Finally the paradigm 
change transformation shifted towards Murray Bookchin’s radical democracy or 
Municipalism to organise society without questioning national borders of the state in Turkey. 
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According to Öcalan’s lawyers as mentioned in the earlier chapters, he had long debates with 
the security and intelligent apparatus of Turkish state on the case of transforming the PKK, 
and came to conclude that there could be a general amnesty and some cultural and political 
rights could be given. So, the PKK transformed all the fundamental principles it stood for. 
From 1999 to 2009 the PKK announced four more ceasefires in order to give an opportunity 
for a peaceful democratic solution. The Turkish state not only rejected a democratic solution, 
but also detained more than ten thousand legal political activists and imprisoned them.  
From 2009 to 2015 a further three ceasefires were announced, and while the Turkish 
state showed sincerity in these peace dialogues , the purpose of the state and the AKP 
government was to win the March 2014 local, August 2014 presidential and June 2015 
parliamentary elections. The PKK and the AKP government engaged a dialogue via 
mediation of the HDP, which continued from January 2013 to July 2015. Within two and half 
years the PKK brought down Kurdistan National Liberation to the minimum, demanding 
democratic changes, which they were announced on 28th February 2015 in the Dolmabahçe 
Castle.  Those demands were listed as ten titles: 
1- Definition of democratic and content. 
2- Definition of national and local dimensions of democratic resolution. 
3- Legal and democratic safeguards for free citizenship. 
4- Headings for relationship between democratic politics and the state and the society and 
for its institutionalization.  
5- The social-economic dimensions of the process of resolution. 
6- Addressing the relationship between democracy and security in the process of resolution 
in a manner that will protect public order and freedoms. 
7- Safeguards for women and solutions for their legal, cultural and ecological problems. 
8- The development of a pluralist democratic understanding recognising the concept of 
identity and its definition. 
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9- The democratic definition of a democratic republic, joint homeland and people, and the 
introduction of legal and constitutional safeguards within a pluralist, democratic system. 
10-  A new constitution that aims to embed all these democratic transformations (Basaran 
2017: pp.135). 
Three HDP MP representatives (Sirri Surreya Onder, Idris Baluken and Pervin 
Buldan)and three AKP government MPs officials (Yalçin Akdogan, Mahir Onal and Efkan 
Ala), with the presence of the state official Mehmet Dervisoglu who attended all talks 
between Öcalan and the HDP meetings in Imrali prison, announced these ten points as the 
topics to be negotiated with the monitoring committee in Imrali, whereby the PKK would 
then have an extraordinary congress to declare the end of the armed struggle in a live TV 
programme on 28th February. As soon as the live declaration ended, the AKP government 
spokesman Bulent Arinc declared that his government was committed to sending a 
monitoring committee to Imrali to complete the solution/peace process. The problem was the 
Turkish state, and the AKP government were not letting either an international or national 
monitoring committee to take part, because they did not want to have international 
involvement and international mediation. 
 The Turkish state and the AKP government not only declined an international 
monitoring committee to observe the progress, but also did not permit even an internal 
monitoring committee too. After the declaration of the ten points, Turkish president Recep 
Tayip Erdogan immediately rejected these and declared that he was waiting for that moment 
for long time ago. The AKP government, under leadership of Prime Minister Ahmet 
Davutoglu, was keen to continue the process of dialogue and to negotiate it. But on 21st of 
March 2015, when Erdogan returned from Ukraine, he declared that there was no Kurdish 
question and that he was against such a deal to negotiate with terrorists in Turkey. Erdogan 
took a firm stand against the HDP and the PKK during the national parliamentary election 
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campaign of 7th June 2015. The results of elections were that the AKP lost overall majority 
and was not able to get vote of confidence. The HDP won Eighty MPs. And so, the so-called 
peace process collapsed. The AKP announced on the 1stNovember a call for renewing the 
elections date. The AKP entered to an anti-Kurdish coalition of ultra-nationalists, the deep 
state and Islamists. 
Since eighteen years of officially declaring a democratic liberation process, the 
Turkish state has shown that it would not be able to enter a democratic process, because 
within a democratic environment, democratic dynamics are the winners. Therefore the 
autocratic nation-states could only be fuelled by using force against democratic dynamics. 
Even if the PKK and the pro-Kurdish democratic-legal-political movement accepted all of the 
demands of the state once again, the state will not negotiate any political settlements, similar 
to Northern Ireland or similar to the one in Scotland. The above mentioned Ten Points were 
simply showing that the PKK and pro-Kurdish legal political parties and civil organisations 
in Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey were ready to compromise on minimum demands for the sake 
of peace, democratisation and solving Kurdish question. Even in the Ten Points nothing was 
mentioned about the issue of Kurds and Kurdistan other than the democratisation of Turkey, 
though the Turkish state and the AKP government rejected firmly.  
While the Kurdish question has been transformed beyond a local question of Turkey’s 
Democratisation, it is a question of a nation’s universal national right to self-determination 
and it has been an international question related to four nation-states of the Middle East. Any 
democratic peaceful solutions to the question of the Kurds and Kurdistan, which has become 
an international question, could be negotiated internationally with the mediation of the UN, 
EU and related global organisations. It is not a local question of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria 
any more, it has transcended far beyond the borders of the Middle East. But also in terms of 
actors the PKK has to accommodate all pro-Kurdish political parties and pro-Kurdish legal 
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and cultural organisations in any future peace talks and negotiation. As this study has argued 
throughout, the Kurdish question is the mother of all national, ethnic, political and cultural 
questions of the Middle East. The solution of the Kurdish national question will open the gate 
of democratisation of the Middle East.  
The national, political, cultural and social diversity and ill treatment of the Kurds at a 
status of less than slaves has caused the emergence of uprisings, rebellions and insurgencies 
in Kurdistan. As it has been shown in Chapter three, from 1806 up to 1970s all of the Kurdish 
uprisings had failed. These failures and the four states’ national, political, economic, cultural 
and social colonisation policies caused the emergence of the last 29th radical-revolutionary 
rebellion led by the PKK. If Kurdish nationalist parties prior to the PKK had been able to 
secure the national and political rights of communities of Kurdistan, the PKK would have not 
emerged.  A failed Kurdish primordial nationalism in 19th and at three quarters of 20th century 
caused the radical-revolutionary emergence of the PKK. Ideationally and virtually the PKK 
became the most secular, modern, patriot and revolutionary party in comparison to all prior 
Kurdish nationalist parties. Gradually it became the dominant party ideologically and 
politically in 1990s. Following the years of 1990s, it became a hegemonic party in Bakur and 
Rojava Kurdistan, and in it began in Rojhilat challenging the KDP-Iran and the Komala 
organisations too. The success of the PKK was hidden in its national, political and 
ideological defence of Kurdistan national liberation, strategic aim towards an independent 
Kurdistan state, and in its organisational practice that showed the masses what it was saying 
in theory was also being implemented it practice. Hence it was able to mobilise the masses in 
home and in the Diaspora. 
The KDP’s tradition led by the Barzani family in the last half of the 20th century, and 
still in the first and second decades of 21st century, has prevented any radical democratic 
changes in all parts of Kurdistan. In Bashur from 1962 to 66, primordial-nationalist tribalism 
  
	270	
prevented any radical-democratic initiative to occur to lead the rebellion. It also prevented the 
radical-revolutionary fraction of the Rojhilat KDP too. In Bakur and Rojava radical-
revolutionary initiatives had outcomes similar to Bashur and Rojhilat, but they were 
prevented by the KDP-Iraq in the first instance, which had been the hegemonic political 
power in Kurdistan from Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad until the failure of 1975.  
The PKK shattered that taboo of the KDPs tradition, starting in Bakur and Rojava, 
then in Rojhilat, and then to some extent in Bashur, too. As a modernist movement taking 
some ethno-symbolic elements of nationalism in the creation of a party, popular front, 
guerrilla army, and mobilizing the people of Kurdistan (both at the home and within the 
diasporas establishment of cultural and diplomatic centres in most of European countries), it 
broke the taboo of the four colonialist states denial policies. That national, political and 
international performance of the PKK at the formation stage made the organisation the 
dominant and hegemonic power by the end of 1990. As it was becoming the most hegemonic 
actor of defending the KNLM, it could have had opened the gate of democratic politics 
between Kurdish political parties in the Diasporas. Although the other Kurdish political 
parties were blaming the PKK for not being democratic, as a national liberation movement 
the PKK had to accommodate them. 
With the national and international political changes, the PKK also evolved to another 
stage of the reformation. At this stage, as explored in Chapter five, as a national and political 
actor with a considerable popular support and guerrilla army, it entered into a strategic and 
tactical engagement to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Turkish state. It reformed its 
ideological and political manifesto. The issue, as always, was that the Turkish state did not 
make any strategic changes in its official ethnic-Turkish state policies. For democratization of 
Turkey and the solution of the Kurdish question, the PKK leader did not move to the 
mountains of Kurdistan but to Europe. This was because there was a sense that Europe was to 
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become the centre of liberal democracy, where it would help the process of democratization 
to uncover a just solution to the Kurdish question. What happened was that the PKK leader 
was not welcomed in Europe and was handed over to the Turkish state instead. It was the 
major mistake that the PKK organisation, and its leader, committed. In the PKK’s history the 
first major mistake was after the detention of Sahin Dönmez in Elazig in May 1979; the PKK 
did not protect Mazlum Dogan, Hayri Durmus, Ferhat Kurtay, and Akif Yilmaz alongside 
hundreds of future leaders of Kurdistan national liberation. The second major mistake was 
not moving to the mountains of Kurdistan, or when Ocalan was in Italy he should have stayed 
in Italy.  
Analysing the paradigm change and transformation, the PKK focused on non-violent 
civil disobedience movements around the world during its five years ceasefires – how could 
they put pressure on Turkish state to accommodate pro-Kurdish democratic opposition and 
reach a peaceful settlement in the Kurdish question? For the sake of a peaceful settlement, 
and removing the PKK from the list of terrorist organisations, it changed its name its 
organisational structure and its national liberation strategy. But all these changes did not have 
any positive response neither from European Union nor from the Turkish state. The new 
names of the organisation, KADEK and then Kongra Gel, were also put in the proscribed 
terrorist organisations list. In the end it become obvious that there was no need for that much 
comprehensive change as the PKK had implemented; this was the third major mistake of the 
organisation of the PKK. A prisoner is never free; a leader such as Öcalan during his 
meetings with his lawyers sent messages to the PKK for changes, but the organisation should 
have had the experience to not implement the demands or the commands of its imprisoned 
leader in as much as he asked for, but gradually. The PKK transformed its ideology, its 
strategic and tactical manifesto and even changed its name too. Although the transformation 
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safeguarded the organisation from a failure similar to the one in 1975 in Bashur, it did not 
have to implement all those changes that were not necessary.  
This transformation process was in parallel with the AKP governance and acceptance 
of Turkey’s EU membership candidacy. The pro-Kurdish political movement flourished in 
Bakur Kurdistan and Turkey, they won hundreds of Municipalities and entered the parliament 
in Turkey. The PKK, one after another, declared ceasefires and engaged in dialogue with the 
Turkish state by mediation of an international organisation for the solution of the Kurdish 
question by non-violent means. What the PKK and the pro-Kurdish political-democratic 
movement understood from the dialogue with the Turkish state was a similar solution to 
Scotland and the UK, or a Cantonal system of Switzerland. This understanding was not 
matched with the one in mind of the Turkish state. That process was called the Oslo process, 
which failed when the AKP won overall majority in The 11th June 2011 general 
parliamentary elections.  
Chapter seven explored how such a transformation and paradigm change was a 
process of organising a civil society and organising a peaceful democratic social movement 
based on municipal councillors to make a different governing from the one run by the state. 
However, as soon as the state became aware of that, the process became crippled and 
thousands of elected and legal political activists were imprisoned. While the democratic 
political pro-Kurdish movement crippled in the urban areas of Bakur Kurdistan, the PKK was 
in an intensive war with the TAF in the rural areas up to the end of 2012.  
From 3rd January 2013 to 24th of July 2015 the AKP government initiated the process 
called the solution, or peace process. After two years of engagement and meetings by 
mediation of the HDP between the AKP government and the PKK, both parties had finally 
produced ten point negotiating titles. The AKP government and the state understood how to 
win the general parliamentary election and fully decommission the PKK, while the PKK and 
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the HDP were dreaming about how to democratize Turkey through that dialogue and 
negotiations. As soon as the election campaign of 7th June 2015 was over, and the AKP lost 
overwhelming majority, the solution/peace process failed and the most intensive war between 
the PKK and all Turkish security and Armed forces began and continues up to now.  
Once again, almost all of the pro-Kurdish political party members of the HDP and 
DBP, activists, MPs, co-chairs, and elected co-mayors and councillors have been imprisoned. 
The process of achieving a civil society and democratic autonomous Kurdistan totally failed. 
The Turkish state and the AKP government in an ultra-nationalist coalition have shown that it 
has started a process similar to the Armenian Genocide in 1915.  
These events, as explored in Chapter 8, have resulted in a costly human, material and 
environmental loss, especially after the failure of this final solution/peace process. From 1984 
to 1999 the PKK fought for an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan, which was a 
national liberation strategy. The Turkish state officially declared that they could negotiate 
federalism. When the PKK reformed the national liberation to federalism, the state began 
discussions with Öcalan regarding autonomy. When the PKK and Öcalan talked about 
autonomy, the Turkish state suggested the democratisation of Turkey. Nowadays, the PKK 
begins discussions about the democratisation of Turkey, and the Turkish state and the AKP 
government enters an ultra-nationalist coalition aimed the annihilation of the PKK and at 
destroying the pro-Kurdish legal democratic political movement.  
Finally the process of implementing Democratic liberation in order to establish 
Democratic Autonomy in Bakur Kurdistan and the process of democratic republic, 
democratic nation and Democratic Confederalism has failed. If the process of Democratic 
Federation of Northern Syria becomes successful, and the YPG and YPJ under the banner of 
Democratic Syrian Forces and their alliance continues with the US led international anti-ISIS 
coalition, then a huge pressure would be on Turkey. Turkey would only come to terms of 
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negotiating peace with the Kurdistan National Liberation/Freedom Movement if it gained 
international recognition. The PKK has to understand that the principles and the reasons that 
caused its emergence are still there and the Turkish state mentality has not changed. The only 
ways left is reformulating its paradigm towards the National Right to Self-Determination and 
a Kurdistan centred paradigm. During its emergence the PKK thought that eventually the 
Soviet Union led Socialist camp would support the Kurdistan National Liberation. It did not 
happen and it failed as a system, but today, the US led international coalition is supporting 
Bashur and Rojava Kurdistan. The paradigm change and transformation of the PKK will 
continue in the form of retransformation, and presumably the US led coalition will support 
Bashur and Rojava Kurdistan and eventually Rojhilat and Bakur Kurdistan too. Although the 
transformation of the PKK was politically and nationally criticised firmly, nevertheless the 
PKK and all its associations overcame the odds and kept their organisational strength and 
brought Kurdish question to the table of the super powers of the world. As time changes, the 
transformation process will evolve to retransformation, all the while, also strengthening its 
relations with the US, the UK and EU, due to the international character of the Kurdish 
Question, and its significance within the Middle East. 
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